In addition, the Weitz/Rice Payments are unreasonable because, as the New Jersey Superior Court found, the very Claimant Agreement that provided for the payments was “an Case 3:09-cv-04371-JAP Document 520 Filed 04/13/10 Page 17 of 21 6 Any recovery from the Debtors for Weitz and Rice’s post-petition expenditures would constitute administrative expenses payable, if at all, under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4), pursuant to which qualifying creditors counsel may receive administrative expense awards. As a recovery under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4) requires that counsel’s client qualifies for administrative expense treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3), and Weitz and Rice’s asbestos injury clients have not so qualified, Weitz and Rice are not eligible to have their post-petition expenditures reimbursed from estate funds under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(4). 18 unreasonable agreement, not made in good faith.”

However, the bankruptcy court denied that motion, holding the Bankruptcy Code did not authorize the court to pay the professional fees of a non-debtor spouse or creditor like Fox. (21) Following this setback, the Firms submitted a substantial contribution claim to the bankruptcy court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D). In their substantial contribution claim, the Firms contended that the Rosbottom bankruptcy estate should pay the Firms $1.

140 11 U.S.C. § 503(a). 141 11 U.S.C. § 503(b). The IRS filed a claim for administrative expenses for these taxes, but there is a factual dispute regarding when this occurred.

Rather, this reservation simply preserved the Bankruptcy Court’s ability to resolve potential disputes pertaining to the estate arising from the IRS’s efforts to collect against Mazur’s assets. For example, if the IRS seized property that Mazur acquired before bankruptcy that was property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) or proceeds of such property, then the Trustee could claim that said property should be used to pay claims with a higher priority than the IRS’s tax claims.6 In contrast, if the IRS 6 Under the Bankruptcy Code, administrative claims allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) have a higher priority than a debtor’s pre-petition tax claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(2) and (9). Case 2:15-cv-05042-SVW Document 9 Filed 09/21/15 Page 8 of 25 Page ID #:629 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 seized property of Mazur that he acquired after the entry of an order for relief in his bankruptcy, that property would not be property of the estate.7 In that case, the Trustee would have no claim to it and the IRS could retain all of it.

0384(WK), 1994 WL 90358 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994) ........................................................................................................15 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) .................................................................................................................13 Xuedan Wang v. Hearst Corp., No. 12CV 793(HB), 2013 WL 3326650 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013) ...................................................................................................11, 20 Yamaha Motor Corp., USA v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996) .................................................................................................................13 FEDERAL STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) ............................................................................................................... passim 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) ................................................................................................................. passim 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6) ..........................................................................................................

Moore Freight could therefore qualify as a member of the class affected by the proposed settlement in this proceeding. Pilot, through its in-house and outside counsel, has actively participated in Moore Freight's chapter 11 case, including filing a motion seeking allowance of an administrative claim of$198,124.18 under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9) in October of2012, for fuel purchases made by Moore Freight in the days leading up to bankruptcy. (ld. at,-[ 5).

The mere fact that their titles contained the words “officer” or “director” does not mean that Messrs. DiCarmine and Sanders were officers and directors within the meaning of the law. E.g., In re: Borders Group, Inc., 453 B.R. 459, 469 (Bankr. SDNY 2011) (noting that when considering whether an individual is an officer Case 1:13-cv-01095-ALC-DCF Document 32 Filed 07/12/13 Page 5 of 7 6 62385739_1 or director within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1), “[a]n individual’s title, by itself, is insufficient to establish that an individual is a director or officer.”).