onse, Insurer argued that “the injury was not discovered until the fire was extinguished on July 13, 2018” and, thus, the suit was timely. Insurer also argued that its insureds could not have discovered the full extent of their injuries until July 13, 2018, because the fire “continued raging” throughout the night of July 12, 2018, and into the morning hours of July 13, 2018. The trial court, finding that the cause of action accrued on July 12, 2018, granted KC Welding’s motion and Insurer appealed.Insurer raised two arguments on appeal: 1) that the trial court erred when it determined that the fire was not a latent injury to which the discovery rule applied; and 2) that the trial court erred by determining that the cause of action accrued on July 12, 2018, when the fire started and not on July 13, 2018, when the fire was extinguished. The Supreme Court disagreed.Insurer argued that its inability to immediately know the cause of the fire created a latent injury. As stated by the court, Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(1) states that “[a]ll actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall commence within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued.” In addition, Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(2) discusses latent injuries and the discovery rule, stating that “[i]n actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed, and which involve latent injury . . . the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.”Discussing the discovery rule, the court held that causes of action accrue upon the discovery of the injury, not the discovery of the injury and its cause. In addition, it stated that for the discovery rule to apply, there must be a latent injury, such that the plaintiff is “precluded from discovering harm or injury because of the secretive or inherently undiscoverable nature of the wrongdoing in question . . . [or] when it is unrealistic to expect a layman to perceive the in

n 10 years, the plaintiff, in proving a prima facie case, must do so without the benefit of any presumption.” Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(12).MinnesotaStatute of Limitations: Strict liability claims are subject to a 4-year limitation period. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.05(2). Negligence claims are subject to a 6-year limitation period. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.05(5). Minnesota applies the discovery rule, under which “two elements must be present for a cause of action to accrue for injuries related to a defective product: 1) a cognizable manifestation of the disease or injury, and 2) evidence of a causal connection between the injury or disease and the defendant’s product, act or omission.” Klempka v. G.D. Searle and Co., 769 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (D. Minn. 1991).Statute of Repose: None, but Section 604.03 provides an affirmative defense for injuries occurring after “the expiration of the ordinary useful life of the product”—which is a jury issue.MississippiStatute of Limitations: 3 years. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. Mississippi codified the discovery rule, providing that an action “does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.” Id.; see Bryant v. Wyeth, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D. Miss. 2011), aff’d, 487 F. App’x 207 (5th Cir. 2012).Statute of Repose: None.MissouriStatute of Limitations: 5 years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120. Missouri codified the discovery rule: “[T]he cause of action shall not be deemed to accrue when the wrong is done or the technical breach of contract or duty occurs, but when the damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 516.100. The Missouri Supreme Court defined “capable of ascertainment” as when “the evidence [is] such to place a reasonably prudent person on notice of a potentially actionable injury.” Powel v. Chaminade Coll. Preparatory, Inc., 197 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Mo. 2006) (emphasis removed); see Levitt v. Merck & Co., Inc., 914 F.3d 1169, 1174 (8th Cir

1985).[24] Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49.[25] Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko, 499 So. 2d at 976-77.

In Mississippi, however, the cause of action begins to accrue when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery, 909 So.2d 47, 50 (Miss. 2005) (citing Miss. Code § 15-1-49).2.4 Requirements to Invoke JurisdictionFor a plaintiff to maintain a suit over the defendant, the court in which the suit is brought must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. A court has general jurisdiction to hear all claims over a party where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business.

granted the City’s interlocutory appeal and reverses and renders. “Finding that personal injuries are not recoverable in a claim under the Takings Clause and that the three-year limitations period under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 is applicable to takings claims, we reverse the lower court’s ruling, rendering a decision for the defendants.”Kimberlee Davenport v. Hansaworld, USA, Inc. – writ of execution – Davenport was employed by software company HansaWorld as its sales manager for the United States and Canada prior to her termination in October 2012.