13 at 32), but non-voting securities—whether it be non-voting common stock, non-voting preferred stock, or any other non-voting security—are common. See, e.g., Huang v. EZCorp, Inc., 2016 WL 6092717, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2016) (noting that the company had “two classes of common stock, Class A Non- Voting Common Stock, which is publicly traded on the NASDAQ, and Class B Voting Stock, all of which is beneficially owned by [an individual]”); see also DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 151 (“Every corporation may issue 1 or more classes of stock . . . , any or all of which classes may be of stock with . . . voting powers, full or limited, or no voting powers.” (emphasis added)).

This does not plausibly infer that the Executives knew Adeptus’s stock price was inflated by fraud. Fourth, Defendants Fielding and Cherrington had no control over the timing of their stock sales, as they were made in connection with public equity offerings that were set by Adeptus’s Board. Compl. ¶¶ 92–96; see DEL. CODE ANN. Tit.8, § 151(a) (2018). Without such control, these sales cannot contribute to an inference of scienter, much less the required strong inference.