mow the grass; one-word, immaterial errors in the property’s legal description; or minor discrepancies in the government’s records of the property (e.g., government website indicates no air conditioning when the property does have air conditioning).A tax buyer seeking to receive interest and costs for a sale in error now has more limited means to do so, and a number of additional steps to take in order to prove a sale in error. If a tax buyer successfully asserts a sale in error, the county must repay the tax buyer’s full investment, 12% per annum interest, and the fees incurred by the tax buyer for the period of time the property was owned.Real estate investors and developers have a number of considerations presented to them from the Illinois legislature. Real estate tax parcel investors have a large loophole closed in asserting a sale in error. All residential developers must now include EV capability. Residential landlords must heed added pro-tenant requirements.1 765 ILCS 705/4.2 815 ILCS 505/1 through 12.3 420 ILCS 46/1 through 99.4 765 ILCS 710/0.01 through 2.5 Cook County Code § 42-801, et seq.6 Municipal Code of Chicago § 5-12-010, et seq.7 765 ILCS 705/20.8 775 ILCS 5/1-101 through 10-105.9 225 ILCS 320/0.01 through 43.10 765 ILCS 1085/1 through 35.11 35 ILCS 200/1-1 through 32-20.

In Esquibel v. Colgate-Palmolive et al., plaintiffs alleged a “price premium” theory of injury, claiming they would not have purchased the subject product, or would have at least paid less for it, had they known the mouthwash allegedly contained PFAS. Plaintiffs also brought claims under alleged violations of California's False Advertising Law, California's Unfair Competition Law, California's Consumer Legal Remedies Act, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS §505/1, et seq.), breach of express warranty, fraud, constructive fraud, and unjust enrichment.Although Defendants moved pre answer to dismiss on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action, failure to meet the heightened pleading standard for fraud, and under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the Court limited its decision to Article III standing. Specifically, Judge Laura Taylor Swain held plaintiffs failed to plead an injury in fact because the Complaint did not plausibly allege plaintiffs actually purchased PFAS-containing products. The court also granted plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint.Decision Focused on Whether Plaintiffs Plausibly Alleged Exposure to PFASNo physical injuries were alleged on behalf of plaintiffs. Instead, plaintiffs alleged that any amount of PFAS exposure was hazardous and that plaintiffs either would not have purchased the mouthwash had they known of the alleged PFAS presence or would have paid less for it. Plaintiffs’ claims wer

initiation of a sale under the Condominium Act of 1976; or (c) the entry of a judgment foreclosing the right of redemption. Second, on or after July 25, 2022, the measure prohibits a mortgage lender, condominium association, homeowners’ association, or tax sale purchaser, or an agent acting as a representative for any housing or financing entity of a homeowner, from commencing or proceeding with a foreclosure action until 30 days after sending the homeowner to warn of its intention to initiate or continue a foreclosure. (Like B 25-357, we note that this measure includes provisions identical to those previously enacted by the D.C. Council on a short-term basis while it considers permanent legislation with the same effect. B 25-364, a temporary measure that would extend the same provisions on a 225-day basis, is currently pending in the D.C. Council.)Illinois: Effective January 1, 2024, House Bill 2094 (Public Act 103-0292) amends the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1) to address requirements for mortgage marketing materials from a mortgage company not connected to the consumer’s mortgage company. Specifically, the measure adds new subsection 505/2AAA(a-5), under which: No language may be used to state or imply that any response by a consumer who is not an existing customer is required … such as the use of the terms “urgent”, “action required”, “materials inspected”, “time sensitive”, or “important account information enclosed”;The mortgage company’s name of the solicitor must be prominently stated in the body of the text, at the head of the letter or message in a font bigger than the body of the text, and on any envelope;The mortgage company’s name of the consumer may not be used to state or insinuate in any way that the marketing material is from the consumer’s mortgage company rather than the solicitor’s mortgage company and is merely a solicitation;The name of the consumer’s mortgage company must not be visible through an envelope window, app

Regardless of how they’re brought, these claims are not going to go away.Most recently, Trevor Darrow brought suit in Illinois against Just Brands USA, Inc., Just Brands, FL, LLC and SSGI Financial Services, Inc., alleging violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1. A similar lawsuit against Just Brands was filed in Florida.

[12] Graham v. Bank of Am., N.A., 226 Cal. App. 4th 594, 609-10, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 218, 231 (2014); see also Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1144, 63 P.3d 937, 943 (2003) (“A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered.”). [13] 815 ILCS 505/1, et seq. [14] Id. at 829. [15] Id. at 829-30.

The defendants appeal from an order certifying eight classes (which for simplicity we’ll pretend are just one class), consisting of persons in Illinois and Missouri who take eye drops manufactured by six pharmaceutical companies—the defendants in the case—for treatment of glaucoma. The claim is that the defendants’ eye drops are unnecessarily large, in violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010 et seq., because each eye drop exceeds 16 microliters (equal to a tenth of one percent of a tablespoon), and the class contends that the optimal size of an eye drop for treatment of glaucoma is 16 microliters, no more. In places it says that drops as small as 5 microliters would be safe, but its claim is merely that anything larger than 16 microliters is wasteful because, it contends, the additional microliters add no therapeutic value.The difference between the price per drop of the eye drops at their present size, and the presumably lower price if the drops were smaller, multiplied by the number of drops that have been bought by the members of the class, are the damages the class is seeking.

dismisses all counts of the Amended Complaint.BACKGROUNDIn September 2012, unsolicited individuals, known as “skimmers,” tampered with PIN pad terminals in 63 Barnes & Noble stores located in nine states. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 50, Dkt. No. 58.) Barnes & Noble uses these PIN pad terminals to process its customers’ credit and debit card payments in its retail stores. (Id. ¶ 20.) Six weeks after discovering this potential security breach, Barnes & Noble announced to the public that these skimmers had potentially stolen customer credit and debit information from the affected locations. (Id. ¶ 50.) Plaintiffs were customers ofBarnes & Noble at retail stores affected by the data breach during the time period when this data breach occurred.1 (Id. ¶¶ 12–15.)Plaintiffs filed the Original Complaint on March 25, 2013.(Dkt. No. 39.) The Original Complaint pleaded five causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”), 815 ILCS § 505/1 et seq.; (3) invasion of privacy; (4) violation of the California Security Breach Notification Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80 et seq.; and (5) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Act (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. Plaintiffs sought damages for, among other things: unauthorized disclosure of their PII, loss of privacy, expenses incurred attempting to mitigate the increased risk of identity theft or fraud, time lost mitigating the increased risk of identity theft or fraud, an increased risk of identity theft, deprivation of the value of Plaintiffs’ PII, and anxiety and emotional distress.On April 30, 2013, Barnes & Noble filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Original Complaint. (Dkt. No. 43.) The Court granted the motion to dismiss the Original Complaint on September 3, 2013 (“Order of Dismissal”), finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to establish Article III standing. (Order of Dismissal at 10, Dkt. N

Defendant notified plaintiffs that it was terminating their membership in the cooperative (and the parties’ agreement). The following year, the plaintiff filed a three-count complaint, purporting to allege claims for shareholder remedies, under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1) and for common law fraud. On plaintiffs’ motion, the circuit court dismissed the second and third claims with leave to amend, but denied the motion as to the first claim.

The Illinois Appellate Court recently affirmed a finding for a plaintiff individual, upholding the circuit court’s conclusion that defendant Sears, Roebuck and Co. (Sears) violated the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1) (the Act) by overcharging plaintiff sales tax on his purchase of a digital television converter box (converter box”).Aliano v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2015 IL App (1st) 143367 (Dec. 30, 2015).

See Rochelle Ibarrola v. Kind LLC, No. 3:13-cv-50377, 2015 WL 1188498 (N.D. Ill. 3/12/15).Plaintiff brought a putative class action against a maker of food products, alleging she purchased its Vanilla Blueberry Clusters with Flax Seeds (“Vanilla Blueberry Clusters”)—on two occasions in 2013. Citing the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”), 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1 et seq., she alleged that the packaging of Vanilla Blueberry Clusters was deceptive in that it claimed that the product contained “no refined sugars.” Specifically, she asserted that evaporated cane juice and molasses, identified on the products’ ingredient lists, are refined sugars.