The Government, however, argues on appeal that the trial district court, rather than imposing a sentence of life on its own, should have impaneled a jury and conducted a new sentencing hearing. The Fourth Circuit agrees, specifically, "we conclude that the district court erred by finding that § 848(g) was not saved by the general Savings Statute, 1 U.S.C.A. § 109."In the news,DPIC notesthatIn December 2007, New Jersey became the first state to legislatively abolish the death penalty in 40 years.

Issue:Does the Marijuana Possession Decriminalization Amendment Act of 2014 apply retroactively to offenses committed before July 17, 2014?Holding:No.The act was passed against the backdrop of the general savings statutes, 1 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) and D.C. Code § 49-304 (a) (2012 Repl.), which provide that the repeal or amending of statutes will not affect offenses committed under those statutes unless the legislature expressly provides as much.The DCCA held that “[t]here is no language in the Marijuana Decriminalization Amendment or its legislative history that expressly states or necessarily implies that the statute applies retroactively to” offenses committed before July 17, 2014.

(Dorsey’s argument is the same, with the factual variation that although his crime predated enactment, his sentencing was post-enactment.) The arguments appear to be purely statutory in nature – whether the general federal savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109 (repeal of statute doesn’t “release or extinguish any penalty” unless expressly provided) prevents this Act from retroactive application. Not clear, in other words, that the outcome will necessarily have much if anything to say about state results.

A remand, however, is ordered, as "the district court, after granting Stitt relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 as to the penalty phase of his trial and vacating his death sentence, erred by concluding that Stitt was no longer eligible for the death penalty because the statute under which Stitt's death sentence was imposed has since been repealed, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(g) (repealed 2006), and by sentencing Stitt to life imprisonment. We agree with the district court that Stitt is not entitled to relief as to his guilt-phase conflict of interest claim, but we conclude that the district court erred by finding that § 848(g) was not saved by the general Savings Statute, 1 U.S.C.A. § 109 . Accordingly, we vacate Stitt's life sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

A remand, however, is ordered, as "the district court, after granting Stitt relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 as to the penalty phase of his trial and vacating his death sentence, erred by concluding that Stitt was no longer eligible for the death penalty because the statute under which Stitt's death sentence was imposed has since been repealed, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(g) (repealed 2006), and by sentencing Stitt to life imprisonment. We agree with the district court that Stitt is not entitled to relief as to his guilt-phase conflict of interest claim, but we conclude that the district court erred by finding that § 848(g) was not saved by the general Savings Statute, 1 U.S.C.A. § 109 . Accordingly, we vacate Stitt's life sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.