Although properly served copies of the charge and complaint, the Respondent failed to file an answer. In its response to the Notice to Show Cause, the Respondent admitted that it terminated its business and that unit employees have not been paid since September 30, 1999, acknowledged complaint allegations that it failed to bargain over the closing and the failure to pay employees, stated that it filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and requested that the case be stayed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.In Nathan Yorke, the Board adopted the administrative law judge's finding that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to bargain with the Union regarding the effects of its decision to terminate operations where the newly appointed bankruptcy trustee acted immediately upon learning of the Respondent's quickly dwindling assets. The Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's decision, as modified, finding that the emergency situation that confronted the trustee in bankruptcy excused the Respondent's obligation to notify the Union before the plant closure, but did not excuse its failure to bargain after the closing over the effects of the closure because "[o]nce operations had been terminated, the emergency situation ended."

Subsequently, you contacted a member of the FMLA Team in Washington, D.C., office of the Wage and Hour Division (the Division) to discuss your concerns.You enclosed additional documents with your June 4th letter which you contend support that you were terminated from your employment in violation of the FMLA. You also contend that the U. S. Department of Labor is not subject to the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 362(a)) and, therefore, is able to recover money you believe is due to you from Name* since your termination on May 30, 2002. You advised us that Name* filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on May 31, 2002.

The parties are urged to address the impact of the new bankruptcy provisions on any automatic stay that may have entered. In particular, the parties should confirm that the automatic stay has not been terminated under 11 USC 362(e). (Revised 1/06.)

to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agreements.11 U.S.C. §362(o) provides that the rights not subject to the stay pursuant to §362(b)(7) shall not be stayed by any order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under title 11 of the United States Code.Affirmative Defense to Avoidance Actions:The Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law provide a debtor-in-possession and/or a trustee with the power to avoid certain pre-petition transfers of property of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §§544-551.

The 2005 Amendments to the bankruptcy code included some changes to application of the automatic stay in serial bankruptcy cases. Under 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(3), a Debtor who files a case within one year of the dismissal of a prior case only gets the stay for 30 days, unless extended on timely motion. Under 11 U.S.C §362(c)(4), a Debtor who files a case within one year of the dismissal of two or more prior cases gets no stay at all, unless imposed on timely motion.

See The Official Committee of Subordinated Bondholders v. Integrated Resources Inc. (In re Integrated Resources Inc.), 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).14. Break-up fees are outside the ordinary course of a seller's business and must be approved by the bankruptcy court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §362(f). The bankruptcy court will typically approve break-up fees so long as they are negotiated in good faith and do not chill the bidding process.15.

In this appeal implicating CAFA, the Third Circuit reversed the district court’s order and held that a defendant, the parent company, was not precluded from removing a class action to federal court because a co-defendant, the subsidiary, was in bankruptcy.Sun Capital Partners, Inc., is the parent company of JEVIC Transportation, Inc., which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware following the closure of its transportation facility in New Jersey. The day after JEVIC’s bankruptcy filing, several former JEVIC employees (“the plaintiffs”) filed an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court, which was styled as a class action and alleged violations of the Millvale Dallas Airmotive Plant Jobs Loss Notification Act (“New Jersey WARN Act”).One week after the JEVIC bankruptcy filing and despite the automatic stay provided for in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), the plaintiffs filed a class action against JEVIC and Sun in the state court of New Jersey, also alleging violation of the New Jersey WARN Act, replicating their claim in Bankruptcy Court. In derogation of the automatic stay of § 362(a)(1), JEVIC removed the case to the district court.

The “police and regulatory power” exception to the automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)1 and its application to 19 U.S.C. § 3372 investigations by the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) has recently yielded conflicting results, both within federal courts and the ITC. This article illustrates the current legal landscape and offers a way to reconcile this conflict in a manner that is consistent with the plain meaning of § 362, public policy, and applicable precedent.On June 3, 2009, the ITC permitted an ITC investigation to continue against chapter 11 debtor Spansion, Inc. (hereinafter “Spansion”) on the basis that “[p]reventing violation of domestic industries’ intellectual property rights falls squarely within the ‘regulatory power’ of a ‘governmental unit’” and therefore, “[s]ection 337 falls within the exception of section 362(b)(4).”

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued a preliminary injunction in December 2010, which required the debtor to cease its business operations and turn over assets to the franchiser. The franchisee declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in February 2011, and the franchiser asked the bankruptcy court to dismiss the debtor’s bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 U.S.C.S. § 1112(b) or, in the alternative, to grant the franchiser relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.S. § 362(d) (1) so it could enforce the preliminary injunction. The bankruptcy court denied the franchiser’s motion holding that there was no evidence that the debtor declared bankruptcy in bad faith, and lifting the stay so the franchiser could enforce the district court’s injunction would have made it impossible for the debtor to reorganize its business and pay its creditors.

Under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, immediately upon the filing of its bankruptcy petition, a debtor receives the protection of the automatic stay, which, among other things, operates to prevent secured creditors from enforcing liens against the debtor’s estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). One way a creditor can obtain relief from the automatic stay is if the bankruptcy estate qualifies as “single asset real estate,” commonly referred to as a “SARE.”