But contemporary antitrust law no longer permits the “alchemy” whereby multiple baseless claims add up to a valid claim. See, e.g., linkLine, 555 U.S. at 457 (rejecting the plaintiff’s attempt to “alchemize” a meritless refusal-to-deal claim and a meritless predatory-pricing claim “into a new form of antitrust liability”); City of Groton v. Conn. Light & Power Co., 662 F.2d 921, 928-29 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[W]e reject the notion that if there is a fraction of validity to each of the basic claims and the sum of the fractions is one or more, the plaintiffs have proved a violation of section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act.”); see also Aerotec, 836 F.3d at 1178-89 (addressing the plaintiff’s claims through the lens of six individual antitrust doctrines). * * * The Court should grant summary judgment on Songkick’s antitrust claims. F. Songkick’s Related State-Law Claims Fail In addition to its federal antitrust claims, Songkick advances several related state-law claims for promissory estoppel, intentional interference with contractual relations, violation of California’s unfair competition law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Case 2:15-cv-09814-DSF-AGR Document 410 Filed 10/16/17 Page 66 of 81 Page ID #:54260 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ATTORNEYS AT LAW SAN FRANCISCO 56 MEM. OF P & A ISO DEFS. AND COUNTER-CLAIMANT’S MOT. FOR PARTIAL SUMM. J. CASE NO. 2:15-CV-09814 DSF (AGRX) § 17200, and intentional interference with prospective economic relations, all based, at least in part, on Ticketmaster’s application

2. VFML’s Monopoly-Maintenance Conduct A monopolist violates Section 2 by entering into exclusive dealing arrangements, whether express or de facto, that unreasonably foreclose a substantial portion of the relevant market to existing or potential competitors. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); Dentsply, 399 F.3d at 191 (finding foreclosure in § 2 case when exclusionary practices “ensure[d] that the key dealers offer [supplier’s product] either as the only or dominant choice”; “it is not necessary Case 8:12-cv-02102-JLS-AN Document 74 Filed 10/21/13 Page 11 of 29 Page ID #:3785 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -8- that all competition be removed from the market”). “Exclusive dealing arrangements are of special concern when imposed by a monopolist.” ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 271. Whether an arrangement between parties is a de facto exclusive dealing arrangement is a question of fact.

V. PENDENT STATE CLAIMS In addition to alleging federal claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1, § 2, and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), plaintiff also asserts state law claims. Where a court has jurisdiction over one or more aspects of a case, it may properly assert jurisdiction over any other aspects of the case that share a common nucleus of operative facts.

(emphasis in original). And the facts (supra Part III.A.) and expert opinions ( ) at issue here certainly support a jury finding that Huawei’s conduct following the standard-setting process – i and its pursuit of injunction-only relief in China – amounts to a refusal to deal with Samsung and consequently violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 2017 WL 2774406, at *19-23; Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605-11, (1985) (affirming Section 2 violation based on refusal to deal). Indeed, as a policy matter, “[t]he antitrust laws” can and should be applied to “alleviate” the market failures of “patent holdup.

Harcourt Brace, 108 F.3d at 1151–52. Although such communication may “impair the opportunities” of Arista, the “harmful effects . . . are ordinarily not significant enough to warrant recognition under § 2 of the Sherman Act.” Id. at 1151.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, Therapearl has failed to allege a Section 2 claim under either an existing monopoly or attempted monopolization theory. Case 1:13-cv-02792-CCB Document 33 Filed 09/25/14 Page 16 of 17 17 CONCLUSION

(Pl. Br. at 18- 19). In support of this argument, Allergan cites Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 1997). The issue in Schuylkill was whether the plaintiff had suffered antitrust injury and thus had standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act to maintain a private cause of action for damages arising under Section 2.

The Court held simply that the essential facilities doctrine under a § 2 claim, as opposed to a tying claim, where “State or federal regulatory agencies have effective power to compel sharing of the essential facility.” The America Channel, 2007 WL 142173 at * 9. This is not a § 2 claim relying upon the essential facilities doctrine. The cases relying upon Trinko, including Southern Entertainment Television, cited by BHN, rest upon the narrow holding that an essential facilities doctrine claim, which turns upon proof that access to a particular facility is effectively denied, cannot go forward when access is granted by regulation.

See supra at 8-10. Songkick claims that Ticketmaster uses this fan club policy to deliberately earn and maintain monopoly power in the “artist presale ticketing services market,” in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. As noted earlier, there are both “power” and “conduct” elements of a Section 2 violation.

AmeriCare fails to identify any respect in which Defendants’ conduct even affects interstate commerce, much less substantially 13 Section 2 of the Sherman Act, addressing monopolization, includes parallel language. 15 U.S.C. § 2. Case 8:16-cv-01832-JLS-AFM Document 28-1 Filed 01/13/17 Page 35 of 45 Page ID #:216 28 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS CASE NO. 8:16-CV-01832-JLS-AFM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 affects it.