¶13; Ex. 8) Thus, besides the fact that Zwirner did not make the agreement, even if he had it would be unenforceable under N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a)(1), unenforceable under N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201(1)) and, moreover, void for vagueness. Robins has no likelihood of prevailing on his claims premised on this supposed agreement.

See also, Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285 (2d. Cir. 1986) (vacating summary judgment and holding that NY Gen. Oblig. Law s 5-701(a)(10) excepted out-of-state as well as New York licensed attorneys from statute of frauds requirement that "finder's fee" contracts be in writing); Rever v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 29 A.D.2d 920, 290 N.Y.S.2d 154, aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 652, 308 N.Y.S.2d 384, 256 N.E.2d 540 (1970) (applying attorney exemption and declining to narrow it to cases where there was an attorney-client relationship). Therefore, it is indisputable that the statute of frauds has no applicability to a contract to pay compensation to an attorney at law for negotiating a business opportunity and that the contract at issue in this case is a contract to pay compensation to Adams, an attorney at law, for negotiating a business opportunity -- namely procuring a business introduction, which resulted in Defendant earning millions in legal fees.

Case 1:07-cv-07017-DAB Document 4 Filed 10/09/2007 Page 7 of 9 -7- B. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred By The Statute Of Frauds Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is also barred by the Statue of Frauds because a contract to pay a “finder’s fee” must be in writing. Under N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(10) the following must be in writing: [any] contract to pay compensation for services rendered in negotiating a loan, or in negotiating the purchase, sale, exchange, renting or leasing of any real estate or interest therein, or of a business opportunity, business, its good will, inventory, fixtures or an interest therein, including a majority of the voting stock interest in a corporation and including the creating of a partnership interest. “Negotiating” includes procuring an introduction to a party to the transaction or assisting in the Negotiation or consummation of the transaction.

Such an indefinite licensing agreement is barred by the statute of frauds, because it cannot be performed within one year. See N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701; Meyers v. Waverly Fabrics, Div. of F. Schumacher & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 75, 78-79 (1985) (implied license agreement allegedly limiting use of fabric design not performable within one year); Zupan v. Blumberg, 2 N.Y.2d 547, 550 (1957) (“service contract of indefinite duration, in which one party agrees to procure … orders on behalf of the second party, is not by its terms performable, within a year”).

. Plaintiffs do not specify anything more about these supposed [b]y its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof or the performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a)(1) (2009). Further, “contracts of indefinite duration are deemed to be incapable of being performed within a year, and thus fall within the ambit of the Statute of Frauds.” Computech Int’l, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., No. 02 Civ. 2628(RWS), 2002 WL 31398933, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2002) (collecting cases). Case 1:08-cv-07508-SAS-DCF Document 56 Filed 05/19/2009

Even if an agreement existed between A. Kaur, Singh, and Baljinder and Defendants, the oral agreement allegedly reached by the parties is unenforceable because it violates the statute of frauds. Under N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(1), any agreement which is not in writing and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought is void if, by its terms, it “is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof.” See Sheehy v. Clifford Chance Rogers & Wells LLP, 3 N.Y.3d 554, 559-60 (2004); Stillman v. Kalikow, 802 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (2d Dep’t 2005).

103 The Plaintiffs suggest that New York law should be applied here, and the New York statute of frauds does not require agreements to loan money above a certain threshold to be in writing. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5–701 (McKinney 2001). Thus, it would seem that this contract would not be subject to New York's statute of frauds.

2011), aff’d, 81 A.D.3d. 503 (1st Dep’t 2011) ............................................................... 40 Whitman Heffernan Rhein & Co. v. Griffin Co., 163 A.D.2d 86 (1st Dep’t 1990) .................................................................. 33, 35 Wild v. Catholic Health Sys., 21 N.Y.3d 951 (2013) ......................................................................................... 44 Zeising v. Kelly, 152 F. Supp. 2d 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ................................................................ 33 xviii Statutes  61 N.Y. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 14 (2014) .................................................. 28, 45 61 N.Y. Jur. 2d Statute of Frauds § 349 (2014) ....................................................... 38 N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a)(10) ............................................................. passim Other Authorities  Report of N.Y. Law Revision Comm’n, N.Y. Legis. Doc.

To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to allege a breach of an oral contract, that alleged contract supposedly requires royalty payments for 15 years (Compl. ¶70),and therefore would not be enforceable because it would need to be in writing under New York’s statute of frauds. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701. 15 Case: 1:14-cv-06011 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/27/14 Page 22 of 29 PageID #:564 where the fraud occurred, or when it occurred.

New York’s Statute of Frauds expressly requires sufficient written evidence of an agreement to compensate the plaintiff to support a claim based on “contract implied in fact or in law” for compensation for services related to the development of a business opportunity. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(10). This provision bars Plaintiffs’ quantum meruit claim.