Here, in addition to specifically requesting punitive damages in his prayer for relief, Plaintiff alleges in the body of his Complaint that Defendants knew of the Plug’s defects, knew of the dangerous nature of the defects, and still represented that the Plug was safe. Such conduct, if proven to be true, would constitute willful misconduct warranting punitive damages under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1. Whether discovery will reveal facts sufficient to carry Plaintiff’s burden of proving his entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence is yet to be seen, but he has shown enough to satisfy O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(d)(1)’s requirement that punitive damages be specifically prayed. Therefore, Defendants’ motion regarding Plaintiff’s punitive damages request is denied.

Even assuming the evidence permitted an award of punitive damages in some amount, there was insufficient evidence by which the jury could find specific intent to harm warranting an award in excess of the $250,000 statutory cap. See O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f), (g). Georgia Case 4:09-cv-00146-CDL Document 93 Filed 05/02/11 Page 26 of 40 - 18 - courts look to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A to define “intent” in determining whether a defendant has acted with a specific intent to cause harm.

103. Chant Group’s willful misconduct is attended by malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, and an entire want of care that raises a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences of its actions, such that Chant Group is also liable to SHM for punitive damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff SHM prays: 1.

(Emphasis added) O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b). O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b), imposes a strict state of mind requirement upon plaintiffs: Punitive damages cannot be imposed . . . without a finding of some form of culpable conduct, and negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to support an award of punitive damages . . . . There must be aggravating circumstances or outrage, such as spite, malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton.

; Briddle v. Cornerstone Lodge of Am., LLC, 288 Ga. App. 353, 355 (2007) (noting that loss of consortium claims are derivative of underlying claims). In addition, in order to recover punitive damages pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-5.1, a plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence of a defendant’s willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or want of care. Plaintiff has not and cannot meet this burden regarding McWane.

As set forth above, Plaintiff’s attempt to impose liability for Parker based on harms allegedly caused by asbestos in other manufacturers' products fails as a matter of law; therefore, Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim likewise fails. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1, in order to warrant a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiff must present clear and convincing evidence of willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or want of care. Carlock v. Kmart Corp., 489 S.E.2d 99, 105 (Ga.App. 1997) (citing Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Brown, 365 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. 1988)).

Even if the Court were to look past the fact that Plaintiff does not seek punitive damages and the fact that Georgia law does not allow recovery of unpled punitive damages, Defendant’s argument would still fail. In Georgia, punitive damages are limited to “tort actions” (O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b)) and explicitly barred in contract actions (ServiceMaster Co., L.P. v. Martin, 556 S.E.2d 517, 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). Neither of Plaintiff’s claims are “tort actions” and indeed, 3 Jackson v. American Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., is not to the contrary.

Case 1:16-md-02677-GAO Document 18 Filed 02/25/16 Page 13 of 19 14 argument would still fail. In Georgia, punitive damages are limited to “tort actions” (O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b)) and explicitly barred in contract actions (ServiceMaster Co., L.P. v. Martin, 556 S.E.2d 517, 523 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)). Neither of Plaintiff’s claims are “tort actions” and indeed, Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment is an equitable, quasi-contractual claim.4 Thus, even if Plaintiff had pled punitive damages, they do not appear recoverable.

However, no such cap applies where the defendant has acted with “the specific intent to cause harm.” O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f). Thus, given Plaintiffs’ allegation that they are entitled to punitive damages because of Defendants’ “effort to intentionally take business from Plaintiffs and Plaintiff class and to decrease the value of assets of the Plaintiffs,” and Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants had the “intent to injure them financially,” Compl.

However, no such cap applies where the defendant has acted with “the specific intent to cause harm.” O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f). Thus, given Plaintiffs’ allegation that they are entitled to punitive damages because of Defendants’ “effort to intentionally take business from Plaintiffs and Plaintiff class and to decrease the value of assets of the Plaintiffs,” and Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants had the “intent to injure them financially,” Compl.