ARGUMENT I. THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE INVISTA DOES NOT HAVE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM UNDER THE LANHAM ACT Although Invista invokes this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over its alleged federal claims against Rhodia under both 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) and 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (the Lanham Act), the only federal question it raises against Rhodia is whether Rhodia’s conduct violates the Lanham Act. Invista’s claims against Rhodia, however, are extraterritorial Case 1:08-cv-07270-BSJ-DCF Document 22 Filed 09/22/2008 Page 11 of 25 7 in nature and thus not covered by the Lanham Act, and, in any event, do not satisfy any of the applicable provisions of the Lanham Act.

The Lanham Act states in relevant part: The district and territorial courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction and the courts of appeal of the United States...shall have appellate jurisdiction, of all actions arising under this chapter, without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the parties. 15 U.S.C. § 1121. Count 3 of the Complaint lays out a Lanham Act claim, which is appropriately brought in this Court. 15 U.S.C. § 1121.

Even so, the analysis is the same under both 15 U.S.C. § 1121 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1996) (because 15 U.S.C. § 1121 contains the same “arising under” language as appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the principles outlined in cases construing the latter are equally applicable to construction of the former). Case 3:15-cv-00966-D Document 9 Filed 04/24/15 Page 11 of 21 PageID 108 BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 6 federal law the court must examine the ‘well pleaded’ allegations of the complaint.”

¶ 7.)4 Here, the Northern District of Georgia would have had subject matter jurisdiction at the time the action was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (Lanham Act), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction), and Defendants would have been subject to personal jurisdiction in Georgia. The Northern District of Georgia has general personal jurisdiction over Halyard because Halyard’s principal place of business is in Alpharetta, Georgia, (Boothe Decl.

4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1121, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338. 5.

JURISDICTION 13. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this trademark infringement action arising under the Lanham Act (15 United States Code (“U.S.C.”) §1051, et seq.) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1338(a) and 15 U.S.C. §1121. 14.

The Defendant, Woho Natural, Inc., produced and/or sold the WOHO brand of ginseng products at issue in this case. Not only does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this litigation under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 15 U.S.C. §1121(a), as presenting a federal question arising from a Lanham Act violation, but the Court also has class action subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332(d), as the amount in controversy exceeds five million dollars. II.

Case 2:15-cv-01869-MMM-AJW Document 139 Filed 10/26/15 Page 17 of 53 Page ID #:4912 3 [Proposed] Order Granting Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction DWT 27626197v728165737v1 0094038-000021 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP 865 S. FIGUEROA ST, SUITE 2400 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90017-2566 (213) 633-6800 Fax: (213) 633-6899 2. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants and jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue pursuant to 28 U.S. C. §§ 1331, 1338 and 1367, as well as 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a). This Court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce the terms and provisions of this Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 11. This Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. §1121, 17 U.S.C. §101 and 28 U.S.C. §1338, and supplemental jurisdiction over the state statutory law and common law claims under 28 U.S.C. §§1338(b) and 1367. 4 12.

2012WHOLESALEJERSEYSNFL.COM; ZHANG QIAN d/b/a NFLNIKEJERSEYSM.COM; ALVAREZ REGGIE d/b/a NFLSHOPUS.US; ESTHER ZIZZO d/b/a YERNFL.ORG; WEIFANG d/b/a WHOLESALEJERSEYSBEST.COM; FANGXL d/b/a FROMCHINAJERSEYS.COM; GROUP JERSEYS d/b/a GROUPJERSEYS.COM; GUIFAN HUAN d/b/a BESTNFLJERSEYSSALE.COM; FANGXI CHENXIUQULI d/b/a USWHOLESALEJERSEYSTORE.COM; and XYZ COMPANIES, JOHN DOES, and JANE DOES (collectively, “Defendants”) for trademark counterfeiting and cybersquatting arising under the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq., as amended by the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Public Law 98-473 (October 12, 1984), the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-153 (July 2, 1996), and the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2007, H.R. 4279 (October 13, 2008) (the “Lanham Act”). This Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 and 1338(a) and (b); and 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116 and 1121. Case 1:13-cv-02572-LGS Document 44 Filed 06/21/13 Page 8 of 34