A PAG’s desire to obtain the private contact information in order to expand an unsubstantiated putative class action is not a compelling State interest warranting a forfeiture of California’s touted privacy rights. Given California’s numerousandproliferating privacy statutes, this Supreme Court has ample reason to temper sweepinglitigation demandsfor private information based on unsubstantiated allegations pled underthe toothless requirement of California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The solution to balancing California’s right to privacy with the ever- present potential for discovery abuse is the very “phased discovery”plan proposed bythe Trial Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the subject case.

According to the Court of Appeal, “[a]t this nascent stage of plaintiff's PAGA action there has as yet been no discovery—plaintiff has not even sat for his deposition...[n]owhere does he evince any knowledge of the practices of Marshalls at other stores, nor any fact that would lead a * Section 128.7 requires that an attorney has the responsibility, when filing any court pleading, including a complaint, to validate that “... the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7(b)(3)). -10- reasonable person to believe he knows whether Marshalls has a uniform statewide policy.

.............................................................................................................2 California Civil Code § 1599 ............................................................................................................................................8 § 1670.5(a).....................................................................................................................................8 California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7(b)(2)..................................................................................................................................6 § 128.7(b)(3)..................................................................................................................................6 Case 3:17-cv-00152-VC Document 81 Filed 11/14/17 Page 5 of 18 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Case No. 3:17-cv-05052-VC REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT FRITO-LAY INC.’S MOTION TO (1) COMPEL ARBITRATION AND (2) STAY THIS ACTION I. INTRODUCTION Defendant Frito-Lay, Inc. (“Frito-Lay”) asks the Court to order Plaintiff Marcus Chism (“Chism”) to arbitrate his claims pursuant to the terms of his arbitration agreement and, via a separate motion, to transfer the balance of the class action to the Eastern District of Texas. Chism signed an arbitration agreement with Frito-Lay enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (“FAA”) and agreed to arbi