The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the argument “miss[ed] the mark entirely. The evidence was not offered as expert testimony under OCGA § 24-7-702; it was offered as a party’s [Rule 30(b)(6)] admission against interest under OCGA § 9-11-32.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding, “[T]his statement by the Court of Appeals does not accurately reflect the law.”

hat motion. In so doing, the Court of Appeals erected substantial hurdles to successfully stating a claim against the DOT.The Munros’ claims had to fit within a statutory exception to sovereign immunity. In Georgia, the DOT has statutory immunity for losses resulting from “design for construction of or improvement to . . . public works where such . . . design is prepared in substantial compliance with generally accepted engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation.” OCGA § 50-21-24(10). So, to state a viable claim against the DOT, the Munros had prove that the design of the intersection was not in substantial compliance with design standards in effect at the time of preparation.The Munros had to find a qualified expert to opine on these topics. This is where things became interesting. Per Georgia’s Evidence Code, an expert witness whose testimony is to be used in a professional malpractice suit must have been licensed at the time of the alleged act or omission. OCGA § 24-7-702(c)(1). The Munros’ expert’s testimony was deemed inadmissible to support the claim of negligent design because the expert was not licensed at the time of design and installation of the intersection. The expert witness was first licensed in 1969. However, because the intersection was designed even earlier, the Court of Appeals found that the expert witness’s 54 years of experience were insufficient to qualify him to testify.The Munros also attempted to prove that the DOT failed to improve the intersection. This claim, too, was foreclosed to them by virtue of the Munros’ 80-year-old expert’s relative “youth.” Because this claim likewise required a showing that the original design was negligent—and the Munros did not have an expert who was licensed long enough to be qualified to testify to this effect—their failure-to-improve claim also failed.To its credit, the Court recognized that its application of the Evidence Code “effectively destroys an entire class of claims for the negligent design o