ionment statute. As a result, direct negligence claims are no longer subject to summary judgment when the employer admits vicarious liability. As a practical matter, this shift in employer protections under the likely means plaintiffs will be more aggressive in pursuing discovery of the employer’s hiring practices, training, and supervision and lead to the need for more detailed summary judgment motions on each of the direct negligence claims.Double Recovery of Attorneys’ FeesIn March 2022 the Georgia Supreme Court issued its ruling in Junior v. Graham, 313 Ga. 410 (2022). The facts of the case arise out of a motor vehicle accident. After the plaintiff filed his complaint but before trial, plaintiff sent a settlement offer of $600,000 to the defendant. The defendant did not respond within the statutory timeline and the offer was deemed denied. At trial plaintiff was awarded $3 million in compensatory damages plus $1.2 million in attorney’s fees and $51,555 in litigation expenses under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. Because the jury’s award for compensatory damages exceeded plaintiffs’ settlement offer by more than 125%, he filed a post-trial motion for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses under O.C.G.A § 9-11-68. The trial court denied this motion and reasoned that to allow both awards would be to permit double recovery. On appeal the Supreme Court determined that awarding attorneys’ fees under both O.C.G.A. §13-6-11 and O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 did not permit double recovery because the while text of both statutes are similar, they have significant differences. The main difference is that O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 is read as an award as part of damages while O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(2) is read as a sanction for improper behavior. The second difference is that O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 is a permissive award while O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b)(2) is a required penalty. Finally, the legislature placed no limitation on plaintiffs’ ability to collect under both statutes as it has done with past statutes on attorneys’ fees.Thi

This limitation applies even where a jury or trier-of-fact expressly determines that a non-party to the case was also at fault. In practical terms, single-named-defendants in Georgia litigation may now be obligated to cover the entirety of a damage award, minus any proportion attributable to the plaintiff’s fault, regardless of a non-party’s liability.Second, an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses of litigation under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 – typically reserved only for instances of bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, or unnecessary trouble and expense – is subject to apportionment under Section 51-12-13.Georgia’s Apportionment StatuteGeorgia’s apportionment statute, enacted as part of the Tort Reform Act of 2005, governs the reduction of damages awarded by a jury based upon the proportion of fault attributed to others.

On November 20, 2012, Brightharbour Consulting, LLC, 3Lins, LLC, Alden D. Kent, and Hsi-Ming Lin filed a complaint in the Atlanta Division of the Northern District of Georgia against Docuconsulting, LLC, Pivot LLC, Broadwater LLC, Richard Lee, and Daniel Haggerty. The complaint asserts copyright infringement counts and a count under O.C.G.A § 13-6-11 against all defendants, as well as other counts against all defendants except Broadwater, namely, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract. The complaint includes the following allegations:In November of 2008, Brightharbour LLC and Pivot LLC, owned by Alden Kent and Richard Lee respectively, joined to form Docuconsulting LLC (“Docuconsulting”). Docuconsulting specializes in “…the business of assisting insurance companies and companies in the insurance industry to improve their processes through computer software technology.”

First, in the will contest proceeding, the issue of attorney’s fees was never put to the jury. Under the applicable Georgia attorney’s fees statute (O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11), only the factfinder in the particular case can award attorney’s fees. Second, a party cannot recover fees under that attorney’s fees statute to the extent that those fees were incurred in a prior legal action.