See DeSilva v. North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc., 770 F. Supp 497, 509 (E.D. NY 2011). The statute implicated in plaintiffs’ claim, M.G.L. c. 149, § 148 requires employers to pay their employees “the wages earned by him” within 6 or 7 days of the pay period in which the wages were earned. Massachusetts requires employers to pay employees who work more than 40 hours in a week “at a rate not less than one and one half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”

expressly states that it applies to the payment of commissions when the amount of such commissions “has been definitely determined and has become due and payable to the employee.” Id. at § 148 Here, the Complaint alleges, inter alia, that the Defendants are employers for the purpose of the Wage Act, that Mr. Doucot has earned and is currently entitled to portions of his bonus payments pursuant to the Agreement, that his bonuses and benefits are “wages” under the Wage Act, and that Defendants‟ failure to remit payment of these wages to Mr. Doucot is a violation of the Wage Act. See Complaint, ¶¶ 14-15, 31-35. The Agreement, which is attached to the Complaint, supports Mr. Doucot‟s argument that his bonus payments were earned prior to his termination.

Attorney General’s Advisory 99/1, available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/workplace/vacation-advisory.pdf. Here, Plaintiff alleges that, “[b]y their conduct . . .defendants have violated M.G.L. ch. 149, § 148.” Complaint, ¶ 38.

149, § 148 preempted by § 301); Mitchell v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261-62 (D. Mass. 2009) (claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 preempted by § 301); see also Cavallaro v. UMass Mem’l Healthcare, Inc., 678 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2012) (affirming exercise of federal jurisdiction over wage claims under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 because of preemption under Section 301) (citing Adames, 258 F.3d at 13). Remarkably, Plaintiffs fail even to mention Adames, the seminal case governing Section 301 in this judicial circuit, in their Cross Motion for Leave to Amend, much less do they provide any explanation as to how their proposed amendment yields a different result than their original Complaint under Adames.

See Manning, 2011 WL 864798, at *2 (claim of quantum meruit that “assert[ed] a failure to pay wages due for work performed” was preempted by §301); DiGiantommaso v. Globe Newspaper Co., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 85, 89-90 (D. Mass. 2009) (unjust enrichment claim based on failure to pay wages for time worked during breaks preempted by § 301); Hayes v. Aramark Sports, LLC, No. 08-10700-RWZ (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2009) (claims for violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148, quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, and breach of contract preempted by § 301). Moreover, these claims rely on the notion of a promise or implied contract.

Regardless of whether the administrative complaint requirement is jurisdictional, this Court has jurisdiction given Depianti’s receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the Attorney General’s office. The administrative exhaustion requirement is set forth in M.G.L. c. 149, § 150, which states, in relevant part, as follows: [A person alleging a violation of M.G.L. c. 149, §§ 148 or 148B, among other listed statutes] may, 90 days after the filing of a complaint with the attorney general, or sooner if the attorney general assents in writing, and within 3 years after the violation, institute and prosecute in his own name and on his own behalf, or for himself and for others similarly situated, a civil action…. Even if section 150 establishes a jurisdictional requirement, Depianti has satisfied that requirement, so this Court may adjudicate his wage claims.

at 9-10 (“The interrelationship of the state claims and a CBA cannot be avoided merely by refusing to identify the CBA in the complaint and citing the well pleaded complaint rule.”) To establish a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 149 § 148 and Mass. Gen. Laws 151, § 1B, Plaintiffs’ must demonstrate that they are owed wages or overtime as defined by the statutes, and whether they received a proper meal break. See Stanton v. Lighthouse Financial Servs., Inc., 621 F. Supp.2d 5, 10 (D. Mass. 2009).

Sterling Research, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31267, at *38 (quoting Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 18 Mass. L. Rep. 649 (Mass. Super Dec. 31, 2004)). In Sterling Research, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Attorney General under M.G.L. c. 149 § 148 seeking reimbursement of medical costs, certain bonuses, and company stock. Id.

39; MANUAL FOURTH at §§ 21.311-21.312. D. Claims To Be Certified Pursuant to the Parties’ proposed Settlement Agreement, the Parties specifically request that the Court certify, for settlement purposes only, the following claims: the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., claims for breach of express contract (for earned wages and missed or interrupted meal breaks), implied contract, money had and received in assumpsit, quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, negligent misrepresentation, failure to keep Case 1:09-cv-11461-DPW Document 91 Filed 11/05/10 Page 34 of 37 35 accurate records, and Massachusetts wage laws, including Mass. Gen. Law Ch. 149 §§ 148, 150 and Mass. Gen. Law Ch. 151 §§ 1A, 1B. (See Settlement Agreement at § III(G)).

See Compl., ¶ 3 (“Caritas Christi is an enterprise engaged in the operation of a hospital and/or the care of the sick . . .”). Likewise, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148 states that “[the Wage Act] shall not apply to an employee of a hospital which is supported in part by contributions from the commonwealth or from any city or town, nor to an employee of an incorporated hospital which provides treatment to patients free of charge, or which is conducted as a public charity. . . .” By the plain language of this section, Caritas’ employees are triply exempted from coverage because Caritas is supported in part by public funds, provides treatment to patients free of charge, and is a registered public charity.19 Plaintiffs’ cookie-cutter pleadings, recycled from lawsuits in New York and Pennsylvania, simply do not work in Massachusetts. Plaintiffs’ statutory claims must, therefore, be dismissed.