Unlike other financial regulatory agencies, the Director is unchecked by the structure of a multi-member commission. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(1).

Recourse to this bizarre argument is a concession that the Bureau is not subject to Congress’s regular oversight. No federal entity combines the Bureau’s panoply of problematic features, including: [1] strict limitations on the Director’s removal, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3); [2] the Director’s lengthy tenure, id. § 5491(c)(3); [3] a single Director, rather than Commission or Board, id.

at 511. The Bureau is a governmental unit created to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products and services...” Case 1:14-cv-00292-SEB-TAB Document 91 Filed 09/19/16 Page 2 of 5 PageID #: 1545 3 12 U.S.C. § 5491. The CFPA empowers the Bureau to “take any action authorized…to prevent a covered person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive or abusive act or practice under Federal law.”

MSJ at 24-25. This contention—which has been rejected by every court thus far to have addressed it—fails.9 Longstanding Supreme Court precedent forecloses Defendants’ contention that the President’s ability to remove the Bureau Director only for cause, see 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3), impermissibly prevents the President from faithfully executing the laws. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Supreme Court approved identical for-cause removal protections for Federal Trade Commission members.

at 18. SNB’s position is triply wrong: (1) Free Enterprise involved officers within “a freestanding component of the Executive Branch” (i.e., a “Department”), 561 U.S. at 511, not in an entity “outside the executive”; (2) the Bureau is itself “an Executive agency,” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a); and (3) the Court in Free Enterprise did not adopt some new constitutional test, but rather, as in Morrison, asked whether the removal restrictions “contravene[d] the President’s ‘constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.’” E.g., 561 U.S. at 484.

2). Case 1:14-cv-00292-SEB-TAB Document 25 Filed 06/12/14 Page 17 of 49 PageID #: 406 5 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3). In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Supreme Court approved identical for-cause removal protections for FTC commissioners, in light of the functions that the commissioners perform.

The Bureau’s specific purpose is to “regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer laws.” 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). ACICS neither offers nor provides a consumer financial product or service nor does it engage in conduct that touches the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or service.

2110, 2113 (“CFPA”).) The CFPA created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and authorized the Bureau also to enforce TISA. (CFPA, §§ 1011-1012 [codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491-5492]; CFPA, § 1100B [amending 12 U.S.C. § 4309(a)(3)].) Subtitle E of the CFPA gives the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection broad authority to enforce federal consumer financial protection laws, including TISA. Subtitle E vests authority in the Bureau to conduct investigations and administrative discovery related to alleged violations of the federal consumer financial protection laws (CFPA, § 1052 [codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5562]), conduct hearings and adjudication proceedings to ensure or enforce _29 - compliance with such laws (CFPA, § 1053 [codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5563]), and to “commencea civil action against [any person who violates such laws] to impose a civil penalty or to seek all appropriate legal and equitable relief including a permanent or temporary injunction” (CFPA, § 1054 [codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a)].)