ts’ policy to determine whether his vehicle was underinsured.The North Carolina Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Newby, reversed. It held that Herbert could not stack all UIM policies available to him, regardless of their connection to the car involved in the accident, before comparing his UIM limits to the at-fault vehicle’s liability limits. The court concluded that this “stack and compare” rule, which was first established in N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bost, 126 N.C. App. 42, 483 S.E.2d 452 (1997), contravenes the plain language of the UIM statute, which defines an “underinsured highway vehicle” as:a highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of underinsured motorist coverage for the vehicle involved in the accident and insured under the owner’s policy.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added).This language, according to the court, “clearly and unambiguously means that subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4)’s activation provision is concerned with the claimant’s UIM coverages that pertain to the vehicle involved in the accident, not all UIM policies for which the UIM claimant is personally eligible.” As such, the court held that “the only UIM limits that may be considered at the activation stage are those ‘for the vehicle involved in the accident and insured under the owner’s policy.’” It went on to explain that while the statute does not allow inter-policy stacking of UIM coverage when making the initial determination of whether UIM coverage is activated, it does permit stacking when calculating the amount of UIM payments ultimately owed to the claimant. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (“if a claimant is an insured under the underinsured motorist coverage on separate or additional policies, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to the claimant

The timing of service has been a thorny technical issue for plaintiffs since the case of Thomas v. Washington, 136 N.C. App. 750, 525 S.E.2d 839 (2000), where, arguably in a broad sense, the Court held that actual service upon the uninsured motorist carrier needs to be effected within the 3-year statute of limitation. Upon review of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(3)(a), there is no explicit language dictating that Rule 4 service must be made within the S/L, and that failure to do so should result in the dismissal of an action if service was made after the S/L, when the action was nevertheless timely filed within the S/L. The N.C Courts have continually analyzed this issue in the cases of Davis v. Urquiza, 233 N.C. App. 462, 757 S.E.2d 327 (2014), and Powell v. Kent, 257 N.C. App. 488, 810 S.E.2d 241, disc. rev. denied, 371 N.C. 338, 813 S.E.2d 857 (2018).

Third, the driver which hit the Plaintiff had insurance coverage, which tendered $50,000 to the Plaintiff for his injuries. Pursuant to the terms of the UM endorsement and N.C.G.S. 20-279.21(Financial Responsibility Act), that driver who hit the Plaintiff was not underinsured, and thus the Plaintiff was not entitled to UIM benefits from his own insurer. After finding that Universal's denial of coverage was proper and supported by North Carolina insurance law, the Court then deemed arguments regarding unfair trade practices or bad faith to be abandoned on appeal, as such arguments wholly related to the assertions that Universal failed to honor its obligations under the insurance policy.

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff tendered an underinsured motorist claim to his own insurance company, Universal. Plaintiff contended that because $1 million was the limit for bodily injury liability coverage under his policy with Universal, he was entitled to $1 million in UIM coverage based on the first clause of N.C. Gen. Stat. §20-279.21(b)(4) which reads as follows: “the limits of such underinsured motorists bodily injury coverage shall be equal to the highest limits of bodily injury liability coverage for any one vehicle insured under the policy.” Although there is language later in subdivision (b)(4) allowing the insured to purchase greater or lesser UIM limits, Plaintiff contended that that language contradicted the first clause and therefore the first clause should be given effect.