r-old) chapter 15 has become an invaluable resource for the representatives of foreign debtors in cross-border bankruptcy cases.Tolling of Deadlines in BankruptcySection 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code essentially establishes a two-year deadline from entry of the bankruptcy "order for relief" for a bankruptcy trustee (or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP")) to commence actions on behalf of the estate, provided that the applicable time period did not expire before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Section 108(a) provides:If applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor may commence an action, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee may commence such action only before the later of—(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or (2) two years after the order for relief.11 U.S.C. § 108(a). Limitation periods for causes of action arising under the Bankruptcy Code are not governed by section 108(a) but rather by sections 546(a), 549(d), and 550(e).

However, in AmMed the Court accepted the filing of the appeal as timely because a second notice of appeal was filed within the Bankruptcy Code’s extended deadlines for “commencing or continuing a civil action” which expire during the application of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)(2) (extending deadlines to commence or continue a civil acton which expire during the period of the automatic stay by thirty days from the expiration of the automatic stay). In Hewett, however, no notice of appeal was filed within the period described in Section 108(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Citing to AmMed, Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the notice of appeal was filed in violation of the automatic stay, rendering the notice of appeal void, and that in the absence of some other valid method of invoking the appellate court’s jurisdiction, the appeal ought to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b) provides that, generally, “when an act is required to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion ... order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b).In an opinion issued on February 15, 2024, by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut, the court held that Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) may be utilized to extend the statutes of limitation set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Ho Wan Kwok, No. 22-550073 (JAM) ), 2024 WL 666646, at *3-4 (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024).The Trustee, relying on IBT International, Inc. v. Northern (In re International Administrative Services, Inc.), 408 F.3d 689 (11th Cir. 2005), and its progeny, argues that it is within the Court's discretion to extend the deadlines. The Objecting Parties – particularly G Club – rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2075, Joint Council Dining Car Employees Local 370 v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Company, 157 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1946), In re Walnut Hill, No. 16-50960 (JJT), 2018 WL 2672242 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 1, 2018) (Tancredi, J.), and In re Damach Inc., 235 B.R. 727 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (Krechevsky, J.), to argue that Rule 9006(b) may not extend the deadlines set forth in sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d).The bankruptcy court first addressed whether sections 108(a), 546(a), and 549(d) contain statutes of limitation – subject to tolling, ext

In re Colarusso, 295 B.R. 166, 173 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2003). The expiration of the statutory period to recover possession, as extended by 11 U.S.C. § 108(a), may shift ownership and control of real property from the bankruptcy estate to others. Reported decisions often arise in the context of a debtor’s efforts to sell property free and clear of the interest of the adverse possessor.

eld that because “bankruptcy courts operate as arms of district courts, statutes governing district courts generally apply to bankruptcy courts, and § 1961(c)(4) follows this general rule.” Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corp., 84 F.4th at 271–72.As to the second question, the court held that adversary proceedings are “civil” in nature. In so doing, the court relied on Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001’s description of “adversary proceedings” which includes actions to, among other things, “recover money or property,” to “determine the validity ... of a lien,” to “obtain an injunction,” and to “obtain a declaratory judgment.” The court found that these to be “quintessential civil actions” Id. The court also relied on various provisions of Title 28 and Title 11 to bolster the civil nature of bankruptcy cases. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (“all civil proceedings arising under title 11”) (emphasis added); id. § 1452 (permitting removal of claims “in a civil action”) (emphasis added); 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (referencing “civil action”); id. § 110(j) (same); id. § 526(c)(5)(B) (referencing “civil” penalties); id. § 707(b) (same).The court concluded by holding: “[W]e think the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1961 compels the conclusion that post-judgment interest applies to adversary proceedings in bankruptcy, except in cases where more specific provisions of Title 11 may control.” Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corp., 84 F.4th at 272.The Fifth Circuit’s decision is in line with numerous other Circuit Court decisions that have addressed the issue. See In re Riebesell, 586 F.3d 782, 794 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Because a bankruptcy court is part of the district court, [§ 1961] applies to bankruptcy proceedings.”) (quoting In re Pester Refin. Co., 964 F.2d 842, 849 (8th Cir. 1992)); In re Resyn Corp., 945 F.2d 1279, 1284 (3d. Cir. 1991) (similar); see also In re Williams, 11 F. App'x 344, 347 n.8 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting § 1961 applied in an adversary proceeding); see also Ocasek v. Manville Corp. As

of its franchisees. In re Start Man Furniture, LLC., 2023 WL 2717662 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 30, 2023). AVF and related entities had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, but their cases were converted to Chapter 7 cases and a Trustee was appointed. The Trustee initiated adversary proceedings against several franchisees, alleging breach of the franchise agreements for failure to pay royalties and for merchandise purchased from AVF, seeking damages and the turnover of bankruptcy estate property in the amount owed under the franchise agreements. The franchisees moved to dismiss, arguing that the Trustee’s complaints were time-barred under the one-year limitations period in the franchise agreements. The Trustee argued that a timeliness defense was not appropriate for the motion to dismiss stage and that there were unresolved factual issues regarding possible trademark violations that were not time-barred.The court rejected the Trustee’s arguments. Although the court noted that, under 11 U.S.C. § 108(a), the bankruptcy filings extended the period of limitations to two years, that was not enough to save the cases from dismissal. The court acknowledged as a general rule that a statute of limitations defense is typically not appropriate to consider at the motion to dismiss stage. But because the complaints actually attached the franchise agreements and dated invoices giving rise to the claims, the applicability of the defense was clear. As a result, the court granted the motions to dismiss, noting that the possible trademark violations were a separate claim, not yet before the court, that the Trustee could still bring via separate actions.[View source.]

it does not appear that any court has yet weighed in — then the agreement between the exchange and the depositor with respect to such an account arguably would be deemed to be a securities contract.The debtor exchange would therefore be an entity that enters into a securities contract, and, given the total gross dollar value of all outstanding securities contracts, would likely be found to be a financial participant.Putting all of the pieces together, a withdrawal of coins could thus be determined to be a settlement payment made by a financial participant or a transfer made by a “financial participant ... in connection with a securities contract.” In either case, the withdrawal would be shielded from clawback by the safe harbor.ConclusionDepositors who receive demand letters and are faced with the threat of preference litigation need not immediately reach for their checkbooks. A variety of potential defenses exist that may limit or completely eliminate their preference exposure. Under Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor-in-possession or trustee has two years from the date of the bankruptcy petition to file avoidance actions. I use the term liquidation trustee here—that is, a post-confirmation trustee appointed under a chapter 11 plan of liquidation—because preferences are most likely to be pursued in a liquidation scenario. As a practical matter, a debtor that continues as a going concern, whether through a standalone reorganization or a sale under 11 U.S.C. § 363, will be reluctant to sow further ill will among the very creditors who are key to its future survival. This is why purchasers of assets in bankruptcy often include, among the acquired assets, all clawback claims against trade vendors with whom they will continue to do business—they want to ensure the clawback claims are not pursued so that their relationship with their new supplier base is not poisoned. To the extent that the value of any crypto withdrawals is clawed back, the depositor will have a general unsecured claim again

Id. at 896.Id. at 900.Id.Id.Id. The court rejected an argument by the debtor that another provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 108(c), tolled its deadline to file its foreclosure action. Id. at 900-02.Id.[View source.]

The 14th court of appeals agreed with both points. In noting neither it nor the Texas Supreme Court had expressly addressed the bankruptcy tolling issue in a published, precedential opinion, the 14th court joined its sister courts and the fifth circuit holding Texas common law tolling principles are incorporated through 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) and the automatic bankruptcy stay tolls limitations.The 14th court of appeals also held notices of default conclusively established an abandoned acceleration because they (1) demanded payment of only the past due amount and not the full accelerated amount, and (2) stated if the borrowers failed to pay the demanded amount, it would accelerate the maturity date of the note.

Id. at *2. 6. 11 U.S.C. § 108(b). 7. 2020 WL 6038813, at *8.