consecutive determinate term of 10 years for each personaluse ofa firearm allegation (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); on _ count XV, attempted murder (§§ 664/187), a consecutive indeterminate term of 39 yearsto life pursuant to the Three Strikes Law,plus a consecutive term of 25 yearsto life for the personal discharge of a firearm allegation (§ 12022.53, subd.(d)); on count XVUI, carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), a consecutive indeterminate term of 27 yearsto life pursuant to the Three Strikes Law, plus a consecutive determinate term of 10 years for the personaluse ofa firearm allegation (§ 12022.53, subd.(b)); and on count XXII, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664/187), a consecutive indeterminate term of 45 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes Law, plus an additional indeterminate term of25 years tolife for the personal discharge ofa firearm allegation (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). (ICT 15-20; 2RTS 510-512.) The court stayed imposition of the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) associated with count XXII. (ICT 15; 2CT 442-444; 2RTS 510-511.) The court further imposed and stayed sentence pursuant to section 654 on the remaining counts and allegations.

A multiple murder special circumstance” allegation was attached to counts one, two, and three, pursuantto sections 190.2, subdivision (a)(3). Firearm enhancements werealso attached to counts one through four pursuant to sections 12022.7, 12022.53(a)(b)(c)(d) and 12022.5(a)(1), and a great bodily injury enhancement wasattached to count five pursuant to section 12022.7(a). (1CT 63-68.)

Mr. Bell filed a Traverse on September 25, 2014. On November 12, 2014, this Court issued an order directing that a 1 The Information also alleged that Mr. Bell personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon — a knife — within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022(b), and as to count two, that Mr. Bell personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.7. 1 CT 15-16. Judge of the San Diego Superior Court be selected to sit as a referee to take evidence and makefindingsof fact on the following questions: 1) Did Juror M.H.discuss the jury’s deliberations, or any other aspect of the case, with her husband during her service as a juror? 2) If so, when did the conversation or conversations occur? 3) What information or advice, if any, did M.H.’s husband give M.H.? 4) Did M.H.tell Juror P.R. about a conversation between M.H. and her husband? 5) If so, when and what did M.H.

(See People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146,1166-67 ({court must instruct that great bodily injury enhancement requires general intent}). Further, the plain language of the statute (Penal Code § 12022.7(g)), states that the great bodily injury enhancement“shall not apply to ... manslaughter.” (People v. Beltran (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693, 696; see generally United States v. Santos (2008) 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 [federal constitutional right to notice embodiedin “[t]he rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal statutes to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them”]; Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 353 [federal due process right precludes court from retroactively expanding reach ofa state statute]; but see People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1329-35).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE On September 18, 2008, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code (WIC) section 602,alleging that appellant assaulted Joe C. in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The petition also alleged that appellant personally inflicted great bodily injury on Joe C., in violation of Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Finally it was alleged, pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(c), that appellant committed the assault for the benefit of a criminalstreet gang. (CT1-3.)

CT 655-65. Further, it was alleged as to Counts VIII-XI that Petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury on each of three identified victims, within the meaning of section 12022.7, making each count a serious felony within the meaning of section 1192.7(c)(8). CT 662-65.