(See Engberg v. Wyoming (Wyo. 1991) 820 P.2d 70); McConnell v. Nevada (Nev. 2004) 102 (01 See Code of Ala. § 13A-5-40(b) (2005); Ark. Code Ann.§ 5- 10-102(a)(1) (2005) [killing mustbeat least reckless]; 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2) (2005) [at least reckless]; Kans. Stats.Ann. § 21-3439 (2005); La. R.S. 13:30(a)1 (2005); R.S.Mo. § 565.021 (2005), Ginnings v. State (Mo. 1974) 506 S.W.2d 422; New Hampshire RSA 630:1, 630:1-b [at least reckless] (2004); Ohio ORC Ann. 2903.01(b) (2005) [at least reckless]; Or.Rev.Stats. § 163.095 (2003); Commonwealth v. Rollins (Pa. 1999) 738 A.2d 435; Tex. Pen. Code § 19.03 (2004); Utah Code Ann.§ 18.2-31 (2005); Rev. Code Wash. § 10.95.020 (2005). 300 P.3d 606.

But more than 20 years have passed since Tison. As noted above, in Kennedy the high court appears to have raised the death-eligibility bar to intentional murder, which 6(...continued) 638, 665 as examples .. 7 See Shatz, supra, at p. 770, fn. 252, citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01(D) (West 2007); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2007) as examples. -8- is wholly consistent with its emphasis on the need to restrain the reach of the ultimate penalty.

The State was not required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Prible killed the children with the required intent. See Tex. Pen. Code § 19.03 (West 2012). And in state proceedings, the question was not whether the prosecution at trial met the required burden.