But its latest tranche of grants of review consists of eight new cases, implicating numerous different area of the law.Arafa v. Health Express Corporation is one of two arbitration cases that the Court will take up. The question presented, as phrased by the Supreme Court Clerk’s office, is “If the plaintiffs are exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, are the parties’ arbitration agreements unenforceable, or can the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, apply in place of the FAA?” Reversing the Law Division, a three-judge Appellate Division panel, in an unpublished opinion, held that the inapplicability of the FAA made the parties’ arbitration agreement unenforceable.

The court held:“The primary purpose of the agreement was the resolution of the issues incident to the parties’ divorce through binding arbitration pursuant to the Act. This is evident from the contractual language stating: “The Parties having determinedthat such issues be referred to binding Arbitration pursuant to the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et. seq. . . . The parties shall attend binding Arbitration pursuant to the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et.

d of the burden of resolving our disputes.https://images.shulcloud.com/202/uploads/Divrei_Torah/Beit-Din-101.pdfAs with all arbitrations, prior to having a case heard by the Bais Din, parties must enter into a legally binding arbitration agreement, and a Bais Din is required to conduct proceedings consistent with the requirements of any other type of civil arbitration proceeding. Provided that is done, and there are no indications of fraud or other wrongdoing during the arbitration proceedings, an arbitration will be enforced by a civil court.The Family Part permits arbitrations related to resolve a divorce and all issues attendant thereto. However, there are specific procedures and mandates related to such arbitrations in New Jersey to keep in mind.Pursuant to R. 5:1-4(a)(5) – Arbitration Track:At any point in a proceeding, the parties may agree to execute a Consent Order or Agreement to arbitrate or resolve the issues pending before the court pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1, et seq., the New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1, et seq., or any other agreed upon framework for arbitration of disputes between and among parties to any proceeding arising from a family or family-type relationship except as provided in R. 5:1-5(a)(1). If the parties elect to arbitrate, the litigation shall be assigned to the Arbitration Track, provided the parties have executed and filed with the court the Arbitration Questionnaire, which is set forth in Appendix XXIX-A, and the Arbitrator/Umpire Disclosure Form, which is set forth in Appendix XXIX-D. Thereafter, the arbitration shall proceed pursuant to R. 5:1-5. Issues not resolved in the arbitration shall be addressed in a separate mediation process or by the court after the disposition of the arbitration.The procedure for agreeing to arbitration in the Family Part is provided in Rule 5:1-5(b), which sets forth “Prerequisites” to any Agreement to Arbitrate:(1)Arbitration Questionnaire.T

In its opinion, the trial judge rejected defendant’s arguments, finding the arbitrator reached his decision after reviewing ample evidence submitted by both parties and determining which of the expert opinions in the record was most credible. However, in reaching its decision, the trial court applied provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -31, establishing the grounds on which the court may vacate or modify an arbitration decision, rather than the corollary provisions of the APDRA, which were applicable to the parties’ motions.After substantially more motion practice, an appeal followed which ultimately affirmed the trial court’s orders even though the wrong statute was applied.

Arafa v. Health Express Corp., ___ N.J. ___ (2020). Justice Fernandez-Vina’s opinion today actually involved two consolidated cases, both of which were putative class actions. The issue was whether a contract that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. (“FAA”), exempts from its own coverage, can or must be covered by the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et seq. (“NJAA”). As discussed here, two different Appellate Division panels reached opposing results.

The legal framework is nothing new. Under the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. § 2A:23B-1 et seq., arbitration agreements are entitled to the “equal-treatment principle,” which requires courts to interpret arbitration agreements like any other contract. Thus, traditional contract law requires that the parties to a contract manifest mutual assent to the agreement.

Hereford, however, demanded an in-person arbitration hearing and eventually moved to compel such a hearing. Hereford asserted that the New Jersey Uniform Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, required in-person hearings. State Farm took no position.

In an opinion by Judge Currier in a matrimonial appeal, the Appellate Division held that an unenforceable provision inserted into an agreement to arbitrate would be stricken, and that since doing so did not “affect or defeat the dominant purpose of he agreement,” the agreement would otherwise be enforceable. Plaintiff sought to modify or vacate the arbitration award, but the panel concluded that he had not proven any of the limited grounds that the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32, offers as grounds to modify or vacate an award.Kite v. Director, Div. of Taxation, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2018).

Defendant moved to compel arbitration instead, and the Law Division and the Appellate Division both ruled that arbitration was required. On further appeal, and applying the de novo standard of review to the interpretation of the contract, the Supreme Court today reversed in a unanimous opinion by Justice Albin.The Supreme Court recognized that both the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq., and the “nearly identical” New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 et seq., enunciate “policies favoring arbitration.” But that policy “does not mean that every arbitration clause, however phrased, will be enforceable.”

In light of these disputes, the arbitrator declined to proceed with the arbitration and directed the parties to present the issues to the court.In February 2012, the trial court ruled that the arbitration should not proceed, finding that there was no meeting of the minds on the conditions, parameters, and/or scope of the nature of the arbitration, or the right to appeal. The court directed the parties to litigate their disputes and pursue their remedies in an action which had been commenced in Virginia by Selective Way.The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the arbitration would be governed by the provisions of the New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1, et seq. While the Act does allow the parties to modify or supplement the standard terms and conditions of the arbitration, unless the parties specifically agreed to any additional terms and conditions, the terms and conditions set forth in the statute control.