) Significantly, unlike repealed section 23 under the former Crimes and Punishment Act of 1850, which required provocation from the “personkilled,” and unlike statutes in other jurisdictions which have adopted the common law, section 192 does not explicitly impose any requirement that the provocation come from the “person killed.” (Compare, e.g., A.S. 11.41.1 15(f)(2) [Alaska statute explicitly requires “provocation by the intended victim”]; C. R.S. 18-3-103, repealed and reenacted as 18-3-103(3)(b) [Coloradostatute explicitly requires “a serious and highly provoking actofthe intended victim”]; 18 Pa. C.S. § 2503 [Pennsylvania statute, which codifies the commonlaw, requires “provocation by the individual killed or another whom the actor endeavorsto kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death ofthe individual killed”]; Tx. Pen. Code § 19.02 [Texas statute requires “provocation by the individualkilled or 74 another acting with the person killed”] and former Tx. Pen. Code § 19.04 [former Texas statute required “provocation by the individual killed”].) Even under section 23, which arguably adopted the common law’s general victim-as-provoker tule and its exceptions, the mitigating effect ofheat ofpassion wouldstill be available ifthe victim was one reasonably believed to have provoked, one aiding in the provocation, or one accidentally killed in an assault on any ofthese persons.

Buck was certainly on notice of each of these elements, which are set forth in the Texas capital murder statute and were tracked in the indictment as well as the court’s guilt-innocence charge. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1) & 19.03(a)(7)(A) (West 1995) with CR 12.