In Freeman Investments, LP v. Pacific Life Insurance Co., No. 09-55513, 2013 WL 11884 (9th Cir. Jan 2, 2013), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”) precluded plaintiffs’ class claims for violations of California Business & Professions Code § 17200, but did not preclude plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. The Court held that the Section 17200 claims were predicated on alleged misrepresentations and omissions, whereas the contract claims were not.

Plaintiff claimed that Citibank wrongfully reported the past due balance to the consumer reporting agencies ruining his credit and causing his name to be removed from his mortgage loan application. Plaintiff filed suit and alleged statutory violations of California Civil Code § 1785.25 and California Business and Professional Code § 17200. Plaintiff also alleged a common law claim for negligence.

Despite this, he continued to be assigned new cases. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to create a dispute of fact about whether he should have been transferred to another unit with less stressors.Practical Implications: When an employer knows that an employee is disabled, they may need to engage in an interactive process with the employee to determine whether accommodations should be provided to enable the employee to perform the essential job functions, and whether non-essential job functions should be modified or eliminated.Esparza v. Safeway, Inc., 36 Cal. App. 5th 42, 247 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875 (2019)Summary: Employer’s policy of not paying meal period premiums does not provide basis to seek restitution under California Business and Professions Code section 17200 without evidence that employer failed to provide meal periods.Facts: In 2007, plaintiffs filed a class action suit against defendant Safeway alleging that it failed to provide meal periods to its retail employees throughout California, and failed to pay one-hour premiums to employees when due. Plaintiffs brought claims under California Labor Code section 226.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and held that complaints filed by various state entitles against PG&E under Cal. Business & Professions Code Section 17200 were exempt from removal to Bankruptcy Court under 28 USC Section 1452(a).In 2002, the California Attorney General and the City and County of San Francisco filed separate actions against PG&E alleging violations of section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code.

t case, the employer should notify the person, upon moving to California, that any prohibited clause or covenant in a preexisting agreement is void.In addition, employers using such provisions applicable to California employees should immediately discontinue doing so. Employers should cease attempting to enforce any unlawful noncompete provision. Employers based outside of California should note that it is a violation of the California Labor Code to attempt to avoid California’s noncompete restrictions by applying the law of another state to a contract with an employee in California.Consequences for NoncomplianceSB 699 authorizes civil actions for actual damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees by employees or prospective employees required to sign an unlawful agreement or against whom the employer seeks to enforce such an agreement. In addition, AB 1076 states that the failure to provide the required notice by February 14, 2024, “constitutes an act of unfair competition” under California Business and Professions Code section 17200. This means that if an employee or former employee sues and prevails under this provision, the court may award the plaintiff “equitable remedies,” including injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties. A prevailing plaintiff potentially may also be entitled to recover attorneys’ fees. The injunction would just be an order requiring compliance with the law. Restitution could include any monetary benefit the employer received based on failing to comply with the notification requirement.In addition, for any violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200, the State of California, any District Attorney within the State, and certain County Counsel and City Attorneys, may seek a civil penalty of up to $2,500 for “each violation.” The civil penalty is mandatory if the court finds a violation. These penalties can mount quickly, especially considering that employers typically put the same provisions in contracts with many employees. As one example of how these penalties can moun

Can an organization sue you simply because it chose to divert resources to respond to your allegedly unfair business practices by claiming your practices are a perceived threat to its mission? The California Supreme Court just opened the door to such lawsuits in California Medical Association v. Aetna Health of California Inc., Cal. 5th, 2023 WL 4553703, 2023 Cal. LEXIS 4100 (July 17, 2023) (“CMA”).California’s Business and Professions Code aims to prevent unfair competition that harms both consumers and competitors by banning “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. This law, commonly referred to as the “unfair competition law” (“UCL” or “Section 17200”), sweeps broadly. But in 2004, California voters approved a ballot initiative known as Proposition 64, which limited the private actors who may enforce the UCL to those who have “suffered an injury in fact” and “lost money or property as a result of” the challenged business practice. In other words, only individuals who could meet this heightened level of standing could sue under the UCL, and businesses could no longer be targeted by someone who was not harmed as a result of the alleged misconduct.But what about suits by an organization? Can an organization sue on behalf of its members or those whom it served who may have been harmed by a business practice? After Proposition 64 passed, the answer was “no.” An organization cannot sue under section 17200 unless it can allege, and ultimately prove, that it can meet the heightened standing requirements of the UCL. That led the California Supreme Cour

See Diane Bartz & David Shepardson, Reuters, U.S. Says Google Breakup May Be Needed to End Violations of Antitrust Law (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSL1N2HB0EX?il=0. Carroll v. Google LLC, No. 3:20-cv-07379 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2020) (alleging violations of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1) and the antitrust laws of more than 20 states); Herrera v. Google LLC, No. 5:20-cv-07365 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2020) (alleging violations of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2) and California Cartwright Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16700 et seq.)); McNamara v. Google, LLC, No. 5:20-cv-07361 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2020) (alleging violations of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2) and California Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.)). Pure Sweat Basketball, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 5:20-cv-05792 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2020) (alleging violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3, 15, 26), California Cartwright Act (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16700 et seq.) and California Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.)).

On March 16, 2017, a class action lawsuit was filed in San Francisco against Ivanka Trump Marks, LLC.Modern Appealing Clothing v. Ivanka Trump Marks, LLC, Cal. Sup. Ct, County of San Francisco, Case No. CGC-17-557575. The lawsuit provides an opportunity to review the basics of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200), which enjoins business practices that are “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent” and explore the statute’s outer limits.The Claim Against Ivanka Trump Marks, LLC The gravamen of the claim is that Ms. Trump’s company is using the power and prestige of her father’s position to sell her products and promote her brands, thereby unfairly competing with other women’s clothing and accessories companies.

mercial UDAAP statute provides that covered providers making such determinations may rely on written representations by the business entity as to its location, business size, and primary purpose.UDAAP ProhibitionsIn its new regulation prohibiting UDAAP in connection with commercial financing, the DFPI provides definitions as to what acts and practices are deemed either unfair, deceptive, or abusive. These definitions are substantively similar to those applicable to consumer transactions under the federal Consumer Financial Protection Act, but also include acts that would be deemed unfair or deceptive under California’s unfair competition law.An act or practice is unfair if either:(a) the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to covered entities; (b) the injury is not reasonably avoidable by covered entities; and (c) the injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to covered entities or to competition; orthe act or practice is unfair in accordance with California Business and Professions Code section 17200 and the case law thereunder.An act or practice, including a representation or omission, is deceptive if either:(a) the act or practice misleads or is likely to mislead the covered entity; (b) the covered entity's interpretation of the act or practice is reasonable under the circumstances; and (c) the act or practice is material; orthe act or practice is deceptive in accordance with California Business and Professions Code section 17200 and the case law thereunder.An act or practice is abusive if either:the act or practice materially interferes with the ability of a covered entity to understand a term or condition of commercial financing or another financial product or service; orthe act or practice takes unreasonable advantage of: (a) a lack of understanding on the part of the covered entity of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the commercial financing or other financial product or service; (b) the inability of the covered entity to protect its interests in selecting or usin

located abroad. Companies should also carefully assess their worldwide corporate activities (including activities of their customers and suppliers) before making affirmative statements about their products and business operations.BackgroundTwo recent decisions in the Ninth Circuit demonstrate the continued litigation risk that corporations face from alleged involvement in human rights violations abroad. First, in Doe v. Cisco Systems, 2023 WL 4386005 (9th Cir. July 7, 2023), the Ninth Circuit refused to dismiss claims against Cisco alleging aiding and abetting liability under the Alien Tort Statute related to the use of Cisco's technology abroad to violate human rights. And, in Falcone, v. Nestle USA, Inc., 2023 WL 4551083 (S.D. Cal. July 13, 2023), the District Court for the Southern District of California denied a motion to dismiss a putative class action asserting violations of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. and the Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq., alleging that Nestle falsely labelled its chocolate products as environmentally and socially responsible despite Nestle's having bought cocoa from farms that use child labor.These cases, arising in different areas of substantive law, highlight the continued U.S. litigation risk, especially in the Ninth Circuit, corporations face related to alleged human rights violations abroad.Doe v. Cisco: Ninth Circuit allows suit under Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act to proceedOn July 7, 2023, the Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court's dismissal of aiding and abetting claims under the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") against Cisco Systems, Inc. for alleged use of its technology by Chinese authorities to persecute Falun Gong practitioners. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Doe, 2023 WL 4386005 at *1. Falun Gong is a religious movement whose practitioners allegedly have been tortured and placed in labor camps by the Chinese government. Id. at *3. Plaintiffs allege that Cisco developed the "