21.) Statutory embodiments of competency requirements in other common-law jurisdictions are also instructive: under Canadian law, for example, “unfit to stand trial” is defined as “unable on accountofmental disorder to conduct a defence at any stage of the proceedings before a verdict is rendered or to instruct counsel to do so, and, in particular, unable on account ofmental disorder to (a) understand the nature or object ofthe “8 Available at 90 proceedings, (b) understand the possible consequencesofthe proceedings, or (c) communicate with counsel.” (Criminal Code, R.S.C. s. 2. (1985) (Can.); cf. California Pen. Code §1367 (a) [incompetence defined only as “unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedingsorto assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner’”].).

First jurors were advisedthat “concealment by ambush”or “someother secret design” would suffice, “even though the victim is aware of the murderer’s presence.” (CALJIC 8.81.15 at § 2.) However, in the fifth paragraph appellant’s jurors were told that a “mere concealment of purpose”is not sufficient.

In appellant’s case, his murder conviction — although involving moral turpitude — had no direct bearing on his honesty or integrity, and thus its probative value on his credibility was limited. 2’ His burglary conviction wassimilarly limited in probative value, because(as the trial court conceded) the court did not know whether it was for entry with intent to commit larceny, a theft-related crime, or with intent to commit some other crime, both of which constitute burglary under California Penal Code section 459, 2¥ Onthe prejudicial effect side, an equally important factor is whetherthe prior conviction is for the same or similar conduct as the 20. Cf. People v. Woodard, supra, 23 Cal. 3d at 340: “The voluntary manslaughter conviction established the commission of a violent act, which may, at the most, have indicated a character for violence...It cannot be inferred from the commission of a violent act that he wasalso disposedto falsify.”

. . . . . . . . 253,258-260 Brown v. Louisiana (1980)447U.S.323 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 Brown v. Sanders (2006)546U.S.212 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Buchanan v. Angelone (1998)522U.S.269 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Burger v. Kemp (1987)483U.S.776 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143,269 Bush v. Gore (2000)531U.S.98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Cage v. Louisiana (1990)498U.S.39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Calhe l l v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim California v. Roy (1996)519U.S.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 California v. Trombetta (1984)467U.S.479 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Campbell v. Blodgett (9th Cir. 1992) 997 F.2d 512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Carella v. California (1989)491U.S.263 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Carter v. Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (1981)450U.S.288 244 xvi Chapman v. California (1 967) 386 U.S. 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Charfauros v. Board of Elections (9th Cir. 2001) 249 F.3d 941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -263 Clemons v. Mississippi (1990) 494 U.S. 738 . . . . .

See Stats. 1993, c. 611, §§ 4, 4.5, 6. In 1981, the Legislature, as part of a general rejection of the diminished capacity defense, eliminated two mental state defenses previously available in first- degree murder cases. 1981 Cal. Stat. 404, §§ 2, 7 (codified as amended at Cal. Pen. Code §§ 22, 189).

The information further alleged, as an enhancement, that the offenses were committed for the benefit of a street gang with the intent to promote criminal conduct by gang members, within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b). Unless otherwise indicated all statutory references are to the California Penal Code. 2 The information further alleged three special circumstances. It was alleged that the murders were racially motivated within meaning of Penal Code section 190.2(a) (16).

The prosecution's theory was that Bryant's2 family operated a large-scale narcotics organization, which employed the other defendants. The victims were 1 Unless otherwise indicated all statutory references are to the California Penal Code. 2 Many of the people involved in the case are members of the Bryant and Settle families. Several witnesses, not related to appellant, also had the last name "Smith."