One standard was for divorces that preceded the new statute and another addressed divorces that occurred post-statute.Specifically, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(j) “[a]limony may be modified or terminated upon the prospective or actual retirement of the obligor.” We previously blogged on the Mueller v. Mueller trial court opinion from 2016 where the trial court said that an application made at age 62, ostensibly 5 years before retirement, was too soon.

ie case, a finding of cohabitation will be as rare as a unicorn. This cannot be what the Legislature had in mind when it codified the meaning of cohabitation . . . .” Id. at 370. “[W]e reject the argument that evidence of all these circumstances must be presented for a movant to establish a prima facie case of cohabitation . . . the statute does not contain the alpha and omega of what ultimately persuades a court that a supported spouse is cohabitating.” Ibid.We also recognized the difficulty movant has in establishing prima facie evidence of some of the statutory factors, particularly those bearing upon the payee spouse’s finances: …Demonstrating that a former spouse and a paramour are “sharing” or bearing “joint responsibility” for their living expenses is also something a movant is not likely to be able to present without a right to compulsory discovery. Absent an opponent’s voluntary turnover, a movant will never be able to offer evidence about the financial aspects referred to in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n).Though pretty clear that not every possible aspect of cohabitation had to be included in a motion, motions were denied. However, on August 8, 2023, the Supreme Court decided the case of Cardali v. Cardali which clarified the standard making it easier to make a prima facie showing of cohabitation necessary to get discovery. Specifically, the court held that a movant need not present evidence on all of the cohabitation factors set forth in Konzelman (the cohabitation case that applies to pre-2014 alimony areements, or in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) (for cases in which the agreement was executed after the 2014 statute’s enactment, in order to make a prima facie showing. Rather, if the movant’s certification addresses some of the relevant factors and is supported by competent evidence, and if that evidence would warrant a finding of cohabitation if unrebutted, the trial court should grant limited discovery tailored to the issues contested in the motion, subject to any protective order necessary

In this case, the Appellate Division in Wajda reversed the trial court’s decision finding the movant did not make a prima facie showing of cohabitation despite the movants undisputed Certification that the alleged cohabitant stayed overnight at the wife’s home nearly every night from October 5 through December 12, 2018, the alleged cohabitant often stayed in the wife’s home without the wife present, often used the wife’s car, handled chores around the wife’s house as if it were his and housed his two dogs in the wife’s house. While the Appellate Division disagreed with the husband’s position that he successfully demonstrated cohabitation through his pleadings filed with the court as the wife was in “a mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n), the court did agree he made a sufficient showing to warrant further discovery. Although this case yet another opportunity for the court to clarify what exactly a movant must provide to establish a prima facie showing of cohabitation, the court did not address this long standing issue – that is until June 17, 2021.Finally, the Appellate Division in Temple v. Temple, currently an unreported (non-precedential) opinion released on June 17, 2021, cleared up any confusion how the trial court when presented with an application for cohabitation must define the elements necessary to make a prima facie case of cohabitation and further explained that the court’s decision in Landau as a guide for this analysis is limited.

The honor of the first published Appellate Division decision of the new Term goes to Judge Accurso in this matrimonial appeal. The issue, as Judge Accurso framed it, was “whether the changed circumstances standard of Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980), continues to apply to a motion to suspend or terminate alimony based on cohabitation following the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n).”In Lepis, the Supreme court ruled that “[a] prima facie showing of changed circumstances must be made before a court will order discovery of an ex-spouse’s financial status.”

Here, Husband claims that but for his additional training and education after his divorce, Wife would have only received $665 of his retirement pension as opposed to $1,871 per month retirement benefit. On remand, Husband would have the burden of proof to show: (1) that $1,206 of the $1,871 plaintiff was receiving from his pension was the result of defendant's post-divorce efforts; (2) the $1,206 was "income" to plaintiff and outside the scope of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b); and (3) as a result of this additional "income," plaintiff will be able maintain the marital lifestyle without the $100 per week permanent alimony defendant had paid to her over twenty-two years.Quinn v. Quinn, 2014 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1108(App. Div. 2014), certif.

If you and/or your co-parent earn considerable income, an “above guidelines” child support award may be appropriate in your matter. Specifically, if the combined net family income exceeds $187,200, the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) must also be applied to your case to determine if a supplement to the child support guidelines award is appropriate.The factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) are as follows:Needs of the child;Standard of living and economic circumstances of each parent;All sources of income and assets of each parent;Earning ability of each parent, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, custodial responsibility for children including the cost of providing childcare and the length of time and cost of each parent to obtain training or experience for appropriate employment;Need and capacity of the child for education, including higher education;Age and health of the child and each parent;Income, assets, and earning ability of the child;Responsibility of the parents for the court-ordered support of others;Reasonable debts and liabilities of each child and parent; andAny other factors the court may deem relevant.In many child support cases involving high-income

ute is seemingly clear, even judges get it wrong sometimes. That is exactly what happened in the case of Sammarco v. Sammarco, an unreported (non-precedential) Appellate Division decision released on February 13, 2023. In that case, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision to terminate alimony because the post-amendment standard was used to address alimony that was first ordered to be paid, after a trial, in 1999.The 1999 alimony obligation remained in place until May 2021 when defendant moved to terminate alimony on three grounds: he was seventy-four years old, and beyond retirement age; he had been unemployed since March 2020, surviving solely on his Social Security; and he had medical issues, which impacted his ability to work. The trial court ultimately found that the recipient failed to overcome the rebuttable presumption that the payor/s alimony was to terminate upon his reaching full retirement age. In doing so, the court applied the statutory factors found at NJSA 2A:34-23 (J)(1) – which are the standards to be applied to post-amendment alimony obligations. (J)(1) provides as follows:There shall be a rebuttable presumption that alimony shall terminate upon the obligor spouse or partner attaining full retirement age, except that any arrearages that have accrued prior to the termination date shall not be vacated or annulled. The court may set a different alimony termination date for good cause shown based on specific written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The rebuttable presumption may be overcome if, upon consideration of the following factors and for good cause shown, the court determines that alimony should continue: (a) The ages of the parties at the time of the application for retirement; (b) The ages of the parties at the time of the marriage or civil union and their ages at the time of entry of the alimony award; (c) The degree and duration of the economic dependency of the recipient upon the payor during the marriage or civil union; (d) Whether

By application of this logic, if the judge determined the net yearly income was $1,520,268 or $126,689 per month, the alimony award allotted defendant disposable income of $36,7925 and plaintiff $89,897 per month without explanation. This was a misapplication of law because it ignored Crews and N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b)(4), which requires a judge consider “[t]he standard of living established in the marriage . . . and the likelihood that each party can maintain a reasonably comparable standard of living, with neither party having a greater entitlement to that standard of living than the other.”As an interesting aside, it appears as though the Court is espousing the theory that the parties’ net income equaled their marital lifestyle.

On September 10, 2014, Governor Chris Christie signed an alimony reform bill into law, which makes significant changes to the New Jersey alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. While the new law does not create alimony guidelines, it imposes restrictions on the duration of alimony and provides guidance on when alimony may be reduced, suspended or terminated. If you are going through or are contemplating a divorce, you should review these highlights to the new alimony statute: For any marriage or civil union that has lasted less than 20 years, the length of alimony may not exceed the length of the marriage or civil union.For example, if a marriage lasted 12 years, the supported spouse may not receive alimony for any longer than 12 years.

In specifically overruling Grange v. Grange, supra, the Supreme Court held as follows: The Family Part is a court of equity. We read the statutory requirement that directs equitable distribution at the time of the divorce judgment to be limited by the portion of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 that authorizes the court in its discretion to “ make such order as to the alimony or maintenance of the parties, and also as to the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children.” We conclude that, consistent with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 and Rule 5:3-5, the trial court may exercise its discretion to order the sale of marital assets and the utilization of the proceeds in a manner as “the case shall render fit, reasonable and just.”