Without doubt, the clear public policy of the State of New Jersey is – and always has been – to eradicate invidious discrimination from the workplace, and a central purpose of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J.S.A. 10:5-12, is the prohibition of discrimination in all aspects of the employment relationship. Recently, this purpose has been extended by way of a new state mandate to ensure equal pay to all employees for equal, or “substantially similar,” work.Effective July 1, 2018, the Diane B. Allen Equal Pay Act (the “Act”) became the most sweeping equal pay legislation in the nation.

§§3-304, 3-304.1 (2016); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 105A(d) (2018); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(t) (2018); N.Y. Lab. Law §194 (2016); Or. Rev. Stat. §652.220 (2019); Wash. Rev. Code §49.

On January 9, 2017, Roseus filed a complaint against the State of New Jersey and the NJDOC alleging discriminatory practices and a failure to accommodate a sincerely held religious belief, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) which prohibits employers from imposing a condition on employees that “would require a person to violate or forego a sincerely held religious practice or observance” unless, “after engaging in bona fide effort, the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(q)(1). The State and NJDOC moved to dismiss Roseus’ complaint, and the trial court dismissed the case on June 30, 2017.Appellate Court’s Decision The Appellate Division ruled that Roseus’ complaint should be reinstated finding that there was no evidence the NJDOC acted in “a bona fide effort” or that it is “unable to reasonably accommodate” his religious practice without a “undue hardship.”

-letter-on-behalf-of-shareholders-to-officers-and-directors-of-novartis-ag/.[15] Starbucks Complaint ¶¶ 66–68.[16] See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Coca-Cola Never Adopted Diversity Plan for Law Firms; Group that Threatened Suit Targets Other Companies, ABA J. (Mar. 30, 2022, 8:39 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/coca-cola-never-adopted-diversity-plan-for-law-firms-group-that-threatened-suit-targets-other-companies.[17] See, e.g., City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating Richmond’s Minority Business Utilization Plan, which required prime contractors to subcontract 30 percent of city-awarded construction contracts to minority business enterprises, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).[18] See examples above; McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286–87 (1976) (holding that Section 1981 applies to “racial discrimination . . . against white persons”).[19] Perlowski v. Elson T. Killam Assocs., Inc., 384 N.J. Super. 467, 478 (Law. Div. 2005) (holding that N.J.S.A. 10:5–12(l) allows contractor, in this case a law firm, to sue a company for discrimination on the bases articulated in New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination, which include race and gender).[20] Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).[21] Flizack v. Good News Home for Women, Inc., 346 N.J. Super. 150, (App. Div. 2001) (holding that New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination applies to discrimination against white persons on the basis of race); Correll v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 21-1833, 2022 WL 5264496, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2022) (alleging that Amazon’s policies to “promote, encourage, and incentivize minority certified sellers” violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act).[22] Alexis Bateman, Ashley Barrington, Katie Date, Why You Need a Supplier-Diversity Program, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 17, 2020) https://hbr.org/2020/08/why-you-need-a-supplier-diversity-program.[23] Id.[24] 539 U.S. 244 (2003).[25] Id. at 270.[26] Id. at 276 n. 23 (“[W]ith respect to § 1981, we have explained that the provision was ‘meant, by its broad

llenging California’s board diversity mandates, the Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment brought a Section 1981 claim in addition to the Equal Protection claims that only apply to state actors. See Complaint ¶¶ 56–58, Weber, No. 21-cv-01951 (C.D. Cal. July 12, 2021), ECF No. 1.[7] See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”).[8] See Jeff Green, Corporate America’s Love For The Rooney Rule Is Under Scrutiny, Bloomberg Law (Mar. 21, 2022), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/corporate-americas-love-for-the-rooney-rule-is-under-scrutiny; Lila MacLellan, More Than 90% Of S&P 500 Boards Disclose Racial Representation. But The Numbers Have Barely Budged, Fortune (Nov. 2, 2022), https://fortune.com/2022/11/02/most-sp-500-boards-disclose-diversity-representation/ (Fifty percent of S&P 500 companies said “they’ve adopted a Rooney Rule-like policy mandating that boards include executives from underrepresented groups in candidate pools.”).[9] Saadeh, supra note 5, Order at 12-13 quoting N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)2.[10] Crest – Underrepresented Communities, 2022 WL 1073294, at *5–6

Accordingly, employers should strive to ensure that all personnel decisions are well-documented, thoroughly reasoned, and not based on an individual’s age.Further, despite the enactment of A-681, LAD still provides that it, “shall not be an unlawful employment practice to require the retirement of any employee who, for the two-year period immediately before retirement, is employed in a bona fide executive or a high policy-making position, if that employee is entitled to an immediate non-forfeitable annual retirement benefit from a pension, profit sharing, savings or deferred retirement plan, or any combination of those plans, of the employer of that employee which equals in the aggregate at least $27,000.00[.]” See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). This provision, which shields employers from liability for implementing mandatory retirement policies in the above circumstances, seems to contradict A-681’s intent to eliminate age discrimination in the workplace given that the aforementioned provision, in practice, disparately impacts older employees.

That ruling was discussed here. The question presented to the Supreme Court, as phrased by the Supreme court Clerk’s office, is “Did the Township of Ocean Police department’s “Maternity Assignment Standard Operating Procedure” violate the New Jersey Pregnant Workers Fairness Act and its provisions within the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12?” Vacating a summary judgment for defendants that the Law Division had entered, the Appellate Division held that the maternity SOP violated the statute.

There is little tenable argument as to the well-documented, pervasive hostile and discriminatory environment affecting the vulnerable female prisoner population at EMCFW. Notwithstanding, the NJDOC has successfully argued in the trial court that, technically, the class of prisoners at EMCFW somehow would not be able to prove that they were the subject of discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 et seq., (the “LAD”). This has effectively tied the plaintiffs up in an appeal, which is now set to be heard in May.The plaintiffs argue that this is precisely the type of case that the LAD was meant to address.

The act establishes that discrimination on the bases of hair texture, type, or style constitutes unlawful race discrimination in New Jersey.The Crown Act amends the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), which bars employers from discriminating against individuals on the basis of, among other protected categories, race. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a). Specifically, the Crown Act expands the definition of “race” under the NJLAD by adding the following two provisions:vv.

The first New Jersey state court published opinion of 2020 goes to Judge Sabatino. The case arose under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (“PWFA”), a 2014 amendment to the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(s). Judge Sabatino observed that the statute “ha[d] yet to be construed in a published opinion” before the Appellate Division’s decision here.