As a final alternative argument, Plaintiff suggests that the First Department's opinion was procedurally, if not substantively, defective for failing to comply with NY CPLR § 5522(b). This argument has no merit, and, even if it did, the appropriate remedy would be temanding the matter to the First Department to write a lengthier opinion, and not reversing the First Department's decision. Accordingly, even if the Court accepts this argument, judgment absolute should enter for Crane Co. Section 5522(b) requires the Appellate Division to "set forth in its decision the reasons" it determined a verdict to be excessive under Section 5501(c), including "the factors it considered in complying" with that section. In so doing, the Appellate Division is not required to expressly compare the damages it believes to be appropriate with damage awards in other cases.

But again, when a party makes a request, the request in itself makes known to the court the action which it seeks from the court. The CPLR captures these two different circumstances, providing that an appellate court may review “any ruling to which the appellant objected or had no opportunity to object or which was a refusal or failure to act as requested by the appellant.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(a)(3) (emphasis added). The text before the word “or” refers to the circumstance in which a court makes a ruling (such as a 16 ruling requested by the adversary) and the party objects.

7. Is a New York State statute that requires a private nursing home owner to apply for and obtain prior written approval from the Commissioner of Division in its interim, non-final order upon review here, and are pure questions of law. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(b). The State agrees.

Section 4111, in turn, requires an itemized verdict only in “medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice actions,” id. § 4111(d), or actions “brought to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death.” Id. § 4111(e). By its terms, Section 5501(c) has no bearing on the excessiveness determination in the breach of warranty context.

By contrast, the Appellate Division is permitted to review questions of law and questions of fact. CPLR § 5501(c); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 N.Y.2d 43, 52 (1999) (“The Appellate Division, as a branch of Supreme Court, is vested with the same discretionary power and may exercise that power, even when there has been no abuse of discretion as a matter of law by the nisi prius court.”)

Id. at § 5501(a)(3). 12 In the courts below, there was no suggestion that there was any ambiguity about what Mr. Henry had requested at the hearing, or that he somehow was seeking relief from the courts that was different from what he sought in the hearing.

As Professor Siegel explains, “[t]here is no requirement today to follow an unfavorable ruling with the word ‘exception’ or any other word or words to indicate displeasure. As long as the loser’s position on the point has been made known to the court, the unfavorable ruling is preserved for appellate review without the follow- up utterance of the pouty ‘exception’ at one time in favor.” Id.; see also, e.g., People v. Grice, 98 A.D.3d 755, 755 (3d Dep’t 2012) (“To preserve an issue for appeal, a specific objection or ‘exception’ is not mandated; rather, it ‘is sufficient if the party . . . either expressly or impliedly sought or requested a particular ruling’”) (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 470.05; CPLR § 4017); Mars Assocs., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Educ. Const. Fund, 126 A.D.2d 178, 189 (1st Dep’t 1987) (party preserved for appeal its request that jury be asked to clarify its verdict, by requesting the relief and receiving ruling denying the request) (citing CPLR §§ 4017, 5501(a)(3)). Indeed, some courts have reprimanded counsel for objecting to the denial of requests, on the basis that doing so is disruptive and is plainly unnecessary to preserve the issue for appeal.

This case originated in the Supreme Court, one of the courts specified in CPLR § 5602 (a) (1). This Court has jurisdiction to review the questions of law presented herein pursuant to CPLR § 5501 (b).

16 STANDARD OF REVIEW Interpretation of an insurance policy, and whether a policy affords coverage in a particular case are questions of law subject to de novo review. N.Y. Const. Art. 6 § 3(a); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(b). Insurance agreements are to be interpreted under the same general principles applicable to contracts generally.

While it has been held that an Appellate Division may search the record and rule on issues not raised in the lower Court proceeding, the Court of Appeals lacks that power. See, Feinberg v. Saks & Co., 56 N.Y.2d 206, 436 N.E.2d 1279 (1982) and Brown v. City of New York 60 N.Y.2d 893, 458 N.E.2d 1248 (1983); see also, CPLR §5501. As such, the issue of whether the County illegally transferred the location of the accident is not subject to this Court’s review, as it was never raised in opposition to the underlying motion.