Do Not Arise Out Of Any Business Allegedly Conducted By AHRN, Inc. in Maryland The Maryland Long-Arm Statute states that “if jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, he may be sued only on a cause of action arising from any act enumerated in this section.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6-103(a). MRIS does not establish, as required under § 6-103(a) that its alleged causes of action against AHRN, Inc. under section 6-103(b)(1) arose out of AHRN, Inc.’s “[t]ransact[ing] any business or perform[ing] any character of work or service in the Case 8:12-cv-00954-DKC Document 29 Filed 06/15/12 Page 25 of 31 22 State.”

Paragraph 20 of Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that WhitServe “transacts business” in Maryland, mirroring language in Section 6-103(b)(1). None of the other statutory categories could possibly apply in this case. Section 6-103(a) further limits long-arm jurisdiction to cases “arising from” an act listed in (b). Fidelity, 21 F.Supp.3d at 513. This case “arises from” one letter sent to the District of Columbia, written by a Connecticut company’s Illinois attorneys, addressed to a Delaware corporation that is not even the Plaintiff in this case.

See Giannaris v. Cheng, 219 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692-93 D. Md. 2002). Pursuant to § 6-103(b)(4), a Maryland court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who “[c]auses tortious injury in the State or outside of the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State . . . .” Md. Code. Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6-103(b)(4). Copyright infringement is an intentional tort, and a defendant’s persistent course of conduct in committing copyright infringement satisfies § 6-103(b)(4).

The Maryland long-arm statute, however, restricts specific jurisdiction to cases where the cause of action “aris[es] from any act enumerated” in the statute itself. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 6–103(b)(1). Thus, a plaintiff must “identify a specific Maryland statutory provision authorizing jurisdiction.”

Section 1965(a) of RICO cannot provide a source of venue for the Plaintiffs’ RICO claim in this court. 2 Screen v. Equifax Information Systems, LLC, 303 F.Supp.2d 685, 688 (D.Md.2004) (citing Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §6-103(b); and inter alia ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 710 (4th Cir. 2002)). 3 Screen v. Equifax Information Systems, LLC, 303 F.Supp.2d 685, 688 (D.Md.2004) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.E2d 490 (1980)). 4 Sadighi v. Dahighfekr, 36 F.Supp.2d 267, 276 (D. SC 1999) (citing ESAG Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 627 (4th Cir. 1997)). 5 18 U.S.C. 1965(a). Case 8:16-cv-02855-GJH Document 57-1 Filed 11/09/16 Page 3 of 9 Page 4 of 9 Section 1965(b) provides that, “[i]n any [civil RICO action] in any district of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial district of the United States by the marshal thereof.”6

Maryland’s long-arm statute allows it to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants to the extent allowed by the due-process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Md. Code Ann. Cts and Jud Proc § 6-103; ALS Scan, Inc. supra at 710. Because Maryland’s long- arm statute has been construed to permit the assertion of personal jurisdiction in all cases where jurisdiction does not violate due process, the normal two-step process merges into one.

Carbone v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103241 , at *14-15 (D. Md. Aug. 6, 2016) (Bennett, J.); citing Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2003). Maryland's long-arm statute, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 6-103(b), “is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction set out by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution,” Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 396, but must still be examined as part of the two-step personal jurisdiction analysis. Carbone, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103241, at *14-15; Case 1:16-cv-02550-RDB Document 19-1 Filed 08/22/16 Page 2 of 7 - 3 - Mackey v. Compass Mktg., Inc., 391 Md. 117, 892 A.2d 479, 493 n.6 (Md. 2006).

See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §6-103 (2015); Dring v. Sullivan, 423 F.Supp.2d 540, 545 (D.Md. 2006). In terms of the timeframe applicable to any asserted contacts with the forum state, the Fourth Circuit has held, “[t]he proper focus in the specific jurisdiction analysis is on those contacts leading up to and surrounding the accrual of the cause of action. Later events are not Case 1:16-cv-01992-JKB Document 8-1 Filed 07/22/16 Page 6 of 16 7 considered.”

(2) The provisions of this section apply to computer information and computer programs in the same manner as they apply to goods and services. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc., § 6-103 (emphasis added). With respect to the recently added provisions in subsection (c) of the Maryland Long Arm Statute, the Commercial Law Article, Section 22-102 provides the following additional definitions: (9) "Computer" means an electronic device that accepts information in digital or similar form and manipulates it for a result based on a sequence of instructions.