Filed July 11, 2014
at 2183 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). By contrast, Illinois’ notice rule is a time limit for providing notice of one’s intent to rescind a transaction (not for filing suit), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13(B), and its purpose is to prevent plaintiffs from treating voidable securities as option contracts, or otherwise gaining an unfair advantage or imposing an unfair detriment on a defendant, by sitting on known claims.8 Nothing in the FCUA’s text, structure, or history suggests a desire to alter the state-law regime addressing these distinct concerns. In short, the “case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak,” CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2188 (quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575), and NCUA has not satisfied its heavy burden of establishing that the ISL’s notice provision and the FCUA are in such direct and irreconcilable conflict that the former poses “an unacceptable obstacle to the attainment of [the latter]’s purposes.”
Filed April 5, 2016
Stat. 5/13(B) .............................................................................................. 31 § 13(D), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13(D) ............................................................................................. 31 Texas Securities Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 581 (Texas Blue Sky Law) ................................
Filed February 3, 2012
. at 2 & ¶ 6. 67 See Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 595 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (equi- table tolling provision of 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13(D) may extend the three year limitations period by up to two years, “provided that plaintiffs properly allege and demonstrate the requisite grounds”); Frank E. Basil, Inc. v. Liedesdorf, 713 F. Supp. 1194, 1201 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
Filed March 6, 2015
The Illinois statute, however, provides an express private cause of action that extends to “[e]very sale of a security made in violation of the provisions of this Act.” 815 ILCS 5/13(A). Under the plain language of that provision, because reliance is not required for the State of Illinois to prove a violation of § 12(G) (as both the text and the analogy to § 17(a)(2) demonstrate), it is also unnecessary for any private plaintiff to prove reliance in order to recover.
Filed October 27, 2011
See 15 U.S.C. § 77m; Cal. Corp. Code § 25506(b); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13(D); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-12a509(j); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Filed April 5, 2012
So, too, do the state statutes relevant to NCUA’s claims, see Cal. Corp. Code § 25506 (“Limitation of actions”); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/13(D)(2) (“period of limitation”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17- 12a509(j) (“Statute of limitations”); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.