At the time the letter was sent, the New Jersey statute of limitations applicable to debt collection actions had run. The plaintiff filed a class action alleging that the letter violated the FDCPA because the debt collector had falsely represented the legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A), made false threats to take actions that cannot legally be taken in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692e, 1692e(5), and used false representations and/or deceptive means to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). Reading the Third Circuit's 2011 decision in Huertas v. Galaxy Management to hold that an attempt to collect a time-barred debt does not violate the FDCPA unless it is accompanied by a threat of legal action, the district court granted the debt collector’s motion to dismiss.

At the time the letter was sent, the New Jersey statute of limitations applicable to debt collection actions had run. The plaintiff filed a class action alleging that the letter violated the FDCPA because the debt collector had falsely represented the legal status of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(A), made false threats to take actions that cannot legally be taken in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§1692e, 1692e(5), and used false representations and/or deceptive means to collect the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10). Reading the Third Circuit's 2011 decision in Huertas v. Galaxy Management to hold that an attempt to collect a time-barred debt does not violate the FDCPA unless it is accompanied by a threat of legal action, the district court granted the debt collector’s motion to dismiss.

The ruling interpreted § 1692e of the FDCPA, which prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The Seventh Circuit found that the validation notice violated § 1692e because the validation notice was misleading to an unsophisticated consumer as to the appropriate time and manner for responding to the complaint.

eventh Circuit (and a growing majority of courts) in rejecting the “Hunstein theory” of liability under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). In Shields v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland, Inc., the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of FDCPA claims for lack of standing, confirming that a debt collector’s use of an outside mail vendor does not constitute an actionable, concrete injury.The case involved attempts to collect a consumer’s student loan debt. In 2019, the debt collector sent the consumer three letters to collect a balance that increased over time. None of the letters disclosed that the balance would increase due to accruing interest, fees, and other charges (i.e., the Miller/Avila safe harbor language that accounts for the fact that a debt may increase). All three letters were mailed by a third-party mail vendor.The consumer brought four claims against the debt collector for various violations of the FDCPA, including (1) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) for falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of the plaintiff’s debt; (2) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) for using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of debt; (3) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) for failing to meaningfully convey to the plaintiff the amount of debt in its initial communication or within five days thereafter; and (4) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) for communicating with a third party regarding the plaintiff’s debt without consent or permission.The debt collector argued that the consumer lacked standing to assert any of these claims. In dismissing the first three claims, the district court held that the consumer’s general confusion resulting from the discrepancy in the letters about the amount owed, and whether it included interest and fees, did not rise to a tangible harm sufficient to confer standing. The court also dismissed the fourth claim, rejecting the consumer’s argument

eventh Circuit (and a growing majority of courts) in rejecting the “Hunstein theory” of liability under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). In Shields v. Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland, Inc., the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of FDCPA claims for lack of standing, confirming that a debt collector’s use of an outside mail vendor does not constitute an actionable, concrete injury.The case involved attempts to collect a consumer’s student loan debt. In 2019, the debt collector sent the consumer three letters to collect a balance that increased over time. None of the letters disclosed that the balance would increase due to accruing interest, fees, and other charges (i.e., the Miller/Avila safe harbor language that accounts for the fact that a debt may increase). All three letters were mailed by a third party mail vendor.The consumer brought four claims against the debt collector for various violations of the FDCPA, including (1) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) for falsely representing the character, amount, or legal status of the plaintiff’s debt; (2) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) for using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of debt; (3) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) for failing to meaningfully convey to the plaintiff the amount of debt in its initial communication or within five days thereafter; and (4) a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) for communicating with a third party regarding the plaintiff’s debt without consent or permission. The debt collector argued that the consumer lacked standing to assert any of these claims. In dismissing the first three claims, the district court held that the consumer’s general confusion resulting from the discrepancy in the letters about the amount owed, and whether it included interest and fees, did not rise to a tangible harm sufficient to confer standing. The court also dismissed the fourth claim, rejecting the consumer’s argumen

See id. (citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, ---U.S.---, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021)) Under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.004(a), the statute of limitations period for bring an action to collect a debt is four years. Defendant’s letter was sent one day after the four-year statute of limitations had expired. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, entitled “False or Misleading Representations,” states that a “debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” Further, section 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,” and section 1692e(5) prohibits the “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.”

OhioFair Debt Collection Practices ActSnyder v. Finley & Co., L.P.A., 6th Cir. No. 21-3997, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 16512 (June 15, 2022)In this appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio’s decision, finding the debt collector violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by suing plaintiff to recover her husband’s criminal-defense legal fees under Ohio’s Necessaries Statute because the lawsuit was contingent on the debt collector’s claim against the husband, and when they sued plaintiff, the debt collector had not satisfied the prerequisite to collect from her.The Bullet Point: At issue in this dispute was whether the debt collector violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692e, when it sued plaintiff to recover her husband’s criminal-defense legal fees under Ohio’s Necessaries Statute. Specifically, the debt collector filed a debt-collection lawsuit jointly against plaintiff and her husband, asserting a spousal-obligation-to-support claim under Ohio’s Necessaries Statute.

The Ninth Circuit thus expressed “great confidence that the Oregon Supreme Court would hold the four-year statute of limitations would apply to a suit on Kaiser’s debt.”Next, the Ninth Circuit joined other courts of appeals in concluding that attempts to collect on time-barred debt through a lawsuit or threat of suit violate the FDCPA. The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from using any “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, and also from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation” to collect a debt, including any “false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of any debt” and any “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, (2)(A), (5). The Court explained that lawsuits to collect time-barred debts are both unfair and misleading, violating § 1692f and § 1692e, and threats to sue on time-barred debts are at least misleading, violating § 1692e.

After filing two amended complaints and court-ordered sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel for, among other things, failure to participate in the initial status conference in good faith and filing a frivolous motion by failing to follow the protective order’s procedures for challenging documents’ confidential designations, Midland moved for summary judgment. In its decision on summary judgment, the Lower Court focused on two theories raised by Plaintiff: (i) whether Elliot’s questions about the nature of Plaintiff’s dispute led Plaintiff to believe that he could not dispute his debt without cause, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(8) and (10); and (ii) whether Midland reported Plaintiff’s debt to credit reporting agencies without mentioning that the debt was disputed, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(5), (8) and (10), and also mailed Plaintiff a letter falsely claiming that Midland notified the credit reporting agencies that the debt was disputed, thereby violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). The Lower Court rejected both theories and held “the FDCPA does not make it illegal to ask a consumer questions about the nature of his dispute when the consumer calls to lodge one” because requesting that information could help both the collector and consumer resolve the dispute faster.

The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation” in connection with the collection of a debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Recently, the Eastern District of New York took an expansive view of section 1692e, thereby making truthful statements a violation of the statute’s mandates.