(IRTS 224-225.) The prosecutor also presented evidence which demonstrated that appellant had five prior felony convictions, including convictions for attempted residential burglary (§§ 664/459), possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350), cocaine sales (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352), robbery (§ 211), and second degree burglary (§ 459). (2CT 332; see CAT 816-850.) In addition, appellant had pleaded guilty to nearly one dozen armed robberiesprior to the guilt phase trial.

Whatever be our views on the wisdom ofthe Legislature's chosen delineation of the mental state necessary for robbery, the separation ofpowers clause (Cal. Const., art. IL, § 3) prohibits this court from abolishing the claim-of-right defense altogether on policy grounds, as such would effectively alter a statutorily defined element of that offense by judicialfiat. The Legislature of course remains free to amend section 211 to preclude a claim-of-right defense in robbery prosecutions. The question whether such amendment would better reflect sound public policy is one properly addressed to that body rather than to this court.

[Citing People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 792; People v. Morlock (1956) 46 Cal.2d 141, 146; People v. Sanchez (1950) 35 Cal.2d 522, 526.]” (People v. Butler, supra, 65 Cal.2d at 573.) Moreover, People v. Tufunga (1998) 21 Cal.4th 935 reaffirmedButler's rejection of Justice Mosk’s position by holding that the legislative history of Penal Code § 211 “plainly reflects the Legislature’s intent to incorporate the commonlaw claim-of-right defense as part and parcel of the animusfurandi [intent to steal] element found in the current robbery statute.” (People v. Tufunga, 21 Cal.4th at 947; see also People v. Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 1183-84 [recognizing incorporation of common law in the statute defining theft (Penal Code § 484)].)

While petitioner was entitled to a reduction of his grand theft conviction to a misdemeanor and to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, the People were also entitled to move to withdraw the plea bargain as a result of being substantially deprived of its benefits including a six year sentence. Petitioner fails to demonstrate the respondent court erred in granting the People’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea and reinstate the robbery charge under Penal Code section 211. (People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 215; People v. Nitschmann (2010) 182 7 Cal.App.4" 705, 707-710.)”pp The third justice separately wrote: “I would grant an order to show cause to decide this issue, which is one of statewide importance.”

In count3, appellant was charged with murdering Patelin the first degree (§ 187, subd. (a)) on May 26, 1997, and it was alleged that appellant: personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)); committed the murder while engaged in the commission of the crime of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)); and committed the murder while engagedin the crime of kidnapping (§ 190.2, _ sub. (a)(17)). In count 4, appellant was charged with robbing Patel in the second degree (§ 211), and it was alleged that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). In count 5, appellant was charged with kidnapping Patel (§ 207, subd.(a)), and it was alleged that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). (2CT 407-409.)

a a II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 12, 1992, the San Diego County District Attorney filed an Information charging Mr. Bell with the murder of Johnny Joseph Anderson, pursuant to Penal Code § 187(a) [count one], and first degree robbery, pursuant to Penal Code §§ 211 and 212.5 [count two]. 1 Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) 15-17.

(9 RT 2007.) On October 16, 2001, appellant was found guilty on all counts: Count 1, murder, in violation of Penal Code Section 187; Count 2, the murder was committed while engaged in a robbery,a violation of Penal Code Section 211; Count 3, first degree burglary, a violation of Penal Code Section 459 and 460; and Count4, taking of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code Section 10851. (15 RT 3688-3689.)

m Vitae 127 Declaration of Dr. Kathy Pezdek, Ph.D.; Curriculum Vitae 128 Declaration of Kenton S. Wong, M.A., Curriculum Vitae 129 Declaration of Pablo Stewart, M.D.; Curriculum Vitae 130 Declaration of Craig Haney, Ph.D., J.D.; Curriculum Vitae; Appendix of Declarations Pages PE 1152 - 1193 PE 1194 - 1216 PE 1217 - 1227 PE 1228 - 1286 PE 1287 - 1431 V72377019.1 xlvii A/723770 I 9 I xlvifi TO THE HONORABLE RONALD M. GEORGE, CHIEF JUSTICE OF CALIFORNIA, AND TO THE HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA: Petitioner, ABELINO MANRIQUEZ ("Petitioner"), by and through undersigned counsel, petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and by this verified petition alleges as follows: I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 1. By information filed April 26, 1991, in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Petitioner was charged with seven counts of murder under section 187, subdivision (a) (Counts I-VII), three counts of attempted residential robbery under California Penal Code sections 211 and 664 (Counts VIII-X), and one count of residential burglary under section 459 (Count XI).' CT 653-66.

He was convicted of felony grand theft, impositionof sentence was suspended and he was placed on felony probation, including a condition that he serve a six month sentence to the Contra Costa County Jail. Exh. 239. On December30, 1971, Juror Ary was charged with seven counts of Robbery in violation of Pen. Code § 211 in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Exh. 240.

In Breed v. Jones, as in appellant’s case, a petition wasfiled under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The seventeen-year-old minor wasalleged in a petition filed in 1971'* to have committed acts “which,if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of robbery in violation of California Penal Code section 211.” (Breed v. Jones, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 521.)