(Slip op. at 15.) This mandate violates C.C.P. § 1094.5(f) by controlling and limiting the discretion of ERCOM. 2. The Opinion Below Supplants The Obligation Of The County And The Union To Bargain The Court of Appeal’s decision imposes on the County and the 50 Union an opt-out procedure that neither party requested and that does not allow the parties to negotiate an alternative.

Once complete, quasi-judicial peer review is subject to judicial review for factual, as well as legal, error. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subds. (b) & (d).

Neighborhood Ass'n. v. City of Los Angeles ("W. Chandler"), 198 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1517-1518 (2011), citing Topanga Ass'n. for a Scenic Community v. City and County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal.3d 506, 515 (1974). Where the issue “is whether a fair administrative hearing was conducted, the independent judgment test [applies] ... and the court is empowered to render its independent judgment on the basis of the administrative record plus such additional evidence" as may be admitted under Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 1094.5(e). Nightlife Partners v. City of Beverly Hills, 108 Cal.App.4th 81, 89 (2003) (citation omitted).

Neighborhood Ass'n. v. City of Los Angeles ("W. Chandler"), 198 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1517-1518 (2011), citing Topanga Ass'n. for a Scenic Community v. City and County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal.3d 506, 515 (1974). Where the issue “is whether a fair administrative hearing was conducted, the independent judgment test [applies] ... and the court is empowered to render its independent judgment on the basis of the administrative record plus such additional evidence" as may be admitted under Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 1094.5(e). Nightlife Partners v. City of Beverly Hills, 108 Cal.App.4th 81, 89 (2003) (citation omitted).

Here, the City Council took (1) legislative action to adopt the Ordinance and (2) quasi- adjudicatory action to apply it to OBOT, as reflected in its adoption of the Resolution. Such quasi-adjudicatory actions, regularly memorialized in resolutions, are commonly reviewed under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5, in which the deferential substantial evidence test applies. See, e.g., McGill, 44 Cal.App.4th at 1785-86 (1996).

Jd. at 1496. See also Rossco Holdings Incorporated v. State, 212 Cal. App. 3d 642, 654, 656 (1989) (following Pfeiffer and McDougal and noting that the owner “never petitioned for an administrative writ ofmandate as required by section 30801 and Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5”). Thestark contrast between these cases and the procedure followed here by the Homeowners again supportsthetrial court’s finding that there has been no waiverofthe right to challenge the conditions.

5 is only appropriate to challenge an administrative order “made as the result of a proceeding in which by law [(1)] a hearing is required to be given, [(2)] evidence is required to be taken, and [(3)] discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal.” Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(a); see Winkelman v. City of Tiburon, 32 Cal.App.3d 834, 840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).

What is more, an APA claim does not furnish plaintiffs with a broader opportunity to develop their claim, because it is reviewed on the basis of an administrative record, as is the proposed state-law remedy. 5 U.S.C. § 706; Cal. Code Civ. P. §§ 1094.5, 1094.6.

Strumsky v. San Diego Cnty. Employees Ret. Assn., 11 Cal.3d 28, 35 fn. 2 (1974). Also, because the issue is whether substantial evidence supported the City’s decision to apply the Ordinance—following the requisite hearing, the taking of evidence, and the City’s exercise of discretion—OBOT’s claim is akin to a petition for writ of mandate to reverse a quasi-judicial decision under Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 1094.5. McGill v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 44 Cal.App.4th 1776, 1785-86 (1996) (where a hearing was required, evidence was required to be taken, and discretion in determining the facts was vested in the agency, the courts evaluate whether the quasi-judicial decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record). Indeed, the DA provides that it may be enforced by mandate, injunctive relief or specific performance.

(See Notice ofAppeal at 1; Appellant’s App. 131.) In all other respects SBCERA complied with the judgment, including by paymentofthe retroactive pension benefits to which Plaintiff Flethez 3 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5 (West Supp. 2015). * Cal. Gov’t Code § 31724 (West 2008) [hereinafter section 31724 or § 31724]. had been found by the Superior Court to be entitled. (See Return to Writ of Mandate at 2; Appellant’s App. 61.)