ost sales.[11] Nor was it necessary for plaintiff to point to actual lost sales because to impose such a requirement would foreclose that section of the long-arm statute to plaintiffs seeking anticipatory injunctive relief, which the Court considered an “unacceptable” result.[12] In 2006, Sybron was endorsed in Sung Hwan Co. v. Rite Aid Corp, where the Court of Appeals stated: “In Sybron, this Court held that a tortious act committed out of state that was likely to cause injury through loss of business in state was sufficient to satisfy personal jurisdiction regardless of whether damages were ascertainable or likely recoverable.”[13]The Second Circuit laid out the competing arguments in depth, including the legislative history behind the enactment of the statute and the competing lines of case law.[14] It then certified to the New York Court of Appeals the following question:In copyright infringement cases, is the situs of injury for purposes of determining long-arm jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) the location of the infringing action or the residence or location of the principal place of business of the copyright holder?In so doing, the Second Circuit sent an unmistakable signal to the Court of Appeals by highlighting that “the presence of online libraries and the Internet may have an impact on the Court of Appeals’ evaluation of the situs of the injury and may figure in the Court’s analysis.”[15]American Buddha raised a wide variety of arguments in its papers to the Court of Appeals. It argued that the Court had no place setting forth broad jurisdictional principles specific to copyright infringement when Congress had pre-empted the field. To decide on the situs of the injury, American Buddha stated, the Court would have to determine the situs of the copyright, which Congress had declined to do in the statute and which the fragmented complexities of copyright ownership would make impossible. It also again raised its library exemption defense under 17 U.S.C. § 108, arguing tha

Summary: City of New York v. Bob Moates' Sport Shop, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). In consolidated cases, plaintiff city filed a nuisance suit against defendant out-of-state firearms retailers, alleging that they illegally and negligently furnished firearms to prohibited persons, which were then trafficked into the city. The retailers had sold guns to straw purchasers, which transferred guns through illegal interstate markets to criminals in the city. The proposed settlement involved most of the retailers. The city sought an injunction abating the public nuisance by the appointment of a special master to monitor the retailers to ensure that they did not make illegal sales. Monetary penalties would be imposed for violating the judgment. The court found that the settlement was reasonable and would protect New York citizens without unduly inhibiting the retailers' abilities to lawfully carry out their enterprises. The court found that personal jurisdiction existed under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii) based on the retailers' supplying guns to individuals, who trafficked them to the state for criminal purposes. That the retailers knew or should have known that many of the guns they sold illegally would be trafficked to New York and used in crimes committed in the city constituted purposeful availment under § 302(a)(3)(ii). Subject matter jurisdiction was not precluded by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 7903, because the retailers' participation in the straw purchases violated federal laws relating to the sale and marketing of firearms. The court further found that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Heller was inapplicable to bar subject matter jurisdiction.Practice Note: This case is a compelling example of judicial bias and the lengths to which certain jurisdictions will go to limit Supreme Court precedent.

Court: Supreme Court of New York, New York CountyIn this asbestos action, defendant T.M. Cobb moved to dismiss plaintiff James Witte’s complaint against them for lack of personal jurisdiction. T.M. Cobb argued that it did not have connections to New York as it did not sell products, nor conducted business, in New York State. In support of its motion, T.M. Cobb relied on the deposition testimony of Jeffrey Cobb. Plaintiff opposed T.M. Cobb’s motion, contending that Witte identified working with T.M. Cobb doors in New York.Ultimately, the court denied T.M. Cobb’s motion. After noting the specific jurisdiction standard under NY CPLR 302(a), the court noted that plaintiff’s identification of T.M. Cobb doors in New York is “sufficient to establish T.M. Cobb’s business in New York during the 1960s.” Thereafter, the court set forth that T.M. Cobb failed to show that it did not sell or distribute doors to New York.Specifically, the court notes that T.M. Cobb failed to show that Jeffrey Cobb had personal knowledge of the sales and distribution ofT.M. Cobb products during the 1960s. In addition, “Mr. Cobb confirmed that T.M. Cobb has not retained any sales records from the 1960s, has no document retention policy, and that he was unaware of which states T.M. Cobb’s customers (largely dealers and distributors) were in.” As such, the lack of sales records, as well as an affidavit or testimony from someone with personal knowledge of sales and distribution during the 1960s, was insufficient to prove that T.M. Cobb did not sell or distribute doors to New York.Thus, the court denied T.M. Cobb’s motion.Read the full decision here.

undered the proceeds of the fraudulent scheme. The individual defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), and all defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).The court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants because they resided in Florida during the course of the alleged fraud. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that because one of the three defendants was licensed to practice law in New York, had been arrested and tried in a criminal case in the Southern District of New York — and that wire transfers to the defendant’s consulting company had been routed through a New York bank account — this was sufficient to find personal jurisdiction over all three individuals. The court determined that those facts did not show that any of the defendants actually transacted any business in New York sufficient to trigger specific jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1). The court also noted that while the plaintiffs purported to represent a nationwide class, the complaint did not allege any injury in New York sufficient to exercise jurisdiction. Finally, the court dismissed the aiding and abetting claims against the bank that allegedly routed proceeds from the fraud to offshore accounts, finding that merely transferring funds was “patently insufficient to plead substantial assistance,” and the plaintiffs failed to plead that the bank had any actual knowledge of the alleged fraud.Southern District of Florida Grants Class Certification in Securities Fraud Action Concerning a Company’s Initial Coin OfferingRensel v. Centra Tech, Inc.,No. 17-24500 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2021)Judge Robert N. Scola Jr. granted class certification in a securities fraud case alleging that Centra Tech, Inc. violated securities laws through the unlawful sale of its cryptocurrency.The plaintiffs were purported investors in Centra Tech’s initial coin offering (ICO) that took plac

Nov.30.2012On Tuesday, November 20, 2012, the highest court in New York State rendered a decision certain to send shockwaves through the international banking community. In Lícci v. American Express Bank Ltd. and Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that maintenance of a correspondent bank account at a financial institution in New York satisfies the "transacting business" requirement of the state's long-arm jurisdiction statute, NY CPLR 302(a)(1). The Court further found that international funds transfers processed through a New York correspondent institution constitute a sufficient nexus to satisfy the second prong of CPLR 302(a)(1) that plaintiff's cause of action arise from the NY-based transaction(s). In other words, a routine practice in which virtually every foreign financial institution engages to facilitate clearing U.S. dollar transactions for foreign customers has now been found to establish a sufficient jurisdictional basis to force foreign banks – even those with no U.S. branches – to answer civil claims in New York courts connected in even the most remote way to those international dollar transactions.In Lícci, plaintiffs, who are victims of terrorist acts in Israel allegedly perpetrated by Hizballah, have claimed that transactions processed by Lebanese Canadian Bank ("LCB"), including dollar transactions processed through its correspondent institution in New York, were for the benefit of Hizballah. The underlying