In their motion to stay the arbitration, plaintiffs argued that Nebraska law applied pursuant to the choice of law provision in the RPA and that the arbitration provision of the RPA was void under section 25-2602.01(f)(4) of the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act (NUAA), which prohibits arbitration of “any agreement concerning or relating to an insurance policy.” Plaintiffs further argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16) (FAA) did not preempt the NUAA because another federal statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015) mandates that state laws “regulating the business of insurance” preempt any federal statute not specifically related to the business of insurance and that impairs state insurance laws. (15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).) Defendants argued that the FAA governs and preempts the NUAA, and that under the RPA's broad delegation clause, any issue concerning arbitrability should be resolved by the arbitrator.Before the hearing on defendants' motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs dismissed AUCRA as a defendant.

In their motion to stay the arbitration, plaintiffs argued that Nebraska law applied pursuant to the choice of law provision in the RPA and that the arbitration provision of the RPA was void under section 25-2602.01(f)(4) of the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act (NUAA), which prohibits arbitration of “any agreement concerning or relating to an insurance policy.” Plaintiffs further argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16) (FAA) did not preempt the NUAA because another federal statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015) mandates that state laws “regulating the business of insurance” preempt any federal statute not specifically related to the business of insurance and that impairs state insurance laws. (15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).) Defendants argued that the FAA governs and preempts the NUAA, and that under the RPA's broad delegation clause, any issue concerning arbitrability should be resolved by the arbitrator.Before the hearing on defendants' motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs dismissed AUCRA as a defendant.

In their motion to stay the arbitration, plaintiffs argued that Nebraska law applied pursuant to the choice of law provision in the RPA and that the arbitration provision of the RPA was void under section 25-2602.01(f)(4) of the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act (NUAA), which prohibits arbitration of “any agreement concerning or relating to an insurance policy.” Plaintiffs further argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16) (FAA) did not preempt the NUAA because another federal statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015) mandates that state laws “regulating the business of insurance” preempt any federal statute not specifically related to the business of insurance and that impairs state insurance laws. (15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).) Defendants argued that the FAA governs and preempts the NUAA, and that under the RPA's broad delegation clause, any issue concerning arbitrability should be resolved by the arbitrator.Before the hearing on defendants' motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs dismissed AUCRA as a defendant.

In their motion to stay the arbitration, plaintiffs argued that Nebraska law applied pursuant to the choice of law provision in the RPA and that the arbitration provision of the RPA was void under section 25-2602.01(f)(4) of the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act (NUAA), which prohibits arbitration of “any agreement concerning or relating to an insurance policy.” Plaintiffs further argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16) (FAA) did not preempt the NUAA because another federal statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015) mandates that state laws “regulating the business of insurance” preempt any federal statute not specifically related to the business of insurance and that impairs state insurance laws. (15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).) Defendants argued that the FAA governs and preempts the NUAA, and that under the RPA's broad delegation clause, any issue concerning arbitrability should be resolved by the arbitrator.Before the hearing on defendants' motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs dismissed AUCRA as a defendant.

In their motion to stay the arbitration, plaintiffs argued that Nebraska law applied pursuant to the choice of law provision in the RPA and that the arbitration provision of the RPA was void under section 25-2602.01(f)(4) of the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act (NUAA), which prohibits arbitration of “any agreement concerning or relating to an insurance policy.” Plaintiffs further argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16) (FAA) did not preempt the NUAA because another federal statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015) mandates that state laws “regulating the business of insurance” preempt any federal statute not specifically related to the business of insurance and that impairs state insurance laws. (15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).) Defendants argued that the FAA governs and preempts the NUAA, and that under the RPA's broad delegation clause, any issue concerning arbitrability should be resolved by the arbitrator.Before the hearing on defendants' motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs dismissed AUCRA as a defendant.

In their motion to stay the arbitration, plaintiffs argued that Nebraska law applied pursuant to the choice of law provision in the RPA and that the arbitration provision of the RPA was void under section 25-2602.01(f)(4) of the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act (NUAA), which prohibits arbitration of “any agreement concerning or relating to an insurance policy.” Plaintiffs further argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16) (FAA) did not preempt the NUAA because another federal statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015) mandates that state laws “regulating the business of insurance” preempt any federal statute not specifically related to the business of insurance and that impairs state insurance laws. (15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).) Defendants argued that the FAA governs and preempts the NUAA, and that under the RPA's broad delegation clause, any issue concerning arbitrability should be resolved by the arbitrator.Before the hearing on defendants' motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs dismissed AUCRA as a defendant.

In their motion to stay the arbitration, plaintiffs argued that Nebraska law applied pursuant to the choice of law provision in the RPA and that the arbitration provision of the RPA was void under section 25-2602.01(f)(4) of the Nebraska Uniform Arbitration Act (NUAA), which prohibits arbitration of “any agreement concerning or relating to an insurance policy.” Plaintiffs further argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16) (FAA) did not preempt the NUAA because another federal statute, the McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015) mandates that state laws “regulating the business of insurance” preempt any federal statute not specifically related to the business of insurance and that impairs state insurance laws. (15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).) Defendants argued that the FAA governs and preempts the NUAA, and that under the RPA's broad delegation clause, any issue concerning arbitrability should be resolved by the arbitrator.Before the hearing on defendants' motion to compel arbitration, plaintiffs dismissed AUCRA as a defendant.

adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a “consumer report” the person must, among other things, provide an adverse action notice to the consumer.The McCarran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C. §§1011-1015; the “McCarran-Ferguson Act”), generally exempts the business of insurance from federal regulation. Enacted in 1945, in response to Supreme Court rulings extending federal regulation to the transaction of insurance under the Commerce Clause, the McCarran-Ferguson Act states, “The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business,” and “No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.” 15 U.S.C. §1012. The McCarran-Ferguson Act also includes certain exceptions. 15 U.S.C. Section 1012(b) states that “the Sherman Act . . . Clayton Act, and . . . Federal Trade Commission Act . . .shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.”In assessing the extent to which the FCRA fits into the exemption and pre-emption framework developed around the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the Alaska Supreme Court explained, “Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, a federal statute will not pre-empt a state statute enacted ‘for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance’ – unless the federal statute ‘specifically relates to the business of insurance’ . . . [the question is] whether the federal statute specifically relates to the business of insurance. And the FCRA does just that because it specifically refers to the insurance industry. For example, the FCRA states that a person may use a consumer report ‘in connection with the underwriting of insu

rnational arbitrations and favors same in various industries, including insurance and reinsurance. These cases, Veterans Blvd. Plaza, LLC v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London (Veterans) (“Veterans”)1and Certain Underwriters At Lloyds, London v. Mpire Properties, LLC(“Mpire”)2, involved insurance contracts governed by Louisiana law between foreign insurers and Louisiana property owners. The arbitration provisions at issue in both decisions were prohibited by Louisiana law, but the foreign insurers argued that the New York Convention, a treaty to which the United States is a signatory, preempts state law and the McCarran Ferguson Act (MFA), a federal law, which leaves the regulation of insurance to the states. The relevant language from the MFA provides:“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”15 USC § 1012(b)The policyholders argued that the New York Convention is not self-executing and therefore requires a separate “Act of Congress” to preempt the MFA and state insurance laws. The district courts in both Veterans and Mpire rejected the insurers’ motions to compel arbitration.The Mpire Court Follows Second Circuit PrecedentThe Veterans and Mpire courts relied on (“Stephens”)3, a 1995 decision by the Second Circuit holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not preempt the MFA. The central dispute in Stephens was between a domestic reinsurer from Kentucky and domestic cedents who moved to compel arbitration of their setoff claims under the FAA. However, the Second Circuit also touched upon arguments from foreign reinsurers’ that the New York Convention required arbitration of their claims, even if the FAA was not preempted by Kentucky law. The Second Circuit rejected these arguments and stated that the New York Convention is not self-executing and relies upon an “Act of Congress”

a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished; especially, so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument. In the United States, a different principle is established. Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract -- when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the court.The Second Circuit then added that, "McCarran-Ferguson states' no Act of Congress shall be construed to … supersede any law … regulating the business of insurance.' 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994). Accordingly, the implementing legislation does not preempt the Kentucky Liquidation Act[.] …The Convention itself is simply inapplicable in this instance."In May, the First Circuit, in Green Enters., LLC v. Hiscox Syndicates Ltd., became the latest Circuit Court to disagree with Stephens. Based on the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Medellín v. Texas, the First Circuit held that "the text of the Convention makes plain that Article II(3) provides a clear 'directive to domestic courts.' Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508. Article II(3), by its express terms, directly commands courts to channel arbitrable disputes to arbitration: 'The court … shall … refer the parties to arbitration….'" In other words, the Convention is a self-executing treaty. In so deciding, the First Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit's 2021 holding in CLMS Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P'ship v. Amwins Brokerage of Ga., LLC, which in turn relied on a concurrence in the Fifth Circuit's 2009 en banc decision in Safety Nat’l Cas. C