No. Religious nondiscrimination provisions in Massachusetts FEPA (M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1A)). 6 To preclude forcing an employee to violate or forego the practice of his creed or religion, “including but not limited to the observance of any particular day or days or any portion thereof as a sabbath or holy day.”

Id.The plaintiff alleged that she was improperly dismissed from her employment due to handicap discrimination. Under Massachusetts General Law chapter 151B, § 4 (16), it is an “unlawful practice … for any employer … to dismiss from employment or refuse to hire …, because of a handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation required to be made to the physical or mental limitations of the person would impose an undue hardship to the employer’s business.”The plaintiff alleged that she was a “handicapped person” because she suffers from Crohn’s disease and that she was a “qualified handicapped person” because she was capable of performing the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation to her handicap; that is, with a waiver of defendant’s policy barring anyone from employment who tested positive for marijuana.

Id.The plaintiff alleged that she was improperly dismissed from her employment due to handicap discrimination. Under Massachusetts General Law chapter 151B, § 4 (16), it is an “unlawful practice … for any employer … to dismiss from employment or refuse to hire …, because of a handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, capable of performing the essential functions of the position involved with reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation required to be made to the physical or mental limitations of the person would impose an undue hardship to the employer’s business.”The plaintiff alleged that she was a “handicapped person” because she suffers from Crohn’s disease and that she was a “qualified handicapped person” because she was capable of performing the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation to her handicap; that is, with a waiver of defendant’s policy barring anyone from employment who tested positive for marijuana.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled this week that an employee’s use of medical marijuana to treat her disability may have to be reasonably accommodated under the state’s handicap discrimination law. In Barbuto v. Advantage Sales and Marketing, the Court said that the plaintiff-employee had a claim of disability discrimination under M.G.L. c. 151B §4(16) and that the lower court erred when it dismissed the claim. The Court held that the plaintiff, who was taking medical marijuana to treat her Crohn’s disease and was terminated from employment because she tested positive for marijuana, had a civil remedy against her employer for handicap discrimination.

As a basis for its decision, the court looked to the language of the Medical Marijuana Act, which provides that patients shall not be denied “any right or privilege” on the basis of their medical marijuana use. The SJC noted that a handicapped employee in Massachusetts has a statutory “right or privilege” to a reasonable accommodation under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 151B, Section 4. Where an employer’s policy prohibiting the use of marijuana is applied to an employee who is being treated with marijuana for a medical condition, “the termination of the employee for violating that policy effectively denies a handicapped employee the opportunity of a reasonable accommodation, and therefore is appropriately recognized as handicap discrimination.”

On July 17, 2017, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) issued a decision affording protections to some employees who use medical marijuana consistent with that law. In Barbuto v. Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC, the SJC considered whether an employer violated M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4, the Massachusetts anti-discrimination law, when it terminated the employment of an employee for off-site use of medical marijuana. The Barbuto case arose from Christina Barbuto’s application for employment in an entry level position with Advantage Sales and Marketing, LLC (Advantage) in which she would work at supermarkets promoting Advantage customers’ products.

s doctor an “Accommodation Request Inquiry Form” and job description, requesting information about “whether there [wa]s a reasonable accommodation that would allow [Der Sarkisian] to perform the essential functions of her job.” The doctor responded that Der Sarkisian was “substantially limited” in her ability to perform several “major life activities,” was having trouble performing all job functions because of her limitations, and that he expected that her impairment would last three to six months. Der Sarkisian’s doctor suggested “total temporary disability” as a suggested reasonable accommodation. But Austin Prep could not accommodate Der Sarkisian’s request for an “extended and continuing leave of absence with no set end date,” and accordingly, terminated her employment on December 26, 2019. Der Sarkisian thereafter filed suit, alleging disability discrimination in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act and M.G.L. c. 151B, and age discrimination in violation of M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4. After a failed mediation and engaging in discovery, Austin Prep moved for summary judgment on both claims, which the district court granted in full. As to Der Sarkisian’s disability discrimination claim, the district court held that regular attendance was an “essential function” of Der Sarkisian’s role at the time of termination, and that she had not satisfied her burden to demonstrate that a reasonable accommodation existed that would have allowed her to perform this essential function. Der Sarkisian’s appeal followed.The DecisionOn appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. In evaluating Der Sarkisian’s disability discrimination claim under the MacDonnell Douglas three-step burden-shifting framework, the First Circuit looked no further than step one, in which Der Sarkisian had the burden of showing that she (1) was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) was a “qualified individual,” and (3) was discharged in whole or in part because of h

A "natural or protective hairstyle," as used in the law, means "hair texture" and "hair type," in addition to "hairstyles, which shall include, but not be limited to, natural or protective hairstyles such as braids, locks, twists, Bantu knots and other formations." The laws modified to bar discrimination based on natural or protective hairstyle include those prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing and lending (M.G.L. c. 151B, § 4), in public school enrollment (M.G.L. c. 76, § 5), in school bullying and prevention plans (M.G.L. c. 71, § 370), in charter schools (M.G.L. c. 71, § 89), and in places of public accommodation, such as restaurants, stores and hotels (M.G.L. c. 272, § 92A). The law expressly prohibits any Massachusetts school district, school committee, public school and nonsectarian school from adopting or implementing any policy or code that impairs or prohibits natural or protective hairstyles.Conclusion and TakeawaysThe law authorizes the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) to provide written guidance, and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) to promulgate rules, regulations, policies and recommendations interpreting and enforcing the new provision.

(SeeConn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51i; M.G.L. ch. 151B, § 4 (9 1/2), (9); RI RSA § 28-5-7 (7); & 21 V.S.A. § 495j)Here is a summary of the law regarding pre-employment inquiries into criminal history information in all six New England states:Maine. Certain state government employees are protected from pre-employment criminal history inquires, but there is currently no ban-the-box law applicable to private employers.

As 2017 starts to wind down, Massachusetts employers should start reviewing and revising their employment policies and practices so they are prepared for the Massachusetts Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), which goes into effect on April 1, 2018 and requires employers with six or more employees to provide written notice to their employees of their right to be free from pregnancy discrimination. The PWFA amends the state’s anti-discrimination statute, M.G.L. Chapter 151B, Section 4, to make pregnancy or a condition related to pregnancy a protected class. While state and federal law already require pregnant women to be treated the same as other employees for all employment-related purposes, the PWFA goes further by requiring employers to provide reasonable accommodations, such as job restructuring, time off, private non-bathroom space for expressing breast milk, and frequent or longer breaks, to employees because of their pregnancy or pregnancy-related condition.