the claim is out of time”). A. The Limitations Period for Plaintiff’s Claims Is Three Years North Carolina’s three-year limitations period for claims of breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment governs Plaintiff’s claims. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-52(1), (4). Because this is a diversity action, Compl. ¶ 25, this Court applies New York’s choice of law rules to determine 4

2, 7.3 NOW COMES North Carolina Department of Public Safety (“Defendant”), by and through counsel, to hereby move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5). Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitation.

Negligence Under North Carolina law, negligence claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5). A cause of action for negligence accrues when the wrong giving rise to the right to bring suit is committed, even if the injury cannot be discovered until a later date.

had February 20, 2008 Fund I LPA (Cherington Dec. Ex. 17) at § 4.03; October 2006 Offshore Fund I OM (id. Ex. 7) at 23-24; March 2007 Offshore Fund I OM (id. Ex. 8) at 24-25; September 2007 Offshore Fund I OM (id. Ex. 9) at 25-26; December 2006 SSOF OM (id. Ex. 5) at 31. Case 1:12-cv-01244-AJN Document 63 Filed 10/25/12 Page 30 of 32 25 risk management, GPS issues at LightSquared or LightSquared generally. But even if the TAC adequately pled false statements by Harbert — which it demonstrably does not — it contains no factual support for the assertion that Harbert knowingly or recklessly made such statements. Fraudulent intent, or scienter, is a required element of a common law fraud claim under New York law, and it is not satisfied by conclusory allegations of knowing or reckless falsity.43 XII. Claims of Armfield and Lang Are Time-Barred Under New York’s borrowing statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202 (McKinney 2011), North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 (1), (9) (2011), governs Armfield’s claims because this is a diversity action, Armfield is incorporated and has its offices in North Carolina (Cherington Dec. Ex. 16 at II-13, III-1) and its economic injuries are deemed to have occurred there.44 Ontario’s two-year statute of limitations, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B, §§ 4-5 (Can.), likewise governs Lang’s claims because he resides there (Cherington Dec. Ex. 12 at 10).

For the same reasons, Plaintiffs’ state common law fraud claim also should be dismissed as time-barred. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(9) (2010) (three-year statute of limitations); Rothman’s Tobacco Co. v. Liggett Group, Inc., 770 F.2d 1246, 1249 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Wilson v. Crab Orchard Dev. Co., 171 S.E.2d 873, 884 (N.C. 1970)). II.

Laws § 600.5813 (unjust enrichment SOL of 6 years); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-2-202 (unjust enrichment SOL of 3 years); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(3) (same); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1) (same); S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-13 (unjust enrichment SOL of 6 years); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105(3) (unjust enrichment SOL of 3 years). 15       8 b ’ ’ l i “ l st ‘ i ’” – ’ l 8 “ ” ICase 2:16-cv-02873-JLL-JAD Document 73-1 Filed 03/08/17 Page 16 of 23 PageID: 1174 Case: 1:08-cv-05468 Document #: 204 Filed: 03/03/17 Page 16 of 22 PagelD #:970 (citing Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983) (a class action lawsuit tolls the statute of limitations only for "all putative class members."))

STATE STATUTES N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(5).........................................................................................19 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-53(4).........................................................................................19 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301.................................................................................................4 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)..................................................................................11-14 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)..................................................................................14-15 Case 1:16-cv-01108-NCT-JLW Document 72-1 Filed 02/24/17 Page 7 of 38 1 INTRODUCTION Following the tragic downing of their nineteen year-old son in Costa Rica, Plaintiffs-Appellants Roshni D. Thackurdeen and Raj B. Thackurdeen (hereafter collectively “the Thackurdeens”), in good faith, brought the instant action in the forum most convenient to them, rather than hundreds of miles away in the State of North Carol

The counterclaim was filed on December 21, 2016. Case 1:11-cv-00179-TDS-JLW Document 55 Filed 01/23/17 Page 1 of 4 2 ARGUMENT Statute of Limitations N.C.G.S. §1-52(4) provides for a three-year-statute of limitations for taking, detaining, converting or injuring any goods or chattels, including action for their specific recovery. If an action is one for conversion, it is clear that subsection (4) of this section is applicable.

75 et seq., (2) negligence, (3) res ipsa loquitur, (4) nuisance, and (5) trespass. Plaintiffs’ claims fail on several critical fronts: I. Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the applicable statute of repose, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16), and had expired before a substantive amendment of that Case 1:16-cv-01354-CCE-JEP Document 18 Filed 01/13/17 Page 1 of 3 statute was passed in June 2014, so Plaintiffs cannot successfully state a claim upon which relief can be granted; II. Because Plaintiffs’ claims had expired before June 2014 under the then- existing statute of repose, they could not be revived by subsequent changes to the law; and II.

First, Davis’ breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims (Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Twelve) are time barred under North Carolina’s three- year statute of limitations. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1); Toomer v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 171 N.C. App. 58, 66 (2005). Because Davis concedes that he was well aware of the alleged wrongs since 2011, he was required to bring his claims by no later than 2014, which he failed to do.