R. CIV. P. 12(b)6) AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT The Defendant, Bank of America, N.A. (the “Defendant” or “BANA”), respectfully moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiff Bassam Geha’s Complaint as to BANA. In support of this motion, BANA asserts that the Annunzio-Wyle Money Laundering Act, 31 U.S.C.A. §5318(g)(3), specifically exempts BANA from liability for Plaintiff’s allegations of defamation (Count I) and violation of the Massachusetts Privacy Act, Mass. Gen. Laws c. 214, §1B (Count II). In addition, Massachusetts’ witness privilege shields BANA from liability as a matter of law where BANA’s alleged “publication” of the surveillance photograph to the Cambridge Police Department constituted “statements made in context of contemplated criminal proceedings.”

Massachusetts provides a statutory right to privacy. M.G.L. 214, § 1B (“A person shall have a right against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy.”).

G. Case 1:15-cv-12331-IT Document 15 Filed 08/07/15 Page 2 of 10 3 On June 15, 2015, the City initiated this action, purporting to appeal the Supervisor’s decision to this Court. The complaint raises four claims, several of which arise solely under state law: Count I, which seeks review of the Supervisor’s decision under the Massachusetts Administrative Procedures Act, Mass. Gen. Laws c. 30A, § 14(7), see Compl. ¶¶ 16-20; Count III, which alleges a violation of a right to privacy under Mass. Gen. Laws c. 214, § 1B, see Compl. ¶¶ 23-24; and that part of Count IV that alleges an equal protection violation under the Massachusetts Constitution, see id.

Defendants’ Opposition at pp. 10, 16. This can be dealt with easily: Plaintiff has not asserted an invasion of privacy claim or irrationally reasserted his defamation claim under a different heading. Whatever defenses Mr. Beck and his publishers have to an invasion of privacy claim under M.G.L. c. 214, § 1B are irrelevant. It is futile to individually address each one of the cited invasion of privacy cases, because Plaintiff has not asserted an invasion of privacy claim. One point, however, does bear mentioning.

1982) (per curium) (stating that actual damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act include damages for “humiliation and mental distress” even without “out-of-pocket expenses”). With regard to the Massachusetts Privacy Act, M.G.L. c. 214, § 1B, Cheng is similarly entitled to seek damages for emotional harm and mental anguish. Romo does not cite any case law to the contrary.

Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 547, 437 N.E.2d 171, 175 (1982). As to invasion of privacy specifically, M.G.L. c. 214, 1B is considered generally analogous to the common law category of invasion privacy law proscribing public disclosure of Case 1:11-cv-10007-DJC Document 40 Filed 04/05/13 Page 9 of 12 10 private facts. Bratt v. International Business Machines Corp., 392 Mass. 508, 519, n.15, 467 N.E.2d 126 (1984).