In order to plead a RICO claim under either federal law or Georgia Code Ann. § 16-14- 4(b), Plaintiffs must plead that Sanderson Farms “conducted” the affairs of a RICO “enterprise.” Case: 1:16-cv-08637 Document #: 2921 Filed: 07/22/19 Page 11 of 18 PageID #:204077 8 E.g., Walgreen Co., 719 F.3d at 854 (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis removed)); see Kimbrough v. State, 799 S.E.2d 229, 233 (Ga. 2017) (same, interpreting Ga. Code. Ann. § 16-14-4(b)). A RICO enterprise “must be more than a group of people who get together to commit a pattern of racketeering activity,” Richmond, 52 F.2d at 645 (internal quotation omitted), and requires a distinct structure, Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009).

B. Plaintiffs Fail to Plead Essential RICO Elements RICO’s pleading standards are exacting. To state a RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) or O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4, Plaintiffs must allege that Hansberry and Pepper Hamilton “participated in an illegal enterprise ‘through a pattern of racketeering activity.’” Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna. Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).

1. The Georgia RICO Claims (Counts III and IV) Fail Because They Do Not Adequately Allege Tiversa Is The Direct Cause of Defendants’ Harm. Plaintiffs claim that Tiversa is liable for violations of Georgia RICO, 13 O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4 (Count III) and Georgia RICO Conspiracy, 13 O.C.G.A. § 16- 4-4(c) (Count IV). However, both claims fail, as Plaintiffs have not plausibly pled a proximate-causal link between Tiversa’s alleged conduct and the FTC’s investigation and prosecution of LabMD. The Georgia RICO statute provides that “a person who is injured ‘by reason of’ a party's violation of RICO ‘shall have a cause of action for … actual damages.’” Am. Ass'n of Cab Cos., Inc. v. Parham, 661 S.E.2d 161, 166 (Ga.App. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting 13 O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c)). “Georgia courts employ the Anza ‘proximate cause’ standard to determine whether a plaintiff's injury is ‘by reason of’” a RICO predicate act. Brantley v. Muscogee Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 4:10-CV-77(CDL), 2011 WL 3706567, at *8 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2011) (citing Am. Ass’n of Cab Cos., Inc. v. Parham, 661 S.E.2d 161, 166–67 (Ga. App. 2008); see also Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 614 S.E.2d 758, 760 (Ga. 2005) (“Because the Georgia RICO Act wa

Plaintiffs make state law claims of breach of contract and bad faith pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (2007). Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant violated the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (hereinafter “RICO”), O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4 (2007). Defendant removed the suit to this court on January 26, 2007, claiming federal jurisdiction due to diversity among the parties and filed the instant motion to dismiss the complaint in part on February 1, 2007.

Separately, Georgia's RICO statute makes it unlawful for "any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity." O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(b). "Enterprise" means any legal entity or group of individuals associated in fact.

But Plaintiffs’ RICO claims are uniquely deficient as to Sanderson Farms: Plaintiffs cannot plead Georgia or federal RICO claims against Sanderson Farms because they do not and cannot allege that Sanderson Farms participated in RICO “enterprise.” See Ga. Code Ann. § 16-14-4(b); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962–64. Indeed, according to Plaintiffs, the Georgia Dock Defendants associated with each other to form and participate in a RICO “enterprise” in part through their state-appointed Advisory Committee membership.

..................................................................... 17, 21, 29, 30 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) ........................................................................................... 17, 21 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) ........................................................................................... 18, 20 O.C.G.A. § 16-4-4(a) ......................................................................................... 17, 21 O.C.G.A. § 16-4-4(b) ......................................................................................... 17, 21 O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3 .................................................................................................... 23 O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(8)(A) ....................................................................................... 24 O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(9)(A)(i)-(xl) ............................................................................ 22 Case 1:16-cv-03690-TCB Document 36-1 Filed 06/26/17 Page 10 of 60 - ix - O.C.G.A § 16-14-4 ................................................................................................... 30 O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c) ............................................................................................. 30 Other Authorities Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ......................................................................................................... 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) .................................................................................................... 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) .............................................................................................. 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .............................................................................................. 3 Case 1:16-cv-03690-TCB Document 36-1 Filed 06/26/17 Page 11 of 60 INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) disregards applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s April 28, 2017 Order, which explicitly instructe

Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 950 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). Similarly, a party “may be found liable for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(c) if they knowingly and willfully join a conspiracy which itself contains a common plan or purpose to commit two or more predicate acts.” Rosen v. Protective Life Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2011).

Under either federal or state law, however, Plaintiff must allege, at a minimum, (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise Case 1:16-cv-02114-AT Document 13-1 Filed 07/28/16 Page 18 of 22 19 ATL:0530018/01197:528172v3 (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. See O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. Each of these elements must be pled with particularity as required under Rule 9(b).