le on direct appeal and are therefore foreclosed in post-conviction proceedings; (2) Because appearing in readily visible restraints is inherently prejudicial, if the issue had been raised on appeal, reversal would have been required unless the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the result as to either guilt or the penalty; (3) Stephenson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires him to establish substandard performance of counsel and a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for counsel's errors and omissions; (4) Even if Stephenson's trial counsel's failure to object to the belt or to the lack of finding of need for any form of restraint fell below prevailing professional norms, Stephenson has failed to establish a reasonable probability that any such objection would have prevailed; (5) In death penalty cases, we are to evaluate claims of newly discovered evidence under the standard established in 2003 by Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(k), which is whether the previously undiscovered evidence undermines confidence in the conviction or sentence; (6) Because Stephenson's claims of newly discovered evidence largely turn on the credibility of various witnesses and were rejected by the post-conviction court, they do not undermine confidence in Stephenson's convictions or death sentence; (7) Stephenson was not deprived of his right to a fair trial or due process because of the jury's exposure to various extraneous influences; and (8) The post-conviction court's conclusion that Stephenson failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State suppressed evidence that was material to his guilt or punishment is affirmed."Aaron Jones v. Allen,2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 9571 (11th Cir 4/27/2007) Challenge to the three-drug protocol in Alabama denied due to delay.Ivan Teleguz v. Comm, 2007 Va. LEXIS 64 (VA 4/20/2007) Turning aside many challenges on procedural grounds, relief denied on claims including: (A) change of venue; (

le on direct appeal and are therefore foreclosed in post-conviction proceedings; (2) Because appearing in readily visible restraints is inherently prejudicial, if the issue had been raised on appeal, reversal would have been required unless the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the result as to either guilt or the penalty; (3) Stephenson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires him to establish substandard performance of counsel and a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for counsel's errors and omissions; (4) Even if Stephenson's trial counsel's failure to object to the belt or to the lack of finding of need for any form of restraint fell below prevailing professional norms, Stephenson has failed to establish a reasonable probability that any such objection would have prevailed; (5) In death penalty cases, we are to evaluate claims of newly discovered evidence under the standard established in 2003 by Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(k), which is whether the previously undiscovered evidence undermines confidence in the conviction or sentence; (6) Because Stephenson's claims of newly discovered evidence largely turn on the credibility of various witnesses and were rejected by the post-conviction court, they do not undermine confidence in Stephenson's convictions or death sentence; (7) Stephenson was not deprived of his right to a fair trial or due process because of the jury's exposure to various extraneous influences; and (8) The post-conviction court's conclusion that Stephenson failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State suppressed evidence that was material to his guilt or punishment is affirmed."Aaron Jones v. Allen,2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 9571 (11th Cir 4/27/2007) Challenge to the three-drug protocol in Alabama denied due to delay.Ivan Teleguz v. Comm, 2007 Va. LEXIS 64 (VA 4/20/2007) Turning aside many challenges on procedural grounds, relief denied on claims including: (A) change of venue; (

inherently prejudicial, if the issue had been raised on appeal, reversal would have been required unless the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the result as to either guilt or the penalty; (3) Stephenson's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires him to establish substandard performance of counsel and a reasonable probability that the result would have been different but for counsel's errors and omissions; (4) Even if Stephenson's trial counsel's failure to object to the belt or to the lack of finding of need for any form of restraint fell below prevailing professional norms, Stephenson has failed to establish a reasonable probability that any such objection would have prevailed; he therefore has not established a reasonable probability that the result of either the guilt or the penalty phases would have changed. (5) In death penalty cases, we are to evaluate claims of newly discovered evidence under the standard established in 2003 by Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(k), which is whether the previously undiscovered evidence undermines confidence in the conviction or sentence; (6) Because Stephenson's claims of newly discovered evidence largely turn on the credibility of various witnesses and were rejected by the post-conviction court, they do not undermine confidence in Stephenson's convictions or death sentence; (7) Stephenson was not deprived of his right to a fair trial or due process because of the jury's exposure to various extraneous influences; and(8) The post-conviction court's conclusion that Stephenson failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State suppressed evidence that was material to his guilt or punishment is affirmed."Selected Excerpts from, & Commentary on, this Edition's Cases [Note formatting may be off below this point]The Texas cases Smith v. Texas, Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, & Brewer v. Quartermanat the blogCapDefNet's week-at-a-glanceThe general:I realized late that not all who visit the site will know the i

However, we cannot reach the same conclusion with respect to the outcome of the penalty phase. During the sentencing hearing, there was considerable evidence concerning the mitigating circumstances to be considered under Ind. Code sec. 35-50-2-9(c). For example, the PSR indicated the circumstances of Roche's troubled childhood and alcohol and drug problems, Roche's criminal history was relatively minor, and Roche's family members testified about Roche's remorse and about their improved relations with him.