The TILA “Multiple Obligors” Provision Does Not Apply Because Defendants’ Loans Do Not Involve Multiple Obligors Troy LittleAxe cites to 15 U.S.C. § 1640(d) and contends that any recovery from other Defendants precludes recovery from him.51 By its terms, that TILA provision, however, only applies to transactions with “multiple obligors,” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(d), and stands for the simple proposition that two borrowers or lessors can only recover once for the same TILA violation.

As one court noted: “Although TILA does not create a private right of action against a loan servicer, it does impose consequences on a loan servicer who fails to comply with § 1639f. The statute allows for ‘[a]n action to enforce a violation of section . . . 1639f . . . of this title [to] be brought by the appropriate attorney general in any Case 2:16-cv-01291-NBF Document 52 Filed 02/15/17 Page 6 of 10 7 205462159.6 48765/309947 appropriate United States district court[.]’” Barnes, 2016 WL 3018693 at *2 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e)). D.

¶ 228) and asserts TILA claims that, if successful, would preclude Ms. Loya from asserting her own claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(d) (allowing “one recovery of damages” “[w]hen there are multiple obligors”). The Defendants are at risk from her absence, facing double or inconsistent obligations such as from a separate lawsuit by Ms. Loya – even after Defendants defeat Mr. Loya’s lawsuit.

Next, a reduction can be made for the $4,000 statutory damage award, leaving a lessened sum of $2,490.45. As the prevailing party on a TILA claim, Burnett is also entitled to attorney’s fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3). Burnett’s counsel represents that this award will far exceed this amount, see Declaration of Tomlinson, Exhibit S, and Burnett proposes that $2,490.45 of what she is owed in attorney’s fees be set off against an anticipated attorney’s fee award in excess of that amount.

" Id., n. 5. The same is true for Plaintiffs' Case 1:11-cv-00403-WS-B Document 15 Filed 09/14/11 Page 6 of 12 1945127 v1 7 citation to Zamarippa v. Cy's Car Sales, Inc., 674 F.2d 877, 879 (11th Cir. 1982), where the Eleventh Circuit directed the district court to "enter judgment for appellants in accordance with this opinion, and calculate an award for each of the appellants under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) and (a)(3)." Id.

Petroff-Kline therefore confirms that Murphy does not control whether a monetary claim falls within a statutory penalty bar. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held— without invoking the Murphy framework—that the FDIC’s 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b) penalty bar, which is virtually identical to Section 4617(j), precluded a TILA § 1640(a) claim. Dinsmore- Thomas v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 1998) (mem.). Petroff-Kline and Dinsmore-Thomas confirm that penalty bar statutes preclude a far broader range of claims than those that Murphy would define as penal for purposes of survivability.

Actual receipt of the Notice of Substitute Trustee’s Sale is not required and the Notice was sent in compliance with the Texas Property Code. Also, First Guaranty and RoundPoint did not violate the Dodd-Frank Act because 15 U.S.C. § 1640 applies only to loan origination violations, not conduct related to loan modifications. Finally, service of the Substitute Trustee’s Deed is not required.

Unless Regulation Z carves out exceptions such as these, a violation of the statutory requirement to accurately and completely disclose the potential activation of the penalty rate provision and the penalty APR within the LPW triggers civil liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). And for these omissions or inaccuracies, TILA imposes strict liability for statutory damages.

See Shaw v. BAC Home Loans Serv., LP, No. 10-11021-DJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28863 (D. Mass. 2013) (dismissing TILA claim where plaintiff alleged broker told her that payments would be different from TILA disclosures, but she failed to allege how such actions violated TILA). Thus, the TILA claims should be dismissed—again. C. Plaintiffs’ TILA Claim Is Barred by a One-Year Statute of Limitations. Plaintiffs may argue that their TILA claim arises out of the timing of the conclusion of BANA’s investigation “more than ninety (90) days after notifying Plaintiffs that it considered the dispute resolved.” If they do, their claim is doomed because it is barred by a one-year statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (providing that a civil action for a TILA violation must be brought within one year of the violation). 11 As set forth in greater detail below, Plaintiffs filed 10 There is good reason for requiring a statement of reasons supporting the assertion of billing error.

Case 0:12-cv-60177-KMW Document 7 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/08/2012 Page 5 of 6 {23501957;1} 6 IV. CONCLUSION The Baptistes cannot allege any set of facts that could impose liability on BANA, as Trustee pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1640(a) for the loan servicer's alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. 1641(f)(2). The Baptistes' complaint should be dismissed entirely and with prejudice.