Section 13A-5-49 - Aggravating circumstances

1 Analyses of this statute by attorneys

  1. Capital Defense Weekly, July 31, 2006

    Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 30, 2006

    are engaged in a demented, premeditated game of "gotcha" with the courts, but rather that those lawyers representing the absolute pariahs of society are frequently hamstrung by a critical lack of relevant experience, an obvious lack of time and resources, or both. If Judge Boggs truly wishes to bring finality to murder prosecutions in this circuit, I would invite him to spend less time denigrating the dedicated, but often overwhelmed, attorneys who have accepted the responsibility of representation in these very difficult cases, and more time working for improvement of the system.Ex Parte Stanley Stephens (In Re: Stanley Stephens v. State of Alabama), 2006 Ala. LEXIS 183 (Ala 7/28/2006) The trial court's misinstruction on the governing law as it at existed at the time of the offense and not the statutory change that came in to effect only after the incident was error.Based on these facts, the State argued during the sentencing phase that the statutory aggravating circumstance found in § 13A-5-49(8), Ala. Code 1975 - that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel when compared to other capital offenses - existed. The State also introduced evidence indicating that the statutory aggravating circumstance found in Based on these facts, the State argued during the sentencing phase that the statutory aggravating circumstance found in § 13A-5-49(8), Ala. Code 1975§ 13A-5-49(2) - that the defendant had previously been cconvicted of a violent felony - existed because Stephens had been conviccted of second-degree assault for firing a shotgun at Annie in 1992. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that those two statutory aggravating circumstances existed. By special interrogatory, the jury indicated that it had found beyond a reasonable doubt that both of these statutory aggravating circumstances were present.However, the trial court also instructed the jury that the fact that Stephens "intentionally caused the death of two or persons by one act" [*5] was a statutory aggravating