Plaintiffs’ Clayton Act costs and out-of-pocket litigation expenses are reasonable as well. 15 U.S.C. § 26 requires the Court to award the “cost of suit,” including a reasonable attorney’s fee, to any injured plaintiff who “substantially prevails” in an action for injunctive relief under the Clayton Act. For many years, courts in the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Clayton Act strictly to permit recovery of only those costs taxable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1920 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).

So too are Plaintiffs’ taxable costs (subsumed with the larger figure compensable under the Clayton Act) appropriate. 15 U.S.C. § 26 requires the Court to award the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, to any plaintiff who “substantially prevails” in an action for Case4:09-cv-03329-CW Document305 Filed08/22/14 Page9 of 11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case No. 4:09-CV-3329 CW - 9 - PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS injunctive relief under the Clayton Act. Civil Local Rule 54-3 details the standards for taxing costs in any litigation, specifying the taxable costs of fees for filing and service of process; reporters’ transcripts; depositions; reproduction and exemplification; witness expenses; fees for masters and receivers; costs on appeal; and costs of bonds and security.

J, K) alter the analysis. Under 15 U.S.C. § 26 the Court has the authority to preliminarily enjoin state agencies to even suspend enforcement of certain provisions of challenged statutes and regulatory schemes. Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Diary Comm’n, 676 F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1982).

While most of the AGs pursued parens patriae claims, the principles underlying the common fund theory also apply to the AGs’ request for fees and costs from the combined settlement fund. The Clayton Act specifically provides that the AGs can recover their reasonable attorney fees and disbursements if they succeed on their injunctive claims, see 15 U.S.C. § 26, demonstrating that Congress has made the determination that even though States use public Case4:02-md-01486-PJH Document2186 Filed03/11/14 Page37 of 56 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 24 IPPS’ AND AGS’ JOINT APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND INDIVIDUAL APPLICATIONS FOR COSTS servants paid by state-raised tax monies to pursue these claims, they may recover attorney fees and disbursements, whether the case is tried to judgment or settles prior to judgment. See In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197, 214 (D. Me. 2003); In re Toys “R” Us Antitrust Litig., 191 F.R.D. 347, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (approving $5.4 million in fees plus costs to the States and class plaintiffs' counsel pursuant to final approval of settlement agreement); In re Compact Disc Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. at 214-15; In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51271, at *103 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29,

Case 1:11-cv-01600-ESH Document 16 Filed 09/30/11 Page 18 of 32 11 II. SPRINT HAS NOT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THAT THE TRANSACTION WILL HARM SPRINT AS A BUYER OF SERVICES OR EQUIPMENT In those few cases where competitors have established standing to challenge a merger under section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, their alleged harms were not based on an alleged increase or decrease in competition in the competitor’s market resulting directly from the merger. Rather, competitors have established standing where they have plausibly alleged that they would be excluded from a market or suffer harm as a result of vertical effects of a merger — usually, foreclosure of supply of a needed input.6 Here, Sprint’s claims that the transaction will impair competition in the provision of various inputs into wireless service fail to establish standing because Sprint fails to plead facts that support any claim that the transaction will cause either a substantial effect on competition in any market or harm to Sprint (or both).

Under this provision, “a preliminary injunction may issue” if the plaintiffs make “a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 26. To prevail on their motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must establish, among other elements, “that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief . . . .” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No 09-35756, Slip Op. 10855, 10865 (9 th Cir. July 28, 2010), available at 2010 U.S.App.Lexis 15537.

Its alleged anticompetitive conduct is and has been market-wide, and it does not require reference to the actions of individual consumers. Injunctive relief is available to these consumers pursuant to §16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §26). 12/22 Order at 10; see also In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 400 (3d Cir. 2000).

F. Dakota and Solid Edge failed to state a claim for injunctive relief. Case 3:17-cv-08162-SPL Document 81 Filed 09/24/18 Page 14 of 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -15- In addition to unknown monetary damages, the Amended Complaint seeks injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. Section 16 provides that “[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws .

See Palmyra Park Hosp. Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F. 3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010). Case 3:16-cv-02787-WHO Document 358 Filed 07/18/18 Page 14 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -10- Case No. 16-cv-02787-WHO SAMSUNG’S OPPOSITION TO HUAWEI’S MSJ demonstrate antitrust injury—a “threatened loss or damage” by a violation of the antitrust laws is sufficient. 15 U.S.C. § 26. And the threat here is obvious: Huawei’s hold-up campaign is designed to force Samsung to pay an excessive royalty rate or to suffer lost profits. Ex. 6, ¶ 14.

C. AmeriCare’s Unsustainable Claims Ignoring these relevant statutes, AmeriCare alleges six equally non-viable claims, as follows: (1) monopolization in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Sherman Act § 2); (2) restraint of trade in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Sherman Act § 1); (3) conspiracy to monopolize in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2; (4) conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1; (5) declaration of rights under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1060; and (6) declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 15 U.S.C. § 26. III. ARGUMENT AmeriCare attempts to invoke federal antitrust laws to attack the substance and implementation of California’s carefully crafted EMS regulatory structure.