The information the debt collector sent to the mail vendor included the consumer’s name, the balance of the debt, the entity to whom he owed the debt, the fact that the debt concerned the consumer’s son’s medical treatment and the son’s name. The consumer filed suit against the debt collector alleging violations of the FDCPA, as well as the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act.The U.S. District Court, as pertinent to this appeal, dismissed the action for failing to state a claim that the transmittal to the vendor constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt” under provision 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA. § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA prohibits, with certain exceptions, debt collectors from communicating, “in connection with the collection of any debt,” with any person other than the consumer.The Eleventh Circuit first examined whether the plaintiff had Article III standing to sue, looking at whether a violation of § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA gives rise to a concrete injury.

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit used what it determined is the plain language of the FDCPA to once again place a spotlight on privacy. Expect this to be a continuing theme as courts are asked to find privacy rights imbedded in other consumer protection laws.The StatuteThe specific section of the FDCPA at issue is 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). In this section, the FDCPA sets forth who a debt collector can communicate with in connection with the collection of a debt without the consumer's consent.

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is prohibited from communicating with a consumer after the consumer disputes the debt, except “to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c)(2). Dismissing the complaint, the Vazquez court held that “[a]n unequivocal and non-coercive offer to settle a disputed debt for a definite reduced amount is a ‘specified’ remedy ‘ordinarily invoked’ by a debt collector.”

The new opinion is published, meaning it has immediate legal effect and is binding on future 11th Circuit judicial panels and district courts within the circuit.While the members of the three-judge panel that reconsidered Hunstein are the same as those who rendered the prior opinion last spring, the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) resulted in divergence among the panel on the standing issue. This time, as a result of TransUnion, the most senior judge on the panel, Judge Tjoflat, penned a dissenting opinion while the other two members ultimately reached the same conclusions on the plaintiff’s Article III standing and the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).As in its prior opinion, the majority determined that the plaintiff had standing to sue because he had suffered an “intangible injury resulting from a statutory violation.” In determining whether the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that he had suffered an intangible injury, the majority considered both: (1) the history of the alleged intangible harm; and (2) the judgment of Congress as to the FDCPA’s underlying purpose and protections.

The new opinion is published, meaning it has immediate legal effect and is binding on future Eleventh Circuit judicial panels and district courts within the circuit.While the members of the three-judge panel that reconsidered Hunstein are the same as those who rendered the prior opinion last spring, the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in TransUnion v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) resulted in divergence among the panel on the standing issue. This time, as a result of TransUnion, the most senior judge on the panel, Judge Tjoflat, penned a dissenting opinion while the other two members ultimately reached the same conclusions on the plaintiff’s Article III standing and the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).As in its prior opinion, the majority determined that the plaintiff had standing to sue because he had suffered an “intangible injury resulting from a statutory violation.” In determining whether the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that he had suffered an intangible injury, the majority considered both: (1) the history of the alleged intangible harm; and (2) the judgment of Congress as to the FDCPA’s underlying purpose and protections.

And, is the FDCPA a consumer privacy statute? In an apparent issue of first impression, the Eleventh Circuit answered a resounding yes.In an April 21, 2021 opinion: Richard Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management Services, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a debt collector’s transmittal of a consumer’s personal information to a dunning vendor was a third-party communication in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).This opinion has the potential to upend the way debt collectors – including financial institutions that may be considered a debt collector under the FDCPA – run their businesses. At least in the short term, this opinion will likely result in a new wave of FDCPA class action lawsuits, particularly in the Eleventh Circuit (Alabama, Florida, and Georgia).The facts in Hunstein are a common story.

Compumail used the information to send a dunning letter to Mr. Hunstein. Mr. Hunstein filed suit against Preferred alleging its transmittal of this information to Compumail constituted a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which, subject to certain narrow exceptions, prohibits debt collectors from communicating with third parties “in connection with the collection of any debt.” The listed exceptions are “the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector,” none of which applied to Compumail.

Compumail used this information to create, print, and mail a dunning letter to the consumer. The consumer brought suit against the debt collector, alleging violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692c(b), which prohibits debt collectors from communicating consumers’ personal information to third parties “in connection with the collection of any debt.”The court ultimately held that the debt collector’s transmission of the consumer’s information to its dunning vendor was a prohibited communication under §1692c(b) because the communication was made “in connection with the collection of any debt” and the recipient of the communication was not one of the six statutory exceptions—the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector. The practical result of the decision seems clear—transmitting any consumer information to any third party other than the six listed above potentially exposes a debt collector to liability under the FDCPA.The implications could be enormous and, frankly, the decision raises more questions than it answers.

1 The Hunstein II decision continues to warrant attention for debt-collection businesses that outsource customer-related tasks to vendors.In its April 2021 decision, the 11th Circuit panel ruled that a collector’s transmittal of a customer’s debt-related data to a third-party letter preparation vendor without authorization stated a claim under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).2 In its superseding decision, the 11th Circuit panel examined the impact of the Supreme Court’s holding in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez.3 Ramirez addressed the basis for establishing Article III standing under a federal statutory cause of action.

On 21 April 2021, the 11th Circuit held that a debt collector’s transmittal of a customer’s debt-related data to a third-party letter preparation vendor without authorization stated a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). The 11th Circuit’s decision may have implications for the debt-collection businesses that outsource customer-related tasks to vendors.