Section 13A-5-45 - Sentence hearing - Delay; statements and arguments; admissibility of evidence; burden of proof; mitigating and aggravating circumstances

7 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. ROMERO (ORLANDO) & SELF (CHRISTOPHER)

    Appellant, Christopher Self, Opening Brief

    Filed September 25, 2006

    California law as interpreted by this Court does not require that a reasonable doubt standard be used during any part of the penalty phase of a defendant’s trial, except as to proofofprior criminality relied upon as an aggravating circumstance -- and evenin that context the required finding neednot be unanimous. (People v. Fairbanks (1977) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1255; see also '"6+ See Ala. Code, § 13A-5-45(e) (1975); Ark. Code Ann., § 5-4-603 (Michie 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 16-11-104-1.3-1201(1)(d) (West 2002); Del. Code Ann.tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)a.1. (2002); Ga. Code Ann., § 17-10-30(c) (Harrison 1990); Idaho Code, § 19-2515(3)(b) (2003); Il. Ann.Stat. ch. 38, para. 9-1(f) (Smith-Hurd 1992); Ind. Code Ann., §§ 35-50-2-9(a), (e) (West 1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 532.025(3) (Michie 1992); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.art. 905.3 (West 1984); Md. Ann. Codeart. 27, §§ 413(d), (£), (g) (1957); Miss. Code Ann., § 99-19-103 (1993); Neb. Rev.Stat., § 29-2520(4)(f) (2002) ; Nev. Rev.Stat.

  2. PEOPLE v. CLARK (WILLIAM CLINTON)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed June 17, 2005

    In the Wake of Ring, Any Aggravating Factor Necessary to the Imposition of Death Must Be Found True Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. Twenty-six states require that factors relied on to impose death in a penalty phase must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and three additional states have related provisions.*' Only California and four 31 See Ala. Code § 13A-5-45(e) (1975); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-603 (Michie 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-11-103(d) (West 1992); Del. Code Ann.tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)(a) (1992); Ga. Code Ann. § 1710-30(c) (Harrison 1990); Idaho Code § 19-2515(g) (1993); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, para. 9-1(f (Smith-Hurd 1992); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 35-50-2-9(a), (e) (West 1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.025(3) (Michie 1992); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.art. 905.3 (West 1984); Md. Ann. Codeart. 27, §§ 413(d), (8, (g) (1957); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-103 (1993); State v. Stewart (Neb. 1977) 250 N.W.2d 849, 863: State v. Simants (Neb. 1977) 250 N.W.2d 881, 888-90; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 175.554(3) (Michie 1992); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-3 (Michie 1990); Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04 (Page's 1993); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 971 1(c)(1)(iii) (1982); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-3-20(A), (c) (Law. Co-op 1992); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-27A-5 (1988); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(f (1991);

  3. PEOPLE v. SOUZA (MATTHEW ARIC)

    Appellant's Opening Brief

    Filed January 18, 2005

    °©° Only California and four otherstates (Florida, Missouri, Montana, and New Hampshire) fail to statutorily address the matter. California law as interpreted by this Court does not require that a reasonable doubt standard be used during anypart ofthe penalty phase ofa %6 See Ala. Code, § 13A-5-45(e) (1975); Ark. Code Ann., § 5-4-603(Michie 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 16-11-104-1.3-1201(1)(d) (West2002); Del. Code Ann.tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)a.1. (2002); Ga. Code Ann., §17-10-30(c) (Harrison 1990); Idaho Code, § 19-2515(3)(b) (2003);Ill.

  4. PEOPLE v. BRYANT

    Appellant, Stanley Bryant, Opening Brief

    Filed December 16, 2004

    Twenty-six states require that factors relied on to impose death in a penalty phase must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution, and three additional states have related provisions.'*” Only '47 See Ala. Code, § 13A-5-45(e) (1975); Ark. Code Ann., § 5-4-603 (Michie 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 16-11-104-1.3-1201(1)(d) (West 2002); Del. Code Ann.tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)a.1. (2002); Ga. Code Ann., § 17-10-30(c) (Harrison 1990); Idaho Code, § 19-2515(3)(b) (2003); ILL. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, para. 9-1(f) (Smith-Hurd 1992); Ind. Code Ann., §§ 35-50-2- 9(a), (e) (West 1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 532.025(3) (Michie 1992); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., art. 905.3 (West 1984); Md. Ann. Code, art. 27, §§ 413(d), (f), (g) (1957); Miss. Code Ann., § 99-19-103 (1993); Neb. Rev. \ (continued...) 543 California and four other states (Florida, Missouri, Montana, and New Hampshire) fail to statutorily address the matter.

  5. PEOPLE v. JONES (WILLIAM ALFRED)

    Appellant's Opening Brief

    Filed September 15, 2005

    85 2.00.ceceeee ee een aes 280 ~ CALJIC No. 8.88 2.00.ceceeee eens 183 CODE 21 U.S.C. § 84800ccceens 206 OTHER STATE STATUTES Ala. Code § 13A-5-45 000.ceeeen ees 193 Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-46, 47 2000.eens219 Ala. Code § 13A-5-53 2.teens 219, 223 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703 ........... 000. .000008, 193, 197, 219 Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-603 20.0000ees 193, 219 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-11-103 ........ 0.000.000.0000 ..0000. 193 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-46a ............0..0.0..00000.

  6. PEOPLE v. LOPEZ (JUAN M.)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed May 25, 2005

    “ Only. 45. See Ala. Code, § 13A-5-45(e) (1975); Ark. Code Ann., § 5-4- 603 (Michie 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 16-11-104-1.3-1201(1)(d) (West 2002); Del. Code Ann.tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)a.1. (2002); Ga. Code Ann., § 17-10-30(c) (Harrison 1990); Idaho Code, § 19-2515(3)(b) (2003); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, para. 9-1(f) (Smith-Hurd 1992); Ind. Code Ann., §§ 35-50-2-9(a), (e) (West 1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 532.025(3) (Michie 1992); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.art. 905.3 (West 1984); Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §§ 413(d), (f), (g) (1957); Miss. Code Ann., § 99-19-103 (1993); Neb. Rev.Stat., § 29-2520(4)(f) (2002) ; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 175.554(3) (Michie 1992); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(a); N.M.Stat.

  7. RENO ON H.C.

    Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

    Filed May 10, 2004

    However, this heightened standard is employed for matters of much less importance to an individual than life or death,i.e., being committed to a mental hospital or having a conservator appointed to managehis or her affairs. In fact, California’s failure to provide any standard of proof for aggravating or ** See Ala. Code §13A-5-45(e) (1975); Ark. Code Ann. §5-4-603 (Michie 1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16-11-103(d) (West 1992); Del. Code Ann.tit. 11, §4209(d) (1) (a) (1992); Ga. Code Ann. §17-10-3-(c) (Harrison 1990); Idaho Code §19-2515(g) (1993); Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, para. 9- 1(f) (Smith-Hurd 1992); Ind. Code Ann. §35-50-2-9(a), (e) (West 1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §532.025(3) (Michie 1992); La. Code Crm.Proc. Ann., art. 905.3 (West 1984); Md. Ann. Code, art. 27, §413(d), (f), (g) (1957); Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-103 (1993); State v. Stewart, 250 N.W.2d 849, 863 (Neb. 1977); State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881, 888-890 (Neb. 1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §175.554(3) (Michie 1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-20A-3 (Michie 1993); Ohio Rev. Code §2929.04 (Page's 1993); Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 21, $701.11 (West 1993); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §9711(c)(1)Gii) (1982); S.C. Code Ann. §16-3-20(A), (c) (Law Co-op 1992); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §23A-27A-5 (1988); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-204(f) (1991); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. §37.07