With Misenheimer v. Burris, a majority of the NC Supreme Court on Friday overruled a split COA decision, the majority author of which was the then Judge Timmons-Goodson, and said that the 'discovery rule' codified in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) applied to criminal conversation (sleeping with another's spouse). Misenheimer may indicate a broad application of the discovery rule, especially in cases involving deceipt or concealment, and a broad notion of personal injury.

years. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-8. New Mexico applies the discovery rule, so the three-year statute of limitations “commences when a plaintiff knows, or reasonably should know through diligent inquiry, that he or she has been injured.” Martinez v. Showa Denko, K.K., 125 N.M. 615, 620 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).Statute of Repose: None.New YorkStatute of Limitations: 3 years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214.New York applies the discovery rule, thereby triggering accrual on “the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the exercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff, whichever is earlier.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-c; see Gaillard v. Bayer Corp., 986 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Smith & Nephew Birmingham Hip Resurfacing (BHR) Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2775, 2018 WL 6067505, at *13 (D. Md. Nov. 19, 2018) (interpreting New York law).Statute of Repose: None.North CarolinaStatute of Limitations: 3 years. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1)-(5). North Carolina applies the discovery rule, delaying accrual until the injury “becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant, whichever event first occurs.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1–52(16); see Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 645 (1985).Statute of Repose: “12 years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-46.1.North DakotaStatute of Limitations: 6 years. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-16. North Dakota applies the discovery rule to cases involving latent injuries. “Under the discovery rule, the action does not accrue and the limitations period does not begin to run until the claimant knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, that a potential claim exists.” BASF Corp. v. Symington, 512 N.W.2d 692, 695 (N.D. 1994).Statute of Repose: None. The Supreme Court held that the statute of repose was unconstitutional in Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 611 N.W.2d 168 (N.D. 2000).OhioStatute of Limitations: 2 years. Ohio Rev.

COA14-740, 2014 WL 7124838 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2014), the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that the Town of Black Mountain could enforce subdivision performance bonds originally in the name of Buncombe County after the property covered by those bonds was annexed by and the bonds were assigned to the Town. The Court also held that the three-year statute of limitations in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52 did not apply to bar the Town’s action to enforce the bonds. Applying the framework established by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Rowan County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co., 332 N.C. 1, 9, 418 S.E.2d 648, 654 (1992) (“Rowan II”), the Court explained that an action by the State or one of its subdivisions to enforce subdivision bonds under N.C. Gen. Stat.

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger and recent modifications to North Carolina’s 10-year statute of repose, some have questioned how the repose period applies to environmental indemnity agreements. N.C.G.S. 1-52(16) provides that a cause of action for personal injury or property damage may not be brought more than ten years after the defendant’s last act or omission giving rise to the claim. Though the legislature recently added an exception to the repose period for claims associated with consumption of – or exposure to – contaminated groundwater, it does not explain when the repose period begins to run on enforcement of environmental indemnity agreements.

they conducted the investigation and made the discovery.” ¶¶ 31-32. Thus, the Court had to decide how to apply those critical, missing facts to a series of statutory and case law standards that tie claim accrual to its “discovery,” whether by a “knew or should have known” standard, “actual” discovery, or when discovery should have occurred “in the exercise of due diligence.”The Business Court held, at least at a Rule 12(b)(6) stage, that silence was golden (¶ 32):“[O]ur Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiff’s silence with respect to the facts necessary to determine the date of discovery is not a sufficient basis for dismissal.”Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C. App. 637, 641 (1997). Judge Earp noted that in Russell, then Court of Appeals Judge Wynn concurred, but disagreed with the notion that a plaintiff need not plead “facts sufficient to show” when the applicable “discovery” standard was met. In considering the “becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent” standard of N.C.G.S. § 1-52(16), Judge Wynn wrote that, “Since the discovery rule . . . provides that the cause of action will not accrue until this time, the complaint should indicate the time the injury occurred or reasonably manifested itself to plaintiff.” Id. at 642.StandingThe Court also considered a challenge to plaintiffs’ standing to bring several of their claims as a “direct” action. The Court noted the general rule “that shareholders may not bring individual actions to recover what they consider to be their portion of the damages suffered by a corporation.” Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 346 N.C. 650, 658 (1997). Judge Earp weighed the Barger exceptions where direct shareholder claims are permitted when a “special duty” is owed or where the injury is “separate and distinct” from those suffered by other LLC members.The Court rejected several breach claims that equally impacted the LLC’s members as plainly derivative and unavailable to the individual members. A couple of the surviving “direct” claims are

The PDPA, enacted several years after the EEPA, generally declares that the state’s public policy protects workers from discrimination based upon “a disabling condition.”The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the PDPA not only provided the plaintiff’s sole remedy but also established a 180-day statute of limitations, thus preempting the common-law statute of limitations of three years applicable to common law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, found in N.C.G.S. §1-52(1) and applied in Winston v. Livingstone College, Inc., 210 N.C. App. 486, 707 S.E.2d 768 (2011). The trial court agreed with the defendant and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim with prejudice.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in a split decision.

[5]Trillium Ridge Condo. Ass’n v. Trillium Links & Vill., LLC, 2104 N.C. App. LEXIS 1015 (2014) (unpublished).[6] N.C. Gen. Stat § 1-52(9) (2015).[7]Simms v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 140 N.C. App. 529, 532, 537 S.E.2d 237, 240 (2000).[8]Brinkman v. Barrett Kays & Associs.

The Court of Appeals has recently taken the case up on remand. In an unpublished opinion issued on December 30, 2016, the Court of Appeals decided that the ten (10) year catchall statute of limitation (N.C.G.S § 1-56) applied to this action, rather than the three (3) year statute (N.C.G.S. § 1-52(2)) that the Town sought to apply. The Court further determined that the question of whether the Town might owe legal fees under N.C.G.S. § 6-21.7 should be determined by the trial court, applying an abuse of discretion standard, and remanded the case to Moore County for additional findings.DEED FROM PUBLIC ENTITY WITH PUBLIC PURPOSE CLAUSE DOES NOT CREATE REVERSIONARY INTEREST IN PUBLIC ENTITY, ABSENT EXPRESS FORFEITURE CLAUSE OR RIGHT OF REENTRYIn 1948 the Town of Belhaven recorded a deed to the Pungo District Hospital Corporation ("PDHC") for a 100 foot strip of land.

§ 160A-314, it was that section that gave rise to any liability for assessing these fees. Thus, the town argued the three-year limitations period set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(2) should apply. The town also argued that, regardless of the applicable limitations period, the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the estoppel-by-benefit doctrine.

[3]White v. Consol. Planning Inc., 166 N.C. App. 283, 294, 603 S.E.2d 147, 155-56 (2004).[4] N.C. Gen Stat. § 1-52(1) (2015).[5]Toomer v. Branch Banking & Trust, 171 N.C.App. 58, 68-69, 614 S.E.2d 328, 336 (2005).