The defendant, Comer, plead guilty to CSC-I. The original Judgment of Sentence neglected to order lifetime electronic monitoring, as mandated in MCL 750.520b. 20 months after the original judgement was issued, the trial court resentenced Comer and imposed lifetime electronic monitoring.

Defendant psychiatrist was charged with CSC 3 under MCL 750.520d(1)(b), force or coercion, for having sex with a patient.Defendant claimed, and the trial court found, that MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(iv) was unconstitutional as an improper delegation of legislative authority to the extent it criminalizes "unethical" or "unacceptable" medical practices.The trial court found that by delegating the determination of criminal conduct to medical/psychiatric boards, the legislature violated the nondelegation provision (article 4, section 1) of the state constitution.The court of appeals reversed, holding that it is appropriate for the legislature to incorporate medical or psychiatric standards as they have significance independent of the legislative enactment in which they function.

After an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court and subsequent remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the previous sentence was invalid and that the trial court had the authority to correct an invalid sentence without any time limitations. The Michigan Supreme Court agreed that the sentence was invalid, holding that “the Legislature has mandated lifetime electronic monitoring for all CSC-I sentences except when the defendant is sentenced to life without parole under MCL 750.520b(2)(c).” However, reading together the texts of the Michigan Court Rules regarding correcting mistakes in judgments and sentences, the Court held that “the [trial] court’s ability to correct substantive mistakes under MCR 6.435(B) ends upon entry of judgment.”

The Sixth Amendment, in conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each element of a crime be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, but that requirement does not apply to the consecutive sentencing statute, according to People v Deleon, No. 329031. MCL 750.520b(3) allows a term of imprisonment imposed for first-degree criminal sexual conduct to be “served consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed for any other criminal offense arising from the same transaction.” In Deleon, the trial judge found that the defendant’s criminal sexual conduct convictions (CSC I and CSC II) both arose from the same transaction and therefore imposed consecutive sentencing.

In People v. Cummings, No. 150116, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals because the sentencing judge “failed to identify any evidence from which one could conclude that the imposition of consecutive sentences was warranted.” While MCL 750.520b(3) permits a judge to make consecutive sentences for first-degree criminal sexual conduct and another criminal offense, the Court held that the sentencing judge must provide a basis for its determination that the two criminal offenses arose from the same transaction. If no such conclusion can be made, the sentencing judge must resentence the defendant.

In People v. Thompson, No. 318128, the Michigan Court of Appeals found that the trial court may only consider conduct occurring during the sentencing offense for purposes of scoring OV 7. Defendant Jackie Lamont Thompson pled no contest to one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC 1), MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(ii) and was sentenced to a prison term of 15-40 years. Defendant challenges the scoring of offense variable (OV) 7 pursuant to MCL 777.37, claiming that the trial court improperly considered conduct outside of the sentencing offense in its 50-point assessment under OV 7.

The defendant was convicted of four counts of CSC I stemming from the repeated sexual assaults of his three minor relatives. The first conviction was for a violation of MCL 750.520b(1)(a) and (1)(b), involving a victim under age 13 and a defendant over age 17. The trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence for that count consecutive to defendant’s other convictions.

In People v. Tomasik, No. 149371, the Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred by (1) admitting a recording of the entire police interrogation; (2) admitting expert testimony regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome under MRE 702; and (3) denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial based on newly disclosed impeachment evidence from a 2003 report concluding that the abuse victim tended to be dishonest. In 2007, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), stemming from the sexual abuse of a neighbor child. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded to the trial court in light of People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643 (1994), in which the Court held that when a defendant can establish reasonable probability that privileged records of a psychologist, sexual assault counselor, social worker, or juvenile diversion officer are likely to contain material information necessary to defense, the court must conduct in camera review of those records to ascertain whether they contain evidence that is reasonably necessary to defense.

People v Payne, 304 Mich App 667; 850 NW2d 601 (2014)(april’14). Under MCL 750.520b(2)(b) a defendant 17 years of age or older convicted of CSC 1 where the complainant is less than 13 must be sentenced to a flat mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years. Here the Defendant was 17 and a half years of age, and the complainant was 5 years old.

People v Payne, __ Mich App __; __ NW2d __ (No. 314816, 2014 WL 1386871 decided April 8, 2014)(april’14). Under MCL 750.520b(2)(b) a defendant 17 years of age or older convicted of CSC 1 where thecomplainant is less than 13 must be sentenced to a flat mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years. Here the Defendant was 17 and a half years of age, and the complainant was 5 years old.