Plaintiff Trustee U.S. Bank National Association, on behalf of the Lehman XS Trust, Series 2006-GP2 ("GP2"), Lehman XS Trust, Series 2006-GP3 ("GP3"), and Lehman XS Trust, Series 2006-GP4 ("GP4") (collectively, the "Trusts"), and Freddie Mac Conservator Federal Housing Finance Agency (collectively, "Plaintiffs") brought consolidated claims against GreenPoint regarding GP2, GP3, and GP4.Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and indemnification claims for specific performance and damages arising out of GreenPoint's alleged breach of certain representations and warranties. Citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3), the Court first found that Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims under the mortgage loan purchase agreements ("MLPA") for all three Trusts were time-barred under New York state's six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions. The Trusts' respective MLPAs required GreenPoint to cure or repurchase the defective loans in the event that any of the mortgage loans breached these representations and warranties.The closing dates for the Trusts were as follows: GP2 on May 15, 2006; GP3 on June 15, 2006; and GP4 on July 17, 2006.

Plaintiff Trustee U.S. Bank National Association, on behalf of the Lehman XS Trust, Series 2006-GP2 (“GP2“), Lehman XS Trust, Series 2006-GP3 (“GP3“), and Lehman XS Trust, Series 2006-GP4 (“GP4“) (collectively, the “Trusts“), and Freddie Mac Conservator Federal Housing Finance Agency (collectively, “Plaintiffs“) brought consolidated claims against GreenPoint regarding GP2, GP3, and GP4.Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and indemnification claims for specific performance and damages arising out of GreenPoint’s alleged breach of certain representations and warranties. Citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(3), the Court first found that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims under the mortgage loan purchase agreements (“MLPA“) for all three Trusts were time-barred under New York state’s six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions. The Trusts’ respective MLPAs required GreenPoint to cure or repurchase the defective loans in the event that any of the mortgage loans breached these representations and warranties.The closing dates for the Trusts were as follows: GP2 on May 15, 2006; GP3 on June 15, 2006; and GP4 on July 17, 2006.

, does it still constitute designation as a state Superfund site for purposes of the statute of limitations? Likewise, a site might be identified by the DEC as a suspected site requiring more investigation before formal classification on the registry. Will that be counted as being “designated” so as to start the limitations period running?Conclusion The Hoosick Falls legislation appears to have been adopted to address a perceived problem that actually did not exist, as CPLR 214-c(4) and CERCLA §309 were already available to postpone the accrual date of a plaintiff’s personal injury cause of action until he or she discovered the cause of their injury. The ambiguities in the statute as to what constitutes designation as a Superfund site are likely to cause mischief, resulting in unnecessary litigation. In any event, plaintiffs now have an additional basis to avoid dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations, and a possibility that already time-barred claims will be revived.[1] N.Y. CPLR 214-(f), An Act to amend the civil practice law and rules, in relation to the tolling of the statute of limitations relating to personal injury cause by contact with or exposure to any substance or combination of substances found within an area designated as a Superfund site. A9568A, signed July21, 2016.[3] N.Y. State Assembly, Memorandum in Support of Legislation, Bill No. A9568A, (2016).[4] N.Y. CPLR 214-c(2)[5] N.Y. CPLR 214-c(4)[6] Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §9658.[8] As construed by the Second Circuit, a plaintiff would have a year after ascertaining the cause of his or her injury. Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2002).[9] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962 (1986) stating “[i]n the case of long-latency disease, such as cancer, a party may be barred from bringing his lawsuit if the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the first injury rather than from the time when the party ‘discovers’ that his inj