The letter at issue in Kubert also included a paragraph demanding “satisfactory proof” if the recipient contended that the account was in error, which was allegedly misleading because it implied that the debtor must provide proof in order to dispute the claim.15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits a debt collector from “pretend[ing] that [a settlement offer] is final if it is not, in the hope that the debtor will think it is final.” As the Seventh Circuit explained in Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769, 775-76 (7th Cir. 2007), the rule is difficult to implement because “the settlement process would disintegrate if the debt collector had to disclose the consequences of the consumer’s rejecting his initial offer.”
The article notes in a photo caption that debt collectors use pseudonyms, apparently because they fear retribution from consumers from whom they are attempting to collect debts. But doesn't that violate 15 U.S.C. section 1692e, which prohibits "false, deceptive, or misleading representation[s] or means in connection with the collection of any debt"? The use of pseudonyms need not always be innocent; a debt collector who has violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act can use a pseudonym to conceal his or her identity to escape liability.
The FDCPA bars the use of any false, deceptive, or misleading representation in connection with the collection of any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Cruz filed suit and the district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff.
• Collectors may not use false, deceptive, or misleading representations. (15 U.S.C. § 1692e))If a debt collector does violate the FDCPA they can be liable for up to $1,000 in damages plus any attorney’s fees. There may also be local debt collection laws in your state that can provide additional relief.You can learn more about the FDCPA and how it is applied by going to the Federal Trade Commission's website.
The court concluded that the Fourth Circuit would likely follow suit and similarly hold that a foreclosure practice constitutes debt collection under the FDCPA.Next, the court's analysis shifted to whether the plaintiff alleged a violation of a specific FDCPA provision concerning the plaintiff's debt. The plaintiff alleged that PennyMac Holdings' Notice of Intent to Foreclose represented a "threat" by a debt purchaser to foreclose on her mortgage in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692e(5) and that PennyMac Holdings engaged in collection activity without a license. The court noted that, based on these allegations, PennyMac Holdings, the secured party on the note, could be liable for unfair or unconscionable means to collect the debt.
Judge Hollander concluded that the Fourth Circuit would likely follow suit and similarly hold that a foreclosure practice constitutes debt collection under the FDCPA. Next, the court's analysis shifted to whether the plaintiff alleged a violation of a specific FDCPA provision concerning the plaintiff's debt. The plaintiff alleged that PennyMac Holdings' Notice of Intent to Foreclose represented a "threat" by a debt purchaser to foreclose on her mortgage in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1692e(5) and that PennyMac Holdings engaged in collection activity without a license. The court noted that, based on these allegations, PennyMac Holdings may have used unfair or unconscionable means to collect the debt.
Earlier this summer, in a per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit confirmed that a false or misleading statement under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e must be material in order to violate the FDCPA. See Lembach and Lembech v. Bierman, et al., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 12094 (4th Cir. 2013).
The complaint included claims that the debt collector defendants violated the FDCPA by obtaining default judgments in the New York City civil court through the use of affidavits falsely claiming that the debtors had been served when they had not, and that the affiant had personal knowledge of the relevant facts relating to the claims when the affiant did not. More specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the debt collectors violated 15 U.S.C. Section 1692f which prohibits a debt collector from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt” and 15 U.S.C. Section 1692e(8) which prohibits “[c]ommunicating… to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false.” In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss the FDCPA claims, the district court rejected the defendants’ argument that their alleged conduct was not actionable under the FDCPA because the allegedly false communications were directed to the court and not consumers.
Buchanan filed an FDCPA putative class action asserting the letter violated the FDCPA’s prohibition on the use of deceptive representations in connection with the collection of any debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. On defendant’s motion, the district court dismissed the complaint, holding as matter of law the dunning letter could not have violated the FDCPA.In their joint amici briefs, the FTC and CFPB argue that the dismissal should be overturned, but take no position on the ultimate merits of plaintiff’s claims.
A misrepresentation about that fact thus violates the FDCPA. Matters may be even worse if the debt collector adds a threat of litigation, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), but such a threat is not a necessary element of a claim. We recognize that this interpretation conflicts with that of the Eighth and Third Circuits.