This legislative history settles the section 296(6) “attempt” clause issue this Court expressly avoided in Jews for Jesus v. Jewish Community Relations Council, 79 N.Y.2d 227, 233 (1992), by finding instead insufficient proof that the defendants had attempted to cause anyone to violate article 15. See id. (“[d]efendants did not provide, attempt or offer to provide assistance to those who could have denied access to plaintiffs” in violation of Exec. Law §§ 296(2)(a) and 296(13)) (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, based on the record at summary judgment, a reasonable jury could easily find that Allied’s “no hire” contract clause constituted an “attempt” to cause its New York subcontractors, including Astro, to violate Executive Law § 296(15).

The jury subsequently determined ASTRO committed no unlawful discrimination against Appellants, either on its own volition or at Respondents’ behest. On the record established below, the Certification Order requests this Honorable Court to address whether SIRVA or ALLIED could be held liable to Appellants for aiding and abetting ASTRO’s alleged termination of them when Respondents had no knowledge of or involvement in that event and the jury found ASTRO committed no unlawful discrimination against Appellants. 13 POINT I HRL SECTION 296(15) LIMITS LIABILITY TO AN "EMPLOYER" Sound statutory construction principles and the HRL’s legislative history leave no doubt that the Legislature intended the statute to apply only to an “employer” within the common law meaning of that word. A. Statutory Construction Principles.

But that assumption is not sustainable on the plain language and commonly understood definitions of the words and phrases used in the statute. As set forth in Point I.D. of the City’s initial brief, a number of other cases have given General Municipal Law § 50-i a broader reading and applied the statute to require notice of claim on contract, statutory, and constitutional claims. See Defs.’ Br. 72-74; see also 423 S. Salina St., Inc. v. City of Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 480, 482, 490 n.5 (1986) (dismissing claims against City based on NYS Constitution for failure to file notice of claim), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1008 (1987); Febres v. City of New York, 238 F.R.D. 377, 393 (S.D.N.Y 2006). The mere fact the plaintiffs’ claims are grounded in Executive Law § 296, or that such a statutory claim is not recognized as a common law tort, is no basis to exempt them from the plain language requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-i — particularly in light of the personal injuries and property damages they alleged in their complaint. Indeed, such was the outcome in Mompoint v. City of New York, 299 A.D.2d 527 (2d Dep’t 2002).

b. Plaintiff Fails To Plead He Engaged In Protected Activity Under Title VII Or The Human Rights Law Although Plaintiffs Complaint is confusing, even assuming he has articulated a retaliation claim under either Title VII or the Human Rights Law, the Court must dismiss such a claim. Title VII and the Human Rights Law similarly prohibit employers from retaliating against employees because the employee opposed any practices forbidden under Title VII or the Human Rights Law, or because the employee has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under either statute.4/ See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(7); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; see also Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (plaintiffs retaliation claims under the Human Rights Law "are analyzed pursuant to Title VII principles"). Although "informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints to management" constitute protected activity, "[t]he onus is on the speaker to clarify to the employer that he is complaining of unfair treatment due to his membership in a protected class and that he is not complaining merely of unfair treatment generally."

an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing discriminatory employment practices. See Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 24 (2d Cir. 2014); Asabor v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 102 A.D.3d 524, 528 (1st Dep't 2013). Contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion that "the Supreme Court has read . . . individuals' rights against retaliation" into Title VII "despite the lack of specific language in the statute" (see Compl. at ¶ 54), Title VII, as well New York State Executive Law § 296, specifically prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing practices forbidden by law. See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . ."); see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Plaintiff's claim falls well outside the employment context covered by Title VII or N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, and no similar statute prohibits retaliation for "exercising . . . rights under the [Montreal] Convention."

Under both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice “for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of acts forbidden under [the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL, respectively], or attempt to do so.” N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(6); N.Y. City Admin. Code § 8−107(6).

Specifically, under state law a union may not “exclude or . . . expel from its membership [an] individual or . . . discriminate in any way against any of its members” because of membership in a protected class. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(c). Likewise, under federal law a union may not (i) “exclude or . . . expel from its membership, or otherwise . . . discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1), (ii) “exclude or . . . expel from its membership, or otherwise . . . discriminate against, any individual because of his age,” 29 U.S.C. § 623(c), or (iii) “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

State and City laws also bar discrimination against those with disabilities. See N. Y. Exec. Law § 296-2(a) (barring discrimination in public accommodations); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 331(3) & 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § Case 1:12-cv-09162-KBF Document 15 Filed 01/08/13 Page 19 of 38 13 303.1 (barring disability-based discrimination in programs administered by Social Services districts); N.Y. City Human Rights Law, § 8-107(4)(a) (barring disability-based discrimination in public accommodations).

391 U.S. 367,] 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. We observe initially that the statutes at issue in this case that bar “direct” discrimination on the basis of, among other things, race or religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); New York Civ. Rights Law § 40; New York Executive Law § 296(2)(a), easily satisfy these criteria. Id.

The plain language of the HRLs does not apply to discrimination or retaliation based on medical leave. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107. See also McKenzie v. Case 1:11-cv-01554-KBF Document 34 Filed 04/09/12 Page 30 of 33 - 24 - Meridian Capital Grp., 829 N.Y.S. 2d 129, 131 (N.Y. App. Div.