Three days later, the employer terminated the employee, citing concerns that other employees had been frightened for their safety when the employee suffered the panic attacks.The employee filed a disability discrimination lawsuit against his employer under KRS § 344.040, which prohibits employers from discharging an employee because the person is a qualified individual with a disability. The employee alleged, among other things, that his employer failed to reasonably accommodate his request to abstain from their usual practice of having birthday celebrations, and failed to reasonably accommodate his request that his supervisor stop confronting him about his reaction to the birthday celebration.

Kentucky, for instance, has a statute that prevents employment discrimination due to an employee’s status as a smoker. (See KRS § 344.040). Although Ohio currently has no equivalent, as recently as 2015, a bill was introduced in the Ohio Senate to protect employees from employment action for any lawful off-duty conduct.On the federal level at least, more recently the Trump administration has moved to relax the legal standards applying to employer social media policies as they relate to the NLRA.

Lawful Consumable Products StatutesTwenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes giving some protections to employees who smoke. (See, Cal. Labor Code §§ 96(k), 98.6 (California); Colo. Rev. Stat § 24-34-402.5 (Colorado); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-40s (Connecticut); D.C. Code § 7-1703.03 (District of Columbia); 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 55/5 (Illinois); Ind. Code § 22-5-4 (Indiana); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 344.040 (Kentucky); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:966 (Louisiana); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 26, § 597 (Maine); Minn. Stat. § 181.938 (Minnesota); Miss. Code Ann. § 71-7-33 (Mississippi); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 290.145 (Missouri); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-313, 39-2-314 (Montana); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.333 (Nevada); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275:37-a (New Hampshire); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:6B (New Jersey); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-11-3 (New Mexico); N.Y. Lab. Law § 201-d (New York); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-28.2 (North Carolina); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-02.4 (North Dakota); Okla. Stat. tit. 40, § 500 (Oklahoma); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 659A.315, 659A.885 (Oregon); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-20.10-14 (Rhode Island); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-85 (South Carolina); S.D. Codified Laws § 60-4-11 (South Dakota); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Tennessee); Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-2902 (Virginia); W. Va. Code § 21-3-19 (West Virginia); Wis. Stat. § 111.31 (Wisconsin); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-9 (Wyoming).)These statutes vary in what protections they afford, exceptions they

I thought the panel decision was wrong when it was decided, as stated in this post, which says in part: "Here, though, the claim is a creation of state law, and to say that the statute involves "a substantial question of federal law" is just not true, or if is true, the federal right applies only to state actors. In Kentucky, KRS 344.040 "mirrors Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and therefore all the courts applying it, both state and federal, literally "use the federal standards for evaluating race discrimination claims." Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 2000).

Here, though, the claim is a creation of state law, and to say that the statute involves "a substantial question of federal law" is just not true, or if is true, the federal right applies only to state actors. In Kentucky, KRS 344.040 "mirrors Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" and therefore all the courts applying it, both state and federal, literally "use the federal standards for evaluating race discrimination claims." Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 758 (6th Cir. 2000).