In fact, the FLSA does not even apply to those employees who have worked under 40 hours in a week and who have been uncompensated for the work they performed during their meal breaks. Id. Therefore, T.C.A. § 28-3-105(3)’s three year statute of limitations has no bearing on Plaintiff’s state law unjust enrichment claims because the state law claims are not based upon any “alleged violation of any federal statute.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105(3) (2010). Consequently, this is not a “novel” issue as Defendant attempts to urge this Court. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s state law claims for unjust enrichment may be brought with Plaintiff’s federal claims for violation of the FLSA.

5813 (unjust enrichment SOL of 6 years); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-202 (unjust enrichment SOL of 3 years); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(3) (same); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1) (same); S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-13 (unjust enrichment SOL of 6 years); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105(3) (unjust enrichment SOL of 3 years). 15       8 b ’ ’ l i “ l st ‘ i ’” – ’ l 8 “ ” ICase 2:16-cv-02873-JLL-JAD Document 73-1 Filed 03/08/17 Page 16 of 23 PageID: 1174 Case: 1:08-cv-05468 Document #: 204 Filed: 03/03/17 Page 16 of 22 PagelD #:970 (citing Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983) (a class action lawsuit tolls the statute of limitations only for "all putative class members."))

Defendant’s statement of policy is prominent and not subject to misinterpretation. As to Plaintiffs federal constitutional claims, the Tennessee one-year statute, T.C.A. Section 28-3-105, clearly applies. See Wright v. State of Tenn., 613 F 2d 647 (6 Cir, 1980).

As to Plaintiffs federal constitutional claims, the Tennessee one-year statute, T.C.A. Section 28-3-105, clearly applies. See Wright v. State of Tenn., 613 F 2d 647 (6 Cir, 1980).

Quillen Coll. Med., 19 S.W.3d 803, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (confirming that fraud falls within the three-year limitations period of T.C.A. § 28-3-105). Defendants have advanced no argument suggesting that summary judgment is appropriate for either the breach of contract or fraud actions.

Jerry T. Beech Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Larry Powell Builders, Inc., 2001 WL 487574 at * 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2001). C. Statute of Limitations Under Tennessee law, breach of contract claims are generally governed by a six year statue of limitations, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105, while common law tort claims “for injuries to personal or real property” are governed by a three year statute of limitations, Tenn. Code. Ann. § 28-3-105. Ford seeks dismissal of the promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims because they were filed more than three years after Ford sold the dealership to a replacement dealer.

Sharp’s claims under the New York Unfair Competition Law and Tennessee antitrust statute are subject to a three-year limitations period. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(2); Pike v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 901 N.Y.S.2d 76, 81 (App. Div. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-105; State ex rel. Leech v. Levi Strauss & Co., 1980 WL 4696, at *1 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Sept. 25, 1980).

00 payment for June, such claims cannot be brought against Morgan Stanley or Saxon. As to Plaintiffs’ conversion claim, such claim is time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations under T.C.A. § 28-3-105. Exhibit 5 to the complaint establishes that the payment was remitted by the Plaintiffs on May 2, 2012.

“The analogous Tennessee limitations period for trademark violations under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(c) is the three year period provided for actions for tortious injury to property.” Johnny’s Fine Foods, Inc. v. Johnny’s Inc., 286 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 28–3–105). Clare has stated in her sworn Declaration that she neither visited nor had any purposeful contacts with Tennessee in the three years prior to February 5, 2016.